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RUDOLF EUCKEN AND THE SPIRITUAL LIFE

By

MADAME MARGARET M. MAC SWINEY
RELIGIOUS OF CHRISTIAN EDUCATION

A DISSERTATION

*Submitted to the Catholic University of America
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy*

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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To the Memory
of
Our Revered and Beloved Mother Deplanck
and of
My Dear Parents

PREFACE

The reaction against the materialism of the last half century has found an energetic supporter in the Professor of Philosophy of Jena University, Rudolf Eucken, who is proclaiming over three continents—directly or through his students—that the corner-stone of all philosophical thought and the axiom of axioms is the fact of a world-embracing spiritual life. “So ist der Angelpunkt aller philosophischen Betrachtung und das Axiom der Axiome die Tatsache eines weltumspannenden Geisteslebens.”¹

Eucken will not accept any spiritualistic system already propounded. He rejects Scholasticism on many grounds, the most oft repeated being that of *naïveté*, and challenges its advocates, if they still hold it to be the “one permanent foundation of the search after truth,” to prove their position. He has brought forward a new theory, which he has named *Activism*, proposing therein new conceptions of the spiritual and of truth and a new method of reaching both.

A close study of Eucken's philosophy has convinced us that it does not offer a rational interpretation of the universe. Eucken insists on the practical and moral sides of philosophy, laying special stress on the necessity for action, but, claiming that his aim is pedagogical, not speculative, he has left us with irreconcilable contradictions. On the one hand the advocate of *Activism* rises to a sublime height of moral eloquence, on the other he gives an exposition of the Supreme Spiritual Being which destroys the basis of morality. He asserts emphatically the unchangeableness of truth, yet states that he is “at one with the main atmosphere of Pragmatism.” Hence his system contains elements which are essentially incompatible. His antagonism to Catholic philosophy, and in particular to the Scholastic theory, seems to be the main cause of this result. He has, in fact, been caught on the horns of his own “Entweder-Oder.” *Either*, acknowledging the truth of the spiritual life, Eucken must acknowledge the grounds on which it rests, *Or*, denying the grounds, he must, thereby, deny the possibility of a philosophy of the spiritual—and even of the existence of a spiritual reality.

¹ Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart, 4te Aufl., Leipzig, 1913, p. 97.

The main purpose of this dissertation is to show the inconsistency of Eucken's position and to answer his challenge to Scholasticism. We have examined his philosophy chiefly from the standpoint of Epistemology, since the theory of knowledge is the core of his system. *Activism* stands or falls with the validity and objective value of an "immediacy" of higher knowledge. We have, however, followed out to some extent the implications of his conception of the *Geistesleben* and have thus touched on other aspects. In the Final Note we have directed attention to certain points that call for further criticism, in particular Eucken's failure to draw a sufficiently sharp distinction between conscience and other manifestations of spiritual activity, e.g., art; and his inconsistent attitude towards the Person of Christ.

Throughout our treatment we have endeavored to make the citations sufficiently numerous and extensive to enable one otherwise unfamiliar with Eucken's work to test the appreciation here set forth by direct reference to the sources. Moreover, we have refrained, in most instances, from all criticism of individual passages in the course of the exposition. Our aim has been to judge the central conceptions—the *Geistesleben* and the *Gemüt*—as wholes, and for this reason some side issues have been passed over. In dealing with Scholasticism we have not unfolded the theory in all its details, but merely so far as was necessary to repel Eucken's attack. We have sought to show that the system which he rejects is intelligible in its concepts, consistent in its exposition and in harmony with the universally recognized signification of the term "spiritual." An examination of the philosophy of the spiritual seemed to demand a preliminary inquiry into the concept: this has been made in Part I. The plan of the entire dissertation follows.

PLAN

This dissertation is divided into three distinct though related parts:

Part I treats of the Concept of the Spiritual. We have considered,

- 1 its profound influence on human life;
- 2 the earliest sources of our knowledge of it;
- 3 its implication;
- 4 the method of attaining it.

A word of apology may be needed for the brief historical survey made in Chapter II: its purpose is to show that the concept of the spiritual has had a definite kernel of meaning for over two thousand years; that the sources through which it entered the philosophy of the West, and which are today as reachable as in the time of Anaxagoras, Plato and Aristotle, hinder us from arbitrarily changing its signification, from trying to affix "new" meanings to a time-honored word.

In this connection we have pointed out in Chapter III that Eucken is unphilosophical in using the term "spiritual life" to include "incomparably more than is represented by the customary conception of that life." (*Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, p. 240.)

In Chapter IV we have called attention to the difference between the intellectualistic and the anti-intellectualistic theories of knowledge.

Part II, the Main Thesis, deals with Eucken's Philosophy of the Spiritual Life. We have examined,

- 1 the "new" method of *Activism* and found it untrustworthy;
- 2 the "new" conception of the spiritual life and found it a self-contradiction;
- 3 the "new" idea of truth and found it an irrational belief: we have further considered
- 4 the problem of nature—a vital point in a philosophy of the spiritual. We have found Eucken's treatment of it to be confused, pessimistic and inconsistent, constituting an insuperable obstacle to any real philosophy of the spiritual.

We therefore reject the system which Eucken has put forward to supplant Scholasticism.

Part III deals with the "Permanent Foundation" of a Philosophy of the Spiritual.

We have sought, by a fair and careful exposition of the Scholastic teaching with regard to the method of knowledge, the idea of truth and the nature of the First Cause, to re-establish firmly the foundations of the spiritual life and of knowledge which *Eucken's theory would completely shatter*. We have examined in

- 1 the question of truth—"immediacies:" we have sought to show that only in an intellectualistic theory is an "immediacy" trustworthy; in
- 2 the nature of truth is unfolded; in
- 3 the nature of the Absolute Spiritual Life; in
- 4 Eucken's challenge is investigated and the answer pointed out.

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PART I

THE CONCEPT OF THE SPIRITUAL

In which the importance, source and implication of this concept are considered, and the method of attaining it is discussed.

CHAPTER I

IMPORTANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF THE SPIRITUAL

History seems to justify the statement that no other idea in the range of philosophic thought has been the cause of such fierce and bitter contest as the concept of the Spiritual; and no other tenet has been the ground of such unrelenting persecution in the sphere of religion. Martyrs of the Old and the New Law have died for the Spiritual, but so also did the philosopher of the Spiritual, Socrates, as he himself reveals to us.

“Quid ergo aiunt accusatores mei? . . . Socrates iniuste agit . . . ac deos, quos civitas putat, ipse non putans”² . . . etc.

“Si me nunc absolvatis . . . si, inquam, ad haec vos ita dicatis: O, Socrates, Anyto non credimus, teque sententiis nostris absolvimus, hac tamen conditione, ut nunquam posthac in hac inquisitione philosophiaque veriseris: ac si id facere [deprehendere, mortem obeas] si igitur, ut dicebam, his conditionibus demittere me velitis, respondebo utique vobis: O Viri Athenienses, diligo vos equidem atque amo; *Deo tamen parere malo, quam vobis et quamdiu spirabo viresque suppetent, philosophari non desinam*, exhortans et docens quemcunque nactus fuero, sicut soleo, hunc in modum: Quid tu, o vir optime, cum civis sis Atheniensis, civitatis amplissimae, ac sapientia ac potentia praestantissimae, non erubescis in eo omnem operam ponere, quo tibi pecuniarum et gloriae et honoris quam plurimum sit? Ut autem prudentia et veritas, et optimus animi habitus in te sit, neque cogitas, neque curas? . . . O Viri Athenienses, profiteor equidem, sive credatis Anyto, sive non credatis, sive dimiseritis me, sive non dimiseritis, profiteor, me nihil aliud esse facturum, *nec si mihi sit pluries moriendum.*”³

The prominent place which this idea holds is thus due to the tremendous issues bound up with it. Every normal man whether Jew or Gentile, Pagan or Christian, Deist or Theist, whether unlettered or learned, has, at least once in his life, turned philosopher. We can give no direct proof of this statement, but introspection will, it seems to us, establish it beyond doubt for the

² Im. Bek. Platonis Dialogi; Apol. Socrates 19 and 24, Berolini, 1816, Pars I, Vol. II.

³ 29, 30, loc. cit. The italics are our own.

individual. The poet-philosopher, of all men and all time, has voiced this universal speculation:

“For in that sleep of death what dreams may come
When we have shuffled off this mortal coil,
Must give us pause.

. . . the dread of something after death,
The undiscover’d country from whose bourn
No traveller returns, puzzles the will,” . . .⁴

“But here, upon this bank and shoal of time,
We’d jump the life to come.”⁵

What we wish to bring out is the fact that philosophy and religion meet and cross on the territory of the Spiritual. No consistent upholder of Monotheism will accept a system of philosophy in which there is no place for the Spiritual; and no philosopher who upholds a spiritualistic system will accept a religion which offers him only anthropomorphic gods.⁶

The latest German exponent of the Spiritual says, in connection with this problem: “The issue at stake is the destiny of man, the reasonableness or otherwise of his existence, the gaining or losing of a soul.”⁷

But, though philosophy and religion deal here with the same reality, they do so from different standpoints, and the line of demarcation between the two fields is, in the main, clear, if narrow. An investigation into the Spiritual in philosophy will involve two distinct lines of inquiry: (1) an examination into the nature of the soul and its higher faculties of thinking and willing; (2) an examination into the nature of the First Cause. Furthermore, Ethics and Art, in so far as the one treats of the will, and the other deals with the objective expression of the intellectual love of the beautiful, fall, in large measure, under the philosophy of the spiritual. The

⁴ Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. I.

⁵ *Ibid.*, *Macbeth*, Act I, Sc. VII.

⁶ We need hardly point out the radical difference between a religion of anthropomorphic gods and the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation in time of the Second Person of the Blessed Trinity. The infinite dissimilarity between the Divine and the human nature *in se* is pointed out by St. Paul when he describes the Incarnation thus:

“But emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men.”—*Philippians*, Chap. II, Verse 7.

We make the reference, however, according to Catholic interpretation—not in the literal meaning which Kenoticists attribute to the words.

⁷ Rudolf Eucken, *Main Currents of Modern Thought*, trans. by Booth. New York, 1912, p. 113. *Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart*, op. cit., p. 81.

task is therefore clearly defined as soon as philosophy and the sciences exist, but previous to this it is mainly tentative. To confine oneself to the concept in philosophy, when searching for the *origin* of the idea of the spiritual in any country, would be as absurd as to insist on deciding the conditions of the earliest self-conscious states of the child by the mere observation of adult mental life. In both cases we must get back to the antecedents of the phenomena we are seeking to explain.

An examination of religious beliefs and of literature, or—in default of this latter—folklore, is imperative, in order to ascertain whether they offer any faint suggestions of elements of the spiritual. The conservative method of science has, here, to be abandoned, and the investigator must be willing to go from the alpha to the omega of the then existent knowledge—whether it be alleged to be of human or Divine origin—for the purpose of discovering the influences through which, in the course of ages, the idea appeared.

We cannot hold with Eucken that the origin of any form of the spiritual consisted in “little half-animal beginnings.”⁸ This would be to negative the concept *in toto*. That such is not Eucken’s intention, however, may be gathered from the following:

“Change (and with it evolution) is absolutely out of the question as far as the substance of spiritual life is concerned.”⁹

and again:

“If . . . spiritual life is a mere by-product of nature, there remains no possibility of providing a counter-poise for change and wresting a content from life; but humanity and the whole world with it are in headlong flight towards the nothingness which is their sole destination. Thus . . . it is *our attitude towards spiritual life*—more particularly the recognition or rejection of an independence on the part of spiritual life—*which decides the direction in which our thought must move.*”¹⁰

We cannot agree with the statement that any *real* beginning of any form of the spiritual came from matter, but we do hold that, in order to find the beginning in the *ideal* order, we must dig in the débris of old superstitions and pagan rites, and search out any particle of truth that may have been buried therein. If the quest should prove a complete failure as regards our special pursuit we have reason to suspect the existence of foreign influence.

⁸ Ibid., p. 262; Geistige Strömungen, p. 212.

⁹ Eucken, *ibid.*, p. 274; Geistige Strömungen, p. 223.

¹⁰ Eucken, *ibid.*, p. 278. The italics are Booth’s. Geistige Strömungen, p. 227.

CHAPTER II

SOURCE OF THE SPIRITUAL IN GREEK THOUGHT

From the preceding section it is evident that the implication of the concept of the spiritual is of the highest importance: it matters much to man what the spiritual does and does not mean. Before dealing, therefore, with a modern exposition of spiritual life it has seemed prudent to go back to the source of our first knowledge of the concept in philosophy, and inquire into its origin in Greek thought—the medium through which it has entered the modern world.¹¹

This will enable us to test more accurately and fairly the worth of new theories.

Ueberweg justly says that the extent to which the genesis of Greek philosophy was affected by Oriental influences is a problem the solution of which depends on the further progress of Oriental, and, especially, of Egyptological investigation.¹²

The discussion of the question does not fall here, but it is convenient to bring forward some views of it. Clement¹³ and Eusebius¹⁴ are vigorous advocates of a preponderating Jewish influence.

Clement writes:

*“Tempora autem eorum, qui fuerunt principes et auctores ipsorum philosophiae, sunt dicenda consequenter ut, facta comparatione, ostendamus Hebraeorum philosophiam fuisse generationibus multis antiquiorem;”*¹⁵

and again:

*“Philosophia ergo, res quaedam valide utilis, olim quidem floruit apud Barbaros, per gentes resplendens: postea autem venit etiam ad Graecos.”*¹⁶

The most forceful of Clement's arguments to the modern mind are his references to admissions by Greek philosophers of barbarian

¹¹ We have not to consider here the first trace of the concept in philosophy: We confine our investigation to Greek thought because this is the channel through which it has been directly communicated to us.

¹² *Geschichte der Phil.*, Berlin, 7te Aufl, 1866, p. 39; 8te Aufl., 1894.

¹³ *Opera*, Vol. I, *Stromatum*, Lib. I, Cap. XV, pp. 767 sqq. Migne ed. 1857.

¹⁴ *Praep. Evang.*, especially Lib. VIII, p. 587; Lib. XII, Cap. I, X, XVI, pp. 951 sqq.

¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, Cap. XIV, p. 766.

¹⁶ *Op. cit.*, Lib. I, Cap. XV, p. 778.

wisdom; e. g., to Plato, when, speaking through Socrates in the *Phaedo*, he says: "Magna quidem est . . . Graecia, o Cebes, ait ille, in qua sunt viri omni ex parte boni, multa sunt autem etiam genera barbarorum."¹⁷

Ueberweg, while maintaining that the Greeks met with no fully developed and completed philosophical systems among the Orientals, considers Oriental influence on early Greek thinkers to be not only possible, but, in some cases, most probable. He suggests that Anaxagoras possibly came in contact with Jews.¹⁸

Zeller reduces foreign influence to a minimum, and attributes Greek Philosophy, almost exclusively, to the peculiar characteristics of Greek genius.¹⁹

Burnet²⁰ treats the subject with a touch of scorn, and suggests that the first question to be settled is whether any pre-Hellenic philosophy existed. He thinks not. On the remark of Noumenios, "What is Plato but Moses speaking Attic?" he says that Noumenios was probably "thinking of certain marked resemblances between Plato's *Laws* and the Levitical Code when he said this—resemblances due to the fact that certain primitive legal ideas are similarly modified in both."²¹

This is a summary dismissal of a weighty question. *Why* are the primitive legal ideas *similarly* modified by Moses and Plato, and what would Burnet suggest as the *primitive* form of the similarly modified legal ideas? These two points call for explanation.

Burnet grants, however, in conclusion, that Greek Philosophy did not originate quite independently of Egyptian and Babylonian influences.

Gomperz²² in his introduction to "Griechische Denker" gives a very picturesque account of the influences at work in the Hellenic World centuries before the appearance of the "Philosophers of Nature." The description of certain details, e. g., the endless line of pilgrims coming to the Delphic Oracle, and the crowds of strangers thronging to the Olympic Games, is, perhaps, highly colored, but the main outline seems accurate, and impresses the

¹⁷ *Platonis Dialogi*. Im. Bek. Berolini. Pars II, Vol. III, *Phaedo*.

¹⁸ *Geschichte der Phil.*, op. cit., 8te Auflage, pp. 41, 42.

¹⁹ *Phil. der Griechen*, Leipzig, 1892. 5te Aufl., pp. 19 sqq., 41 sqq.

²⁰ *Early Greek Phil.*, 2nd ed., London, 1908, pp. 17 sqq.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 19.

²² *Griechische Denker*, Leipzig, 1896, Vol. I, *Einleitung*.

reader with the incalculable effects which the East had on Greek thought. Erdmann and Fouillée do not deal with the problem at any length.²³ The opening lines of Erdmann's introduction to his *Philosophy of the Ancients* are most significant. "Dazu, sein eigenes Wesen denkend zu erfassen, kann der Menschegeist erst dort versucht und fähig seyn, wo er sich seiner specifischen Würde bewusst ist;"²⁴ and he adds that man does not attain, in the East, to this consciousness of his specific worth *except among the Jews* (ausgenommen bei den Juden)²⁵.

The statement of Fouillée,—in Section V of the first book of his *Philosophy*—"Les Anciens Peuples"—concerning les "Doctrines Philosophiques des Hébreux," is no less suggestive: "La Judée n'offre pas non plus de la philosophie proprement dite: elle est tout entière absorbée par l'idée religieuse. Néanmoins, on peut dégager de ses livres sacrés les grandes doctrines philosophiques qui devaient plus tard entrer comme éléments dans la philosophie chrétienne et moderne."²⁶ Fouillée does not seem to notice the import these remarks have for the inquiry into the genesis of Greek philosophy.

It is not necessary to multiply references: enough has been brought forward to show the general attitude of modern thought on this subject: Zeller is its most extreme exponent. Those who take different views are in the minority. Nevertheless two undeniable facts are generally conceded, or, at least, not disputed.

1. The Hebrews had something worth communicating, whether it be called philosophy or not.

2. Greeks and Jews came into contact at an early date.

We are confining our investigation here to one point—the spiritual—and in searching out its origin in Greek thought we cannot ignore the historic fact that a civilized people with a high ethical code and a spiritualistic religion existed for centuries before Heraclitus used the term λόγος,²⁷ or Anaxagoras spoke of the νόος (νοῦς).²⁸

In Greece we find the earliest attempts at system in the poems of Homer and Hesiod, which serve the Greeks alike as cosmogeny

²³ See Erdmann. *Geschichte der Phil.*, Vol. I, Berlin 1878, par. 17, p. 13; par. 19, p. 14, 3rd ed., 1878.

²⁴ *Op. cit.*, Einleitung, p. 11.

²⁵ *Loc. cit.*

²⁶ *Hist de la Phil.*, 5e éd., Paris, 1887, p. 25.

²⁷ See Mullach, *Frag.*, Heracliti, (1) 1.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Anax., (5) 1.

and theogeny. From Homer and Hesiod to Anaxagoras the distance is spanned by the cosmogenic systems—of which Pherecydes is representative—by the scientific beginnings of the Ionians, and the more abstract speculations of the Eleatics and Pythagoreans.

The poems of Homer, in the aspect of theogeny, are fatal to a system of spiritualistic philosophy. If a steady succession of writers had transmitted progressive ideas in an unbroken current from Homer to Thales, so as to create a continuous development of thought, the presence of the spiritual, at such a comparatively early date, in Greek philosophy would be very difficult to understand, apart from foreign influence. With the data which ancient Greece offers, the hypothesis that the idea of the spiritual is the spontaneous outcome of the fertile Greek intellect²⁹ seems to us untenable. It is as inconceivable, from a psychological viewpoint, that a highly developed abstraction, such as the concept of the spiritual, should appear in philosophy from the above data, as it would be, from an evolutionist viewpoint, that man appeared in the middle of the phylogenic series instead of at the end.

We cannot agree with Gomperz that the system of Pherecydes is suggestive of the spiritual. His account runs thus: "Pherekydes . . . kannte drei Urwesen, die von Ewigkeit her da waren: Chronos oder das Zeit-Prinzip, Zeus, von ihm Zas genannt (wohl nicht ohne Rücksicht auf jene Namensdeutung, die uns schon einmal bei Heraklit begegnet ist und die den obersten Gott als das höchste Lebens-prinzip auffassen wollte); endlich die Erdgöttin Chthonié. Aus dem Lamen des Chronos sei 'das Feuer, der Lufthauch und das Wasser' entsprungen, aus diesen auch 'männigfache Geschlechter der Götter.'" ³⁰

And in his criticism he writes: "Zas und Chronos erscheinen als mehr geistige Wesen." ³¹

Such a novel view of the spiritual would surprise us if Gomperz had not thrown some light on his attitude in an earlier chapter. Treating of Heraclitus he writes: "Die grosse Originalität Heraklits besteht . . . darin, dass er zum erstenmal zwischen dem Natur- und dem Geistesleben Fäden spann, die seitdem nicht wieder abgerissen sind, und dass er allumfassende Verallgemeinerungen gewonnen hat, welche die beiden Bereiche menschlicher

²⁹ See Zeller, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

³⁰ Griechische Denker, Leipzig, 1896, Vol. I, p. 70.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

Erkenntnis wie mit einem ungeheuren Bogen überwölbten."³² If Heraclitus, whose eternal World-Fire $\pi\tilde{\upsilon\rho} \acute{\alpha}\epsilon\iota\zeta\omega\nu$ ³³ is identical with the $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$, is an excellent exponent of the spiritual, according to Gomperz, we may disregard Gomperz's views on the subject in our search, since by "spiritual" we understand something essentially different.

In this connection we may call attention to the misleading statement of Gomperz with regard to the primitive meaning of the words used to signify "spirit." He says: "In der Regel bleibt jedoch dem Hauch, dem Atem, dem warmen Dampf, welcher aus dem Innern des lebenden Organismus hervorquillt, diese Rolle vorbehalten, wie denn der ungeheuren Mehrzahl von Worten, welche in den verschiedensten Sprachen 'Seele' und 'Geist' bezeichnen, diese Grundbedeutung eignet."³⁴

As we are treating of Greece we shall test the statement by reference to the Greek and Latin tongues.

1. $\Psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}$ signified primarily "breath," and was applied figuratively—perhaps even literally at an early date—to "soul" or "living principle." It was not used to signify "spirit." Aristotle has the word in reference to the living principle, or souls of plants and animals, and though he uses the popular word for living principle when treating of the human soul—which he holds to be immaterial—he employs the term $\text{N}\acute{o}\upsilon\varsigma$ to signify its spiritual activity.

2. "Anima" in Latin signifies "breath," and "soul" in popular language; it is found in the Poets applied to the "shades" of the departed. It is never used in philosophy to signify the spiritual—as far as we can discover. The "intellectus," or "mens," is employed as a correct rendering of the Greek $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$.

The Greeks were not slow to perceive the distinction between the two terms as is seen from Aristotle:

"At Anaxagoras videtur quidem aliud animam, aliud intellectum dicere, quemadmodum et antea diximus; . . . verum intellectum principium maxime omnium ponit: solum namque rerum omnium ipsum simplicem et non mistum et sincerum esse dicit." The terms used by Aristotle in the original are $\psi\upsilon\chi\acute{\eta}\nu$ and $\nu\omicron\upsilon\nu$ rendered in Latin by "animam" and "intellectum."³⁵

³² Ibid., p. 52.

³³ Loc. cit., Heracliti (27).

³⁴ Ibid., p. 17.

³⁵ See Arist., Vol. 3, De. An., Lib. I, Chap. II (13).

We conclude our investigation with the statement of our conviction that the concept of the spiritual in Greek Philosophy has been taken, at least "*in germ*," from the Hebrews. The following points resume our arguments briefly:

1. It is contrary to all psychological experience (using the term in the widest sense to include both the individual and the race) that an abstract science, such as Metaphysics, should spring up spontaneously and reach a perfect development in the short space of two centuries, without any antecedents, and independently of foreign influence.

2. (a) Among ancient peoples the spiritual, in the strict sense, was known to the Hebrews alone.

(b) It was quite possible for the idea to be communicated in a general way.

(c) It is, in the highest degree, improbable that the Greeks could be totally ignorant of the central doctrine in the Jewish Religion. The Hebrew nation was too individualistic to escape the quick-witted curiosity of the Greek.

To these may be added two other points:

1. The Spiritual of the Hebrews and the Spiritual of Aristotle are practically identical in all essential features.

2. Aristotle accuses Anaxagoras of using the Spiritual as a "*Deus ex machina*;" his words are: "*Nam et Anaxagoras tanquam machina utitur Intellectu ad mundi generationem; et quum dubitat propter quam causam necessario sit, tunc eum attrahit; in ceteris vero, magis cetera omnia, quam intellectum, causam eorum quae fiunt, ponit.*"³⁶ The fact that Anaxagoras is unable to do anything, so to say, with the spiritual principle which he is the first to propound, is a strong argument against its being really a portion of *his own* system. If he had discovered the principle by the abstractive process of his own thought we believe that it would have been worked in as the vital power in an organic whole. To sum up:

We do not hold that the concept of the spiritual entered Greek thought clothed in philosophical language, but we believe that the germinal thought was cast in at a very early date, that the germ of truth was more fully communicated to Anaxagoras, and that the later philosophers were familiar, in a greater or less degree, with the contents of the Hebrew Sacred Books.

³⁶ Met., Lib. 1, Chap. IV (5).

That this leaves much originality to the Greeks, nevertheless, is evident from a comparison of the results obtained in philosophy by the Greeks and Hebrews respectively. The clear scientific exposition of Aristotle, contrasted with the mystic system of Philo, shows, perhaps, better than any other evidence, the wonderful grasp and power of synthesis of the Greek intellect.

CHAPTER III

IMPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF THE SPIRITUAL

The investigation into the source of this concept has led to its definition: Spirit is that which is not made up of constituent parts nor, in itself, dependent on matter. It is thus opposed to the corporeal, the material, as the supersensible. Such is the widest signification of the term "spiritual"—signification universally recognized in the ancient, the mediaeval and the modern world. Anaxagoras gives, practically, a definition in the following: *νόος δέ ἐστι ἄπειρον καὶ αὐτοκρατὲς καὶ μέμικται οὐδενὶ χρήματι, ἀλλὰ μῶνος αὐτὸς ἐφ' ἑωυτοῦ ἐστι.*³⁷ And Aristotle emphasizes the fact that the earlier philosopher had correctly understood the meaning of the *νόος*.³⁸

Today we find the "spiritual" defined as that which "consists of spirit, as a *spiritual* substance; the incorporeal, the non-material."

Thus, for over two thousand years the content of this concept has remained unchanged. There were men in the days of Anaxagoras who denied the reality of the *νοῦς*, and their type has probably never failed since: sceptics, sincere and otherwise, prolong the echo in every age. What was questioned, however, was the *existence* of the *νοῦς*, not its meaning. Violent discussions have raged concerning the nature of the First Principle of all things: verdicts have been given for or against the spiritual, but nowhere do we find a discussion as to what the *spiritual stands for*. Materialists do not argue about the *implication* of the term: they deny the reality of *what it implies*. Even the Monists, who sought to unite matter and mind in some *un-definable* third have not offered us a new view of the spiritual, though their attempt might have been at least more intelligible if they had. It is therefore something novel, and well-nigh startling, to find one who earnestly advocates a philosophy of the spiritual coming forward and clearly announcing that he has *changed the meaning of the word*. In our last chapter we indicated that Burnet's references to the concept were tainted by materialism, but this to us seems only to suggest that physical and psychical alike were looked on by him as products of the forces of matter.

³⁷ Fragmenta, Anaxagoras, op. cit., 6.

³⁸ Arist., De. An., loc. cit.

With Eucken the case is different: he has proclaimed that the Super-sensible exists in its own right; that an Independent Spiritual Life forms the ultimate basis of all reality. There have been many disputes as to what matter is, none as to what spirit is, but rather as to *whether it is*. Eucken has affirmed the last position and we have the right to demand from him a system in accordance with his standpoint. In the main thesis of this dissertation an inquiry will be made into the new philosophy of the spiritual; here we have but to remark that its exponent is unphilosophical in the following statements.

"Within the soul itself there is a distinction between two levels, of which that other than nature may in agreement with established usage be called spiritual, however little may be implied by this expression; however mysterious, indeed, the conception may for the present be."³⁹ The original text is "*Innerhalb der Seele selbst scheiden sich damit zwei Stufen, von denen die jenseits der Natur gelegene nach alter Uebung als die geistige bezeichnet werden mag, so wenig mit diesem Ausdruck gesagt ist, ja so rätselhaft einstweilen dieser Begriff bleibt.*"⁴⁰

"The spiritual life in itself is incomparably more than is represented by the customary conception of that life."⁴¹

The nature of the "more" must be inferred after the theory has been examined. We may notice the words of S. H. Mellone in this connection: "Another characteristic is that he uses certain terms of fundamental import,—such as 'spiritual,' 'natural,' 'real,' 'ideal,' 'eternal,'—in meanings which, though uniform and consistent, have to be discovered by the reader."⁴² Surely a philosopher, or teacher, is hardly justified in using "terms of fundamental import" and of definite content—we may perhaps except the term "ideal" owing to the now many different interpretations of the word—in meanings which have to be discovered by the reader. Our exposition of the "Geistesleben" will show that we do not consider the meaning of the term to be either "uniform" or "consistent." We maintain that Eucken ought to have called new conceptions by new names; we disclaim the charge of bias because we insist on the recognized meaning of

³⁹ *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, translated by Alban G. Widgery, London, 1912, pp. 131, 132.

⁴⁰ *Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung*, 2te Aufl., Leipzig, 1913. Italics ours.

⁴¹ *Life's Basis*, op. cit., p. 240. See also *Grundlinien*, op. cit., p. 104.

⁴² S. H. Mellone, *Edinburgh, International Journal of Ethics*, Oct., 1910, "Idealism of Rudolph Eucken," p. 18.

words. What would become of Logic if we were to play fast and loose with their connotation? And what would become of Philosophy if Logic were made a ringing of changes upon "terms of fundamental import?"

We have given the definition of the spiritual in its widest signification: we shall point out briefly the more specialized senses in which it is employed.

In the Hebrew Sacred Books, in the metaphysics of Aristotle,⁴³ in Scholasticism and Christian philosophy in general, and in theology, the First and Final Cause of all things is held to be a spiritual being—an Infinite Spirit—omniscient, omnipotent, omnipresent, i.e., wholly present throughout the entire universe and in every part thereof, though not occupying space after the manner of bodies. Possessing the plenitude of all being, He is infinitely perfect and, therefore, changeless.

Man's soul is an individual spiritual substance. It comes direct from the First Cause by a creative act, and being like It in nature it seeks It as its last end.⁴⁴

Inasmuch as the human soul is the animating principle of the body during life, it is capable of sensuous activity; in contradistinction, spiritual activity, or intellect, denotes the higher power of the soul—that through which it *thinks, knows, and wills*; in this connection are also contrasted the terms "spiritual life," "sensuous life." The epithet "human," in that it connotes man's rational nature, always implies the spiritual.

Spiritual life, in the sphere of theology, signifies the life of the soul in its personal relations with the Creator. As this is mainly dealt with in ascetic theology, we pass rapidly from natural to revealed truth, and thereby go beyond the domain of philosophy. A "spiritual man" is, thus, one who makes this supernatural life of the soul his main study and aim.

In German, "geistige" (spiritual) is sometimes used, in a comprehensive sense, to include all the artistic and literary activities and strivings of the soul, which go to form the *Kultur* of the age. This employment of the term is philosophical in itself, since art and literature are chiefly products of the spiritual activity, although the aesthetic imagination plays a large part; nevertheless a careful

⁴³ Metaph., Book XI.

⁴⁴ In the Monadology of Leibniz the soul is a simple, indivisible, immaterial, substantial unit, its "representative" power being likened to the spiritual principle, or form, of Scholasticism; thus, except for his curious terminology, he is practically at one with other Christian philosophers as to the spiritual nature of the soul.

distinction must be made here; neither art nor literature *is* philosophy. The study of the underlying principles of art, as of all other fundamental principles, belongs to philosophy, but the interpretations of life and reality offered by artists and poets may be the very antithesis of philosophical.

It is because Eucken has failed to make this distinction that we find Goethe and Schiller figuring in *Lebensanschauung der Grossen Denker*, a work which is supposed, in the main, to be a history of Philosophy. It is significant that more space is allotted in it to Goethe than to either Descartes or Locke. For a similar reason, viz, the author's failure to distinguish between natural and revealed truth, we find the second part of this volume devoted to an examination of Christianity. It is interesting to note that at least three times as many pages are given to Luther as to St. Thomas Aquinas.

"Spirituel" in French, when used as a personal adjective, has the signification of "witty." The noun "spiritualité" renders the English "spiritual" when this is employed personally, e. g., "a very spiritual man" corresponds in French to "un homme d'une haute spiritualité." Apart from this peculiar use "spirituel" is the equivalent of "spiritual" in its various shades of meaning, e. g., the soul is "un principe spirituel;" "spiritual life," "la vie spirituelle;" matters pertaining to the relations between God and the soul are termed in general "les choses spirituelles;" "spiritual life" in contradistinction to "sensuous life" is often termed "la vie intellectuelle," but its operations are described as "inorganiques et spirituels."

It is evident that each of the above meanings of the spiritual is in perfect harmony with the original definition of the term although some of them belong to it only in its religious, others only in its artistic aspect.

We may remark that although spirit is the recognized English translation of the *νοûs*, *mens* or *intellectus*, it is less suited etymologically than either mind or intellect. St. Thomas uses the adjective "spiritualis," but more often the terms *immaterialis*, *incorporeus*, *intellectualis*.⁴⁵

In concluding this examination of the implication of the spiritual we would point out that the subject matter or context usually prevents any ambiguity as to the particular signification in which the term is being employed.

⁴⁵ E.g., vide Sum., I, q. L, LI, LXXV.

CHAPTER IV

METHOD OF ATTAINING THE CONCEPT OF THE SPIRITUAL

The philosophy of the Spiritual in the modern world is inextricably bound up with the treatment of the problem in the ancient world. It is incontestable that the Spiritual—in the one case in its religious, in the other in its philosophical aspect—was known and appreciated in the Hebrew and classic Greek worlds. The concept of the spiritual, knowledge of the spiritual, are not, therefore, products of modern thought; they have been transmitted from antiquity. However divergent the theories may be concerning the nature of psychic activity, however arbitrarily writers may impose a new content on the concept of the Spiritual, the fact remains that the origin of the conception does not coincide with the discoveries of modern science.

Again, since modern science has not, in fact, changed man's nature, though it has suggested new interpretations of it, the human mind works and must work in the modern world as it did in the ancient. Fresh and abundant material is offered its activity in modern life; much that was unknown or misinterpreted, has been discovered or elucidated, but man does not, psychologically speaking, think in a different manner. He may consider the universe under a new aspect, but there has been no alteration of the laws that govern the working of his own mind. For the philosopher and scientist of today, as for Plato and Aristotle, the law of Contradiction is the fundamental principle of his thought which he cannot really violate—whatever conflicting statements he may make—for the reason that the mind will never accept an evident contradiction.

Eucken well says, "Nothing is more characteristic of the distinctive nature of thought than the fact and power of the logical contradiction."⁴⁶

No normal mind can assent to the statement that black is white, provided it be made in clear and unmistakable terms: if the thought is obscured by a mist of confused expressions, the mind

⁴⁶ Main Currents of Modern Thought, op. cit., p. 183. *Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart*, p. 143.

may assent through ignorance of the nature of the data presented to it. The will has much to do with such assents on insufficient grounds. As Doctor Dubray points out: "That man would be laboring under an illusion who would think that to him could never be applied the words of Henry IV: 'Thy wish was father, Harry, to that thought.' Who, knowing himself as he is and as others perhaps know him, can boast that he never saw things as he wished them to be?"⁴⁷

It is well to insist on this point when examining modern theories of knowledge.

The genesis of knowledge is a central problem in philosophy, but the attempt to transfer the seat of knowledge from what is highest in man to what he shares with the brutes—from what raises him above the animals to what allies him with them—seems to belong exclusively to contemporary systems. The Stoics and Epicureans did not hold that man possessed an intellectual faculty since they conceived the soul as a form of subtle matter; hence it would suggest something of an anachronism to consider them the historical forbears of anti-intellectualists. The term anti-intellectualism implies intellectualism, and anti-intellectualists are, in general, prompt to acknowledge intellectual activity, but they maintain that the intellect is not the true instrument of knowledge—above all of the higher kind. Not through the intellect but through some other channel—instinct, feeling, action—does man learn the meaning of his life and come to realize his responsibility. Eucken is emphatic on the importance—in fact the necessity—of adopting the new method which he advocates as being "Copernican" in contrast to the intellectualistic or "old mode of thought" which is truly "Ptolemaic." We have just cited Eucken's words as to the fact and power of the logical contradiction. Is he free from contradiction in seeking to reject his intellect? Anti-intellectualism, in fact, is a sheer impossibility: it has no more reality than a round square.

Theorists may style themselves what they will, but they cannot change their nature since they are not the authors of their being. All men are intellectualists, since intellect or reason is an essential mark of man. They think, judge, decide by intellect and can do so in no other way; they reject intellect by intellect and select

⁴⁷ "Intellectualism in Practical Life," Catholic University Bulletin, Vol. XX, p. 94, Feb., 1914.

feeling, or instinct, or whatever they choose as new guide of life, only through the intellect they have rejected. Indeed anti-intellectualists move perpetually in a rather narrow circle.

There is one method, and only one, of attaining knowledge of the spiritual, as well as all other knowledge: it is the Intellectualistic. This method presupposes the activities of the lower faculties, especially the cognitive powers. As the Scholastics so often repeat, *nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit prius in sensu*. Intellect and sense work concomitantly and harmoniously. Withdraw intellect and we have perception but never knowledge: to remember is one phenomenon—due to association—to recognize in the true sense of the word, is another—due to intellect. Dogs have good memory power, it is man's prerogative to recognize. To feel is one thing, to know that one feels and what one feels is quite another, belonging to a different order of mental life. Perception and feeling are common to all animals: the "crashing of machinery" theory⁴⁸ is no longer held even by vivisectists. Intellect is, solely, the prerogative of man. The experiments of recent years have gone to prove that there is no trace of thought or reflection in the phenomena ascribed to monkeys. Instinct and association amply account for their feats of dexterity. Hence an anti-intellectualistic mode of thought, if such a nonentity could be conceived, so far from being "Copernican" would be decidedly the reverse, since it would imply not a retrogression, but a downward plunge to the brute world. No analogy exists between the Copernican theory and anti-intellectualism. Copernicus did not suggest a change in the planetary system: he brought forward no theory to disturb the laws of nature; but this is, in fact, what Eucken advocates, since the laws of mental life are the laws of man's rational nature. Copernicus was an Intellectualist of a high order; this, alone, enabled him to offer a more correct interpretation of the material universe; and only Intellectualists can offer correct interpretations, whether it be of the solar system, the data of consciousness or the invisible Reality which is the "Foundation of all the rest."

A comparison of Eucken's statement regarding the fact and power of the logical contradiction with the following: "Even

⁴⁸ The Cartesian theory that animals were automata: some went so far as to maintain that the apparent cry of pain on the dissecting table was due to the crashing of the machinery—in fact, was this crashing! Such a view did not prevail very widely.

when gauging the external world the imaginative flight of thought, piercing infinity, reaches beyond all the bounds of sense-perception,"⁴⁹ leads one to infer that the philosopher did not compare one portion of his system with another; else how could he, after having written the above, advocate an anti-intellectualistic method?

Thought, which is the activity of the intellect, can indeed speed across the oceans, soar above the highest mountain tops, pierce the clouds and make man prostrate himself in spirit before the Uncreated Source of all being. In the phrase "pierce the clouds" we are using an expression which helps the imagination. We know that God is, in fact, everywhere and can make His presence felt to the soul anywhere. The *élans* of the soul do not imply a spatial, but a moral uplift to what is higher and holier. All this is done, however, by or through the intellect, and cannot be done in any other way. Even the more immediate knowledge of God, to which we have just referred, and which Eucken seeks to make the only means of knowledge,⁵⁰ is communicated through the intellect.

We shall cite in conclusion the words of the scientist, St. George Mivart:

"Self-conscious, reflective thought, . . . is our ultimate and absolute criterion. . . . Our ultimate court of appeal and supreme criterion is the intellect, and not sense, and that act of intellectual perception which is thus ultimate, we may call 'intellectual intuition.' "⁵¹

The results of our inquiry into the concept of the spiritual may now be summed up:

1. The concept of the spiritual is the most important in the range of thought; it belongs both to Philosophy and Religion, but to each under a different aspect. If we pass from natural to supernatural truth, from natural Religion to Revelation, the highest that we can know of is Spirit: such knowledge does not belong to philosophy.

2. The religious concept of the Hebrews hastened the appearance and influenced the development of the philosophical concept of the Greeks. Historical data point to the Hebrews as the first

⁴⁹ Christianity and the New Idealism, p. 7. (Hauptprobleme der Religionsphilosophie der Gegenwart, Berlin, 1912, p. 9.)

⁵⁰ This matter will be treated in Part II, Chap. III.

⁵¹ On Truth, London, 1889, p. 113.

to possess knowledge of the Spiritual: the origin and earliest source of the concept would then be religious.

3. The Spiritual is that which is *in se* essentially, forever and in every way, distinct from and opposed to matter.

4. Whether in the natural, or supernatural order, man can only attain to a knowledge of the spiritual through his rational activity, or faculty, Intellect.

PART II

EUCKEN'S PHILOSOPHY OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE *In Which the Theory of Activism is Examined Mainly under Its Epistemological Aspect*

INTRODUCTION

Activism, its name, gives a key to Eucken's philosophy, or, rather, to his own idea about his philosophy. The new system insists upon action, spiritually inspired action, as the only instrument of genuine knowledge and the only path to truth and noble living. Here, at the outset, we are met by something like a dilemma. Eucken has differentiated in action—he distinguishes between soulless work and spiritual deed (*Volltat*).⁵² What is the principle of differentiation unless thought, and if thought be introduced where is the special claim of Activism?⁵³

Tudor Jones, interpreting Eucken, writes:

"Something had to be *done* before the whole nature of what it was could become known. Thus, man gains a special kind of existence long before he is able to interpret such an existence. He lives a reality for which he has often blindly striven, although he may be far from being able to account for it."⁵⁴

It may be questioned whether this is an accurate description of human activity, but it is a fair explanation of Eucken's view. According to him mankind advances from a mere psychic state of existence, from the "narrowly human" to the full possession of spiritual life: "Kurz, der Mensch ist in seiner ersten empirischen Lage nicht nur den Zusammenhängen der Geisteswelt entfremdet, sondern auch unfähig, aus eigenem unmittelbaren Vermögen sie wieder zu erreichen."⁵⁵

In his earlier works he states clearly that the transition can be accomplished only with the help of thought: "Die Ueberzeugung, dass die That mehr enthalten mag, als das Bewusstsein, gab Recht und Pflicht, auf die Gesamtheit des Thuns zurückzugreifen und zu prüfen, ob nicht in ihr eine Ganzheit angelegt sei, deren

⁵² See *Erkennen und Leben*, Leipzig, 1912, p. 65; *Prolegomena zu Forschungen über die Einheit des Geisteslebens*, Leipzig, 1885, pp. 26-39, 46 (top of page), 112 (top of page); *Einheit des Geisteslebens*, Leipzig, 1888, pp. 363 (end of page) sqq., 374, 384 sqq., 421-431, 484 sqq.; *Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt*, 2te Aufl., Leipzig, 1907, pp. 160-167; *Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart*, op. cit., pp. 74-83; *Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung*, op. cit., pp. 99 sqq.; *Einführung in eine Philosophie des Geisteslebens*, Leipzig, 1908, p. 122.

⁵³ "Der Aktivismus." See *Grundlinien*, pp. 143 sqq.; *G. Strömungen*, pp. 51 sqq.

⁵⁴ *The Philosophy of Rudolf Eucken*, London, 1914, p. 12.

⁵⁵ *Einheit des Geisteslebens*, op. cit., p. 449.

Gegenwart das Leben zu seiner Vollendung bedarf, *die es aber ohne Gedankenarbeit nimmer finden kann.*"⁵⁶

"Diese neue Wirklichkeit ist nicht aus seelischer Unmittelbarkeit zu entwickeln; ihre Unmittelbarkeit kann keine andere sein als die geistiger Arbeit; dahin aber muss der Mensch aus seiner Lage *den Weg erst mit Hülfe des Denkens suchen.*"⁵⁷

If thought appears as prime factor and guide, then the special feature indicated by its name is not peculiar to this system. "Activism" may give a key to Eucken's position as a moral philosopher, but we do not consider that it opens up any path to the real comprehension of his philosophy. Eucken practically asserts that he offers a metaphysical theory; he declares that "without *metaphysics*, there is no independent inner world, no true greatness of life,"⁵⁸ and the major portion of his work is spent not in inquiring into lines of conduct or springs of action, but in developing, elaborating and striving to systematize his theory of Spiritual Life (*Geistesleben*). This is his central conception—in fact it constitutes his whole philosophy; we cannot get away from the *Geistesleben*; everything either *is*, or *is on the road to* Spiritual Life. It is therefore, essential to know, in the beginning of our examination, the sense in which he employs the term.

In Eucken's system the concept of the spiritual life embraces all the accepted meanings of the word spiritual⁵⁹ (except the French "spirituel," in its special signification—there is no wit in Activism) *plus* the "more" which Eucken has announced⁶⁰ and which will be examined in Chapter II of this section. It is not that the term is used in its various shades of meaning according to the context, they all belong simultaneously to the content of the *Geistesleben* which is at one and the same time the "Ursprüngliche Quelle" of all goodness and truth, and the direct source of all artistic production; which finds fitting expression alike in the mystic contemplation of a Saint Augustine or a Saint Catherine, and in the poetry of a Goethe. Eucken maintains that although we need metaphysics in order to interpret the universe we must have "a new metaphysics," "not of the Schools, but of life:" its subject-matter will be the *Geistesleben* as above set forth.

⁵⁶ Prolegomena, op. cit., p. 97. Italics ours.

⁵⁷ Einheit des Geisteslebens, p. 309. Italics ours.

⁵⁸ Main Currents, p. 373. (Geistige Strömungen, op. cit., p. 311.)

⁵⁹ See Part I, Chap. III.

⁶⁰ See Part I, loc. cit.

We would point out: (1) that *metaphysics*, as the name implies, is something essentially abstract and therefore "of the Schools." It must be based, as is all natural knowledge, on facts, on the data presented by life and the universe; but metaphysics embraces a great deal more than life, and cannot, in any way, be made a rule of life or code of morals: it is necessary to be clear in the employment of terms. Metaphysics inquires into the fundamental principles not only of life, but of all existence, of all being. Since physics and chemistry account for much in the animal organism, while biology and psychology study life itself, there is only left for metaphysics the explanation of ultimate problems arising from life, e. g., the origin and destiny of man's spiritual soul. Eucken's severe criticism of what he calls metaphysics "of the Schools"⁶¹ is just if applied to the absolutist systems of the Hegelian School, but bears no weight against the Aristotelio-Scholastic theory, as Dr. Wunderle remarks.⁶²

(2) We are examining a system proposed to us as Philosophy. We shall therefore eliminate from our inquiry whatever does not fall under this head. Art, Literature, Natural and Revealed Religion, Morality, Psychology and Philosophy proper *plus* a "more" have been united in one concept by the power of the imagination. We do not intend to consider here what may be called the *artistic* aspect of the *Geistesleben* any more than we would a new theory of music or the latest poem. Natural religion, which is a special department under philosophy, Eucken has made co-extensive with the whole field. Supernatural Revelation, whether historical or individual, he includes in this field. We are still confronted, therefore, with ordinary knowledge, with revealed truths, with natural and supernatural mysticism. Revealed truths, except in so far as they may be reached by unaided reason,

⁶¹ See *Geistige Strömungen*, op. cit., pp. 109 sqq.; *Grundlinien*, pp. 70 sqq.; *Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion*, pp. 46, 403; *Hauptprobleme*, p. 24, pp. 157 sqq. For "Metaphysik des Lebens," see also *Erkennen und Leben*, p. 83; *Sinn und Wert des Lebens*, pp. 137 sqq.; *Einführung in eine Phil. des Geisteslebens*, pp. 155 sqq.

⁶² "Eucken wirft hier die rationalistische Metaphysik des 18 Jahrhunderts mit der schon längst vorher bestehenden aristotelisch-scholastischen zusammen. Für die abstrakten Theorien des Rationalismus ist sein oft wiederholter Ausdruck 'freischwebende' Begriffe u.ä. wohl am Platze. Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles und der ihm folgenden Scholastiker ist aber keineswegs eine mit 'freischwebenden' Begriffen aufgebaute Konstruktion, sondern hat die sinnliche, konkrete Wirklichkeit zur sicheren Grundlage."

Georg Wunderle, *Die Religionsphilosophie Rudolf Euckens*, Paderborn, 1912, p. 31, footnote.

or in the degree to which reason shows that they are in harmony with natural truth, do not belong to the scope of philosophy. In so far as they are otherwise introduced the system in which they figure ceases to be strictly philosophical.

Mysticism, the study of the intimate, personal relations and communications of the soul with God, the Author of its being and only Source of all its happiness and perfection, is not within the domain of philosophy. What we have termed natural mysticism, e. g., the system of a Plotinus, may be dealt with to some extent: philosophy can examine its grounds, acknowledge its possibility, test its principles and conclusions by known truth, and reject them where contrary to such truth. Supernatural mysticism is never opposed to philosophy, but it is wholly beyond its sphere. Where doubt of its genuineness arises, physical conditions are inquired into, or tests of a moral nature settle the question, but philosophy is in no way investigator or judge. Eucken in several of his works asserts the necessity of mysticism, but as he desires "a new metaphysics," so he insists on a new mysticism.⁶³ Whether the life of "pure inwardness" (*reine Innerlichkeit*) of which he frequently speaks, would be reached by his principles and method can be best decided by the perusal of the exposition of his theory. As Mysticism is not philosophy it is not incumbent on us to inquire into any possible mystic aspects of the *Geistesleben*. Eucken is surely right in maintaining the reality and importance of the Interior Life. The supernatural union of the soul with God is the *unum necessarium*, it is that which gives to all the rest the proper light and shade. Its study is at once the most practical and the most sublime to which the human mind can be devoted, but knowledge of it must be sought where it is to be found, i. e., in Revealed Religion. The Saints and Doctors of the Church have contributed a vast wealth of writings on the subject; they constitute a treasury, unacknowledged source upon which many modern writers have freely drawn. Is it only a coincidence that Eucken's oft repeated description of the *Geistesleben* "*Ursprüngliche Quelle*," is almost a literal translation of the words "Living Spring" addressed to the Holy Spirit by the Church in the hymn *Veni Creator*? In any case Eucken's works show that he is acquainted with Catholic Ascetics—in fact he often

⁶³ Grundlinien, p. 104.

speaks their language, although the context in which it is used points to an imperfect apprehension of its meaning.

Both Eucken himself and many of his interpreters look upon his philosophy as a beneficial innovation. Tudor Jones says: "No, there is nothing new in it as Eucken is so fond of pointing out. But perhaps it is new to preach it from a University chair as part and parcel of the deeper implications of philosophy."⁶⁴ That depends on the University. Surely no educated man, in the light of history, can hold that the mediaeval universities neglected the "claims" "of the spirit of man."⁶⁵ Wherever Catholic philosophy is taught "the spirit of man" finds, and has always found "someone to come forward to present its claims."⁶⁶ The "deeper implications of philosophy" are pointed out and *developed in so far as they fall within the philosophical field*, but the philosopher who goes outside it, misses his special aim by trying to hit a higher target. If "Order" is heaven's first law, it is also one of the first essentials of correct human reasoning. St. Thomas did not turn philosophy into either theology or religion, but he did what was better—he showed that it was the "handmaid" of both, and thus insured that its "deeper implications" were preached from the particular chair best fitted to deal with them.⁶⁷

Having further narrowed our inquiry by the elimination of Revelation and Mysticism, the ethical, psychological and metaphysical aspects of the *Geistesleben* plus the "More," which leads to cosmology, remain as our subject matter. For the reason stated in the preface we have dealt with Eucken's theory mainly from the standpoint of epistemology but the issues in the other spheres have been shown. Before concluding this Introduction we shall give a brief, general outline of Eucken's teaching, followed by a brief criticism, in order to facilitate the more detailed examination to those who may be unfamiliar with his thought.

Outline of Eucken's Teaching

A spiritual life is the fundamental basis of all reality. It is independent and supertemporal: in dealing with it we have to do

⁶⁴ Op. cit., p. 34.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 35.

⁶⁶ Loc. cit. It is true that in Germany, the home of Haeckel, as well as of Eucken, "the champions of this life of the spirit" in philosophy belonged in the last decades to a small minority.

⁶⁷ Cardinal Newman's Idea of a University would be interesting reading in this connection.

"with something essentially different from any process following natural laws."

Nature is a "sub-spiritual," a lower kind of inner life. The spiritual is ever trying to draw this to itself, to conquer it, to assimilate it, to spiritualize it. The spiritual develops itself by this process, and finds self-expression in spiritualizing reality. Each age reveals some new phase of the spiritual which speaks "through all the mutations of the ages."

Man is the only part of reality that can directly participate in the Spiritual; hence he alone can grasp "the content of the age." This content is not revealed to him without his own effort. He must—by resistance to the "merely human"—struggle upward to the "vision which sees life as a whole and measures it accordingly." His instrument in the search for truth is Philosophy, which enables him to make creative syntheses; in these he endeavors to unfold "the content of the age." "The whole that" Philosophy "seeks never comes to meet it from outside, but must be shaped from within;"⁶⁸ thus, for the construction of the synthesis, there must be an energetic turning inwards on the part of man, in order to penetrate to the spiritual which lies hidden, at least as a possibility, at the core of his being: "a whole world" comes "into effective activity within man himself."⁶⁹

A distinction must be made between spiritual life as a whole, or the "Absolute Spiritual," and the spiritual as it manifests itself in man, or "the human spiritual form of existence." The former is the absolute truth, in the latter the spiritual is bound down and fettered by human limitations; hence man attains to truth in proportion to the success with which he arises above the "mere ego" and finds a soul, a self, a personality in the "soul of souls," the "self-life," the "world-embracing personality." Yet the spiritual in man is not *in itself* distinct from the absolute spiritual.

"It will not do for spiritual life to be communicated to him through the medium of his special nature (thus becoming alienated from itself); it must in some fashion be present to him as a whole in all its infinity."⁷⁰

The spiritual thus present within him helps in the upward struggle by imparting to him a "cosmic force." "A cosmic force

⁶⁸ Main Currents, p. 133. (Geistige Strömungen, p. 97.)

⁶⁹ Op. cit., p. 54. (G. Strömungen, p. 27.)

⁷⁰ Op. cit., p. 60. (G. Strömungen, p. 33.)

must be operative in man from the very outset; there must be a receptivity corresponding to man's activity, a hand from above to draw the climber up; yea, in freedom itself there must shine out some revelation of grace."⁷¹

Morality is "a self active appropriation" of spirituality. It is "a penetration of life to truthfulness and essential being, a winning of a new, infinite self, a 'becoming infinite' from within."⁷² "The idea of duty which originates here springs from" man's "own being and is not imposed from without."⁷³ Morality is dependent on Art because Art is indispensable in the creation of synthesis.

General Criticism

1. (a) The descriptions of spiritual life and natural phenomena are incompatible. If spiritual life is independent, super-temporal and essentially different from nature we may not speak of nature as a "lower kind" of inner life, since the "lower kind" of life is "lower" from the fact that it depends directly on matter: hence the assertion that nature is a lower kind of inner life is self-contradictory.

(b) In the above description of spiritual life Eucken upholds dualism: in his reduction of nature to "inner life" he makes for monism: the combination is self-destructive.

2. (a) The conception of the fundamental basis of all things as *developing itself* is irreconcilable with the idea of the First Cause, Which must be perfect and changeless.

(b) By describing the spiritual life as finding self-expression in spiritualizing reality, Eucken negatives his own concepts.

3. (a) The antithesis between the "mere ego," the mere human, on the one hand, and the "spiritual," on the other, is unphilosophical, and arises from an erroneous conception of man's soul. The spiritual in man is not distinct from his soul; the soul is the spirit. The term "ego," since it signifies the permanent subject of psychic life is synonymous with soul.⁷⁴

⁷¹ Op. cit., p. 392. (G. Strömungen, p. 328.)

⁷² Op. cit., p. 390. (G. Strömungen, pp. 326 sqq.)

⁷³ Op. cit., p. 391. (G. Strömungen, p. 327.)

⁷⁴ Mills Alden in the *North American* comments on this point as follows: "He seems . . . to make spiritual personality supra-human, superior to what in common parlance we call the human soul. Perhaps he would not be so insistent on this division between soul and spirit if he belonged to any other country than that of Haeckel, to whom the soul is but an epiphenomenon, or by-product of the brain. In Germany more than anywhere else his heroic agonism finds the incentives which convert it to antagonism."

Eucken Agonistes, *North American*, 201, Jan., 1915, pp. 57-63.

"Human" is to be contrasted with "Divine," or with "animal" rather than with "spiritual." The manner in which the soul is to be withdrawn from a too great application to the "merely human" interests, in order to become more absorbed in the Divine, is treated of in Sacred Theology rather than in Philosophy, though the question enters partially into the sphere of Ethics.

(b) Eucken's exposition of the relations between man's soul and the spiritual lead inevitably to Pantheism, in spite of the fact that he rejects the system. "This submersion in the bottomless ocean of eternity, can satisfy only those who do not recognise new and independent reality in spiritual life."⁷⁵ The above statement is true, but does not, on that account, save Eucken from inconsistency.

(c) The conception of the soul finding a personality in the "world-embracing personality" is an impossibility, since incommunicability, individuality are essential attributes of "person."

(d) The exposition of the relations between the soul and nature, alternating, as it does, between Hypothetical Dualism and Monism, is wholly illogical.

4. (a) Unless Eucken intends to speak metaphorically, his idea of the scope of morality is a false one. Morality is directly concerned *hic et nunc*, with man's *actual self*; it has not to aid him in the search for a "new" self, since, if the words are taken literally, the idea is inconceivable.

(b) Moral truth is perceived directly by reason, as is all self-evident truth, and the obligation to morality springs from the fact that man is a rational being; but this fact, so far from proving that the idea of duty has not objective validity is the strongest argument for it. Obligation implies law, and law, a law giver.

It is true that Eucken considers moral truth to be universal and absolute truth, but, in so doing, he is once more inconsistent.

(c) Morality is independent of Art, though this latter can aid it both by presenting moral ideas in a concrete form and by raising man's aspirations from the sensuous to the intellectual or the religious.

Further, there is no place in his system for an individual, immortal soul; but a philosophy of the spiritual which fails in this point is a more enigmatical and inconsistent interpretation of human life than the materialism which denies spirit.

⁷⁵ Main Currents, p. 417. (G. Strömungen, p. 351.)

In treating of Eucken's philosophy of the spiritual life we shall be dealing at the same time with his philosophy of History—the viewpoint from which his work has seemed attractive to a majority—since History is defined by him as a “coming-to-itself of Spiritual Life.”

CHAPTER I

ANTI-INTELLECTUALISM

The right key to Eucken's philosophy is given, we consider, in the title of one of his most important constructive works—*Die Einheit des Geisteslebens im Bewusstsein und That der Menschheit*, the Unity, the *Oneness*, of Spiritual Life in Human Knowledge and Action. When we have grasped the fact that, according to Eucken, the spiritual life is *one and the same in all men*, and that the foundation of the universe is this same spiritual life, which has found but imperfect self-expression in man, then a guiding light is found through many difficult passages. If barriers cannot be crossed at least we can account for their presence.

One of the chief characteristics of Activism is a very decided anti-intellectualistic tendency which frequently develops into absolute irrationalism. Anti-intellectualism is always a self-contradiction as has before been pointed out,⁷⁶ but the elements of incompatibility are intensified to the highest degree when anti-intellectualistic methods are put forward in a spiritualistic system. As soon as we know Eucken's first assumption, however, we perceive that this feature of his work arises from his special view of spiritual life. Two attributes of the *Geistesleben* on which he lays great stress are,

1. Oneness, *Einheit*.
2. Super-temporality, eternity.

The first points directly to Hegelian absolutism, but from this position he recoils with an energy worthy of a dualist. That man's thought should be the ultimate ground of all truth and reality is a proposition which Eucken, in company with the Scholastics, rejects. The Ultimate Ground of truth and reality with them is a Supreme, Independent, Eternal, Spiritual Life. Dualists hold that the spiritual soul of man, which is substantially distinct from the Supreme Spiritual Life, knows the Supreme Spiritual through intellectual activity and seeks good of a spiritual order through the rational will. Eucken's *Einheit des Geisteslebens* does not lead him to any such satisfactory solution of the relations between the "Absolute" and the "human" spiritual. The point

⁷⁶ Part I, Chapter IV.

will be considered in the course of this dissertation. It will suffice to remark here that the exponent of the new theory, convinced on the one hand of human limitations and imperfections and keenly sensible of man's frailty, holding, on the other, that spiritual life is both one and eternal, seeks no escape from the dilemma, but disparages the natural power of the intellect in his effort to shun even the suspicion of intellectualistic absolutism.

We have selected the following citations as indicative of the Activistic position: if they be compared with Eucken's earlier statements regarding the necessity of thought as first guide to the spiritual⁷⁷ and, still more, with his assertion as to "the fact and power of the logical contradiction,"⁷⁸ his halting attitude towards this important problem will be evident.

Evidences of Anti-Intellectualism

"No clear demonstration of the excellency of this world will allow us to infer a transcendent Reason as the cause of it."⁷⁹

"When the whole matter is surveyed, there appears no possibility for any single aspect of life to arrive at religion. . . . The experiments made in such direction are in sharp conflict with one another: on the one side, the attention is directed to the outward character of religion and to the building up of a scientific province of thought, whilst on the other side the standpoint is that of immanence and of the immediate energy of movement which arises out of this. The one is as necessary as the other, but on this path the two aspects refuse to coalesce: the general character of religion, mirrored in the intellect alone, endangers the inward immediacy and spiritual warmth, whilst through the individual results of feeling and will alone the immediacy endangers the spiritual width and validity which extend beyond the individual. So that a *new path* must be sought which will unite the discordant elements. It is certainly clear that through such discord between the two opposites, an immediate united push and a joyous co-operation are impossible. The experience of history testifies to the particular *naïveté* of basing religion on thought, feeling, or will. It remains here to seek a new path which is not, from the very outset, under the power of the opposites."⁸⁰

"In addition, there springs up a painful doubt which no merely intellectual form of religion is ever able to overcome. Is thought

⁷⁷ See Introduction, pp. 25 sqq.

⁷⁸ See Part I, Chapter IV, p. 17.

⁷⁹ Christianity and The New Idealism, p. 2. New York, 1909. (Hauptprobleme der Religionsphilosophie, p. 4.)

⁸⁰ Truth of Religion, translated by W. Tudor Jones, New York, 1911, pp. 83 sqq. First italics are ours, second Eucken's. For original text see Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, 3te Aufl., Leipzig, 1912, p. 56.

able to reach the kernel of things through its own energy, . . . ? Are our conceptions in reality more than mere human conceptions? Is it not a mere world of phantoms which arises in them?"⁸¹

" . . . the old-rooted intellectualism turns the greatness of religion into a hybrid of many colours."⁸²

"Our investigation sought . . . to show that not only did particular contents develop side by side, but also that they *connected themselves* together into a Whole of an entity and produced an essentially new being, which we aspired after by means of our 'ever-becoming' personality."⁸³

"If the *union of nature and intelligence produces so much confusion*, we are inevitably led to ask whether man does not possess in himself more than thought; whether thought is not rooted in a deeper and more comprehensive life, from which it derives its power."⁸⁴

"Representations of the whole are attempted at the highest points of creative activity by philosophy, religion, and art; these representations accompany, indeed govern, the work in these spheres of life through history. But the limitations of our capacity, through which we are unable to give a suitable form to necessary contents, and through which we attribute and must attribute human traits to that which should lead us beyond the human, are of particular force in this matter of forming a representation of the whole; . . . These representations of the whole are, therefore, inadequate; their content of truth is clothed in a wrapping of myth, and humanity lies under the danger of taking the myth for the chief thing and thus of obscuring the truth, and this must produce an incalculable amount of error and strife. Still, it is impossible to give up all claim to these representations of the whole; for they alone make the fact of our belonging to the whole and of the presence of the whole in our life quite clear and enable it to exert a far-reaching influence . . . ; only with their help can a movement from whole to whole begin. Thus it is a matter not so much of abandoning these representations of the whole as of referring them continually to their essence; to those unfoldings of life which are experienced by us; to test them by these and to renew them from these. It was the error of the earlier position—much too indulgent to Intellectualism—that it did not sufficiently maintain the relation with these living sources, and so fell into the danger of having no definite tendency, or even of failing to recognise the relativity of the myth. If a

⁸¹ Ibid., pp. 74 sqq. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., op. cit., p. 50.)

⁸² Ibid., p. 232. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 158.)

⁸³ Ibid., pp. 572 sqq. Italics are ours. The words and arrangement are somewhat altered here in the 3rd German edition, op. cit., pp. 365, 366.

⁸⁴ Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, translated by Alban G. Widgery, London, 1912, p. 118. Italics are ours. There are many changes in wording and arrangement in 2nd ed., Leipzig, August, 1913. See Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung: Hinauswachsen des Menschen über die Natur, p. 55. See esp. Der innere Widerspruch des neuen Lebens beim Menschen, pp. 65-71.

more energetic direction of life upon its own content and experiences teaches us to preserve these connections better and to develop them more forcefully, a new type of representation of the whole is yielded in contrast to the old, and far more different from it than may appear at the first glance. We may hope that with its development the truth will be seen more clearly through the myth, and that the striving, which we cannot give up, to win a universal life may not lead us astray into a world of dreams."⁸⁵

"... the modern strengthening of the subject and the ceaseless growth of reflection have so fundamentally overthrown the immediate relation of man to the world that only a far-reaching transformation of life can prepare for a reunion."⁸⁶

"We seem to overstrain our faculty when we think to prove that life, with all its apparent confusions, has still a meaning and value, and can be confidently declared to be worth the living."⁸⁷

"But one thing we must, above all, bear in mind—that if the invisible world is to have the requisite stability and breadth, it cannot be the mere object of our finite longing or any inference laboriously drawn from the conditions of our finite experience; it must be completely independent, and exist in its own right."⁸⁸

It seems imperative to call attention to the extraordinary antithesis in the passage just cited between the reasoning process and the independent invisible reality which it discloses to us.

"... on the plane of our ordinary existence we see humanity split up into mere isolated units." Hence "there can never be one common world," *on this plane*, "and therefore never one truth common to all men and valid for every sphere."⁸⁹

Treating of the difficulties which his own peculiar conception of the spiritual encounters, he says:

"Thus, as we view the puzzle from our own philosophical standpoint, it grows more baffling than before: far from having solved the mystery, we have but wrapped it in deeper gloom."⁹⁰

His attempt to redeem his position is as follows:

"Now, a closer scrutiny into the essentials of this life-process has revealed immanent within it a movement of a unique kind,

⁸⁵ Ibid., pp. 232 sqq. Refer to last note. See Grundlinien: Grundlegender Teil, C, Der Umriss einer Lebensordnung selbstständiger Geistigkeit esp., pp. 115–122.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p. 259.

⁸⁷ Meaning and Value of Life, translated by L. and B. Gibson, London, 1909, p. 2. See Der Sinn und Wert des Lebens, 3rd ed., Leipzig, 1913, Einleitung, p. 1. The wording is slightly altered but the content is the same.

⁸⁸ Ibid., p. 75. See Sinn und Wert des Lebens, pp. 63 sqq.; p. 80.

⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 81. See Sinn und Wert des Lebens, pp. 77–79.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 118. See Sinn und Wert des Lebens: Die scheinbare Ohnmacht des Geisteslebens im All, pp. 113–132, esp. 115.

through whose activity a new life is brought in, different in kind from the life that is ordered by the succession of natural events. Nor did we apprehend this movement as a series of detached occurrences, but as a main tendency set steadily in one direction, gathering the manifoldness of things into a single characteristic whole. . . .: the work of self-realization which we witnessed was the reality itself; and *it was in and through this work of self-discovery that reality established its own foundations of belief*. Life did not here depend upon knowledge. . . . This fundamental fact—the fact that an Independent Spiritual Life springs up thus within us—cannot be controverted by citing the ways of a refractory world, however terrible these ways may be.”⁹¹

“This deepening of the life-problem sets our conviction of the unity of the universe upon a broader and firmer foundation than the ordinary intellectualistic outlook can possibly supply.”⁹²

“The dangers of an intellectualistic ordering of life are plainly visible to us at the present day, and there is no lack of vigorous opposition. But this opposition will hardly attain to complete victory without a return to the roots of science.”⁹³ “. . . he is no longer certain even of the Deity; in any case his relation to the Deity no longer controls the whole of life. In this situation where can he now turn to find truth, and what meaning can this conception still retain? In accordance with the experiences which we have described man can seek truth nowhere else but in himself; his own life must possess a depth which even for himself at first lies in a dim and distant background; with the full appropriation of this depth, however, he may hope to discover a world in himself, or rather he may himself grow into a world. The object then to be aimed at is a transference of life, not into something which exists outside us or above us, but into something which belongs to us, but which can become completely our own life only by a vigorous transformation, and indeed revolution. Reality is not here found already existing, but it has to be built up from within: truth is thus a striving of life towards itself, a seeking for its own being. Hence it cannot be the agreement

⁹¹ Ibid., pp. 119 sqq. Italics ours. See Sinn und Wert des Lebens, p. 80, top; pp. 132–147, 163–165.

⁹² Ibid., Appendix, p. 155. See Sinn und Wert des Lebens, p. 77, “Je mehr das Leben” to “nicht weiter.”

⁹³ Life of the Spirit, translated by Pogson, New York, 1909, p. 268. Italics are ours. We venture to say here that this book is most *disappointing* and *unconvincing*. Much of it is devoted to what Eucken terms in his Introduction “an historical survey,” but the historical data are strongly, and often strangely, colored by the author’s views; e.g., p. 225, where he tells us, in treating of the Sacraments, that “a man’s own disposition in the matter may easily become a secondary consideration.” We can find in it no satisfying proof of God’s existence, of the value of the soul, of immortality—at least in any true sense of the word. To us it seems that the contents are unworthy of the noble title Eucken has affixed to them. See Einführung in eine Philosophie des Geisteslebens: “Das Wahrheitsproblem,” pp. 131–159.

with a given reality: *it becomes an agreement with itself, a self-co-ordination of a life which becomes independent and raises itself to a higher level*, instead of remaining disintegrated and constrained. Its verification can only lie in the fact that, by embracing it, the whole of existence is transformed into spontaneous life, raised to an essentially higher level, and at the same time united into a whole of creative effort which moulds reality. Here the main problem is to find the point where a spontaneous and creative life springs up in man as the deepest thing in his own nature. *According to the form which this life takes, different forms will be assumed by reality and truth*; but that such a life is attainable in some way or other is the common presupposition of that faith in reason which pervades the creative efforts of the modern period and is enunciated with particular clearness in the works of its leading thinkers. The reason which is immanent in the human race must now take the place of the universe and the Deity. This, too, is common to all attempts, viz., that the movement does not proceed from a pre-existing world towards man, but from man towards a world which has first to be constructed.”⁹⁵

We have cited the concluding passage at length because it is typical of Eucken’s irrational position. The words “faith in reason,” and “reason immanent in the human race,” do not redeem the situation. “Faith in reason” is a rather contradictory expression. And what faith can man put in apparent revelations of reason if he is no longer certain either of the Deity or of an external reality?

Eucken’s Critics

This characteristic feature of Eucken’s system⁹⁶ has been pointed out by most of his critics. Hermann says of him: “With Fichte his affinities are deeper. In his anti-individualism, anti-intellectualism, and theological convictions, they go deep indeed.”⁹⁷ Tudor Jones calls attention to the fact, but he considers it a necessary qualification for dealing with the highest problems. We give the passage which he quotes and his comment on it:

“The Infinite Power and Love that has grounded a new spontaneous nature in man over against a dark and hostile world, will conserve such a new nature and its spiritual nucleus, and shelter it against all perils and assaults, so that life as the bearer of Life Eternal can never be wholly lost in the stream of time.”⁹⁸

⁹⁵ Problem of Truth, *ibid.*, pp. 303 sqq. Italics ours.

⁹⁶ The point will be dealt with more fully in the third chapter of this section.

⁹⁷ Eucken and Bergson, London, 1912, p. 49.

⁹⁸ Truth of Religion, *op. cit.*, p. 435. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 303.)

Tudor Jones comments thus:

"We are here in a region farthest removed from sense and understanding; but the remarkable thing is that the conviction of immortality does not dawn on any lower level; it is not on the lower levels a portion of spiritual experience."⁹⁹

Boyce Gibson—whose work preceded that of Tudor Jones—holds an opinion somewhat similar to that expressed in the second part of the above citation. Gibson maintains that a higher reality is utterly beyond the reach of a lower form of knowledge. Spiritual life, e.g., is "inexplicable in terms of scientific categories."¹⁰⁰

In contrast to Tudor Jones, however, he condemns Eucken for his irrationalism. He says:

"Our spiritual freedom and union with God cannot be illumined and developed by any reasoned inquiry which is not inspired by these spiritual experiences. . . . But that such a reasoned inquiry cannot be forthcoming in the case of what is most fundamental in our spiritual experience, Eucken has certainly not proved."¹⁰¹

Waiving the question of categories we take exception to the distinction between "spiritual" and "scientific" knowledge as "higher" and "lower" forms. All spiritual knowledge, apart from Revelation, must be scientific; that is, it can only be obtained by exercising our rational power of observation on the manifold data of experience—under which head must be included our own conscious states. Again "revelation, salvation, grace," are not mere "*regulative concepts*," requiring "categories commensurate with the spiritual experience within which they are conceived,"¹⁰² they are *facts* of a supernatural order;¹⁰³ they belong to the class of truths to which Our Divine Lord referred when He said: "Blessed art thou, Simon-Bar-Jona: because flesh and blood hath not revealed it to thee, but my Father who is in heaven."¹⁰⁴

As Eucken denies the central truth to which our Saviour directly alluded in the above verse, viz., His Own Divinity,¹⁰⁵ and thereby

⁹⁹ An Interpretation of R. Eucken's Philosophy, New York, 1912, p. 162.

¹⁰⁰ R. Eucken's Phil. of Life, 2d ed., London, 1907, p. 111.

¹⁰¹ Ibid. For entire treatment of the point refer to Chapter VII, pp. 100 sqq.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 112.

¹⁰³ We employ "supernatural" in the *Christian* signification of the word, not in the loose sense in which Eucken often uses it.

¹⁰⁴ Matthew, XVI, 17.

¹⁰⁵ See Können wir noch Christen sein? Leipzig, 1911, pp. 31-37. (Can we still be Christians?, New York 1914, pp. 29-35.) Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., pp. 392-398. (Truth of Rel., pp. 582-591.) Lebensanschauung der

forfeits the right to introduce into his system the essential truths of "revelation, salvation, grace," some of his interpreters have sought to justify the presence of the borrowed elements by attempting an explanation, even when, as with Tudor Jones, the solution is found only in irrationalism.

Hermann is more accurate on this point. He tells us that Eucken's "great and inspiring v'loume"—The Truth of Religion—"leaves a cloud of misgiving upon the spirit;" that, "while Eucken impresses us with the reality of this new world, . . . he leaves the greater question of its authority, its right to exact our choice and obedience, untouched."¹⁰⁶

Dr. Alexander makes a similar statement:

"While he insists upon the possibility, nay, the necessity of a new beginning, he fails to reveal the power by which the great decision is made."¹⁰⁷

Dr. Abel Jones, while granting that Eucken gives "little attention to the psychological implications of his theories," and that there is "serious incompleteness," therefore, in his exposition, defends him from the charge of irrationalism in the following words: "In actual fact . . . the charge is more apparent than real, for Eucken does . . . reason and argue closely . . . he feels there is something higher and more valuable in life than thought—and that is action."¹⁰⁸

It is difficult to reconcile Abel Jones' own criticism with his defense. If Eucken gives "little attention to the psychological implications of his theories"—as Dr. A. Jones maintains—and if there is "a serious incompleteness" about his system, then the charge of irrationalism is *not only real*, it is also grave. Again, the relative valuations of thought and action made here—and which are the inverse of the decision of the Great Teacher¹⁰⁹

grossen Denker, 5th Auflage, Leipzig, 1904, pp. 171 sqq. (Problem of Human Life, New York, 1910, pp. 170 sqq.)

It is beyond the scope of our work to criticize the superficial arguments and assertions put forward in the passages to which the reader is referred. It may, however, be stated that confidence in Eucken is profoundly shaken by his ignorance of what "modern research" has and has not "shown." (See Problem of Human Life, p. 171.)

¹⁰⁶ Eucken and Bergson, op. cit., p. 99.

¹⁰⁷ "Christianity and Ethics," as cited in An Evangelical Warning against "The False Note" in Eucken, Current Opinion, 57, Nov., 1914, pp. 339 sqq.

¹⁰⁸ R. Eucken, A Philosophy of Life, New York, pp. 87 sqq.

¹⁰⁹ "Mary hath chosen the best part, which shall not be taken away from her." See Luke X (39-42).

Whose life, according to Eucken himself, "had a standard which has transformed human existence to its very root," and which "exercises evermore a tribunal over the world"¹¹⁰—are calculated to lead to blind fanaticism. Thought, with action following on it, holds the secret of the perseverance which gains the crown: action, with thought following on it, is the prolific source of poignant, lifelong regret.

Meyrick Booth perceives in Eucken's attitude towards Intellectualism "an analogy with Bergson and with the great historical mystics."¹¹¹

Comparison of Eucken and Bergson

That Eucken has close affinity with Bergson on this point seems evident from a comparison of their respective conceptions as to the method of reaching truth. Each rejects the scholastic standard of conformity between thought and thing: "per conformitatem intellectus et rei veritas definitur. Unde conformitatem istam cognoscere, est cognoscere veritatem."¹¹²

Eucken says: "our conception decidedly rejects the widely held view of truth as a correspondence of our thought with an external reality."¹¹³

Though Bergson holds the traditional view of the immediacy of sense-perception and of the objectivity of the external sensations,¹¹⁴ he maintains that the intellect cannot put us in immediate touch

¹¹⁰ Truth of Religion, p. 360. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 249.)

¹¹¹ R. Eucken, His Philosophy and Influence, New York, p. 81.

¹¹² St. Thomas, Summa, I, Q. XVI, a. 2.

¹¹³ Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, op. cit., p. 216.

¹¹⁴ See Matière et Mémoire and L'Évolution Créatrice. On p. 225 of "Matière et Mémoire" he writes:

"On se plaît à mettre les qualités, sous forme de sensations, dans la conscience, tandis que les mouvements s'exécutent indépendamment de nous dans l'espace. Ces mouvements, se composant entre eux, ne donneraient jamais que des mouvements; par un processus mystérieux, notre conscience, incapable de les toucher, les traduirait en sensations qui se projetteraient ensuite dans l'espace et viendraient recouvrir, on ne sait comment, les mouvements qu'elles traduisent. De là deux mondes différents, incapables de communiquer autrement que par un miracle: d'un côté celui des mouvements dans l'espace, de l'autre la conscience avec les sensations. Et, certes, la différence reste irréductible, comme nous l'avons montré nous-mêmes autrefois; entre la qualité, d'une part, et la quantité pure, de l'autre. Mais la question est justement de savoir si les mouvements réels ne présentent entre eux que des différences de quantité, ou s'ils ne seraient pas la qualité même, vibrant pour ainsi dire intérieurement et scandant sa propre existence en un nombre souvent incalculable de moments."

with reality, for reality, according to him, is movement, and the intellect can only grasp the stable and fixed.¹¹⁵

It is intuition, i.e., disinterested instinct (*l'instinct devenu désintéressé, conscient de lui-même, capable de réfléchir sur son objet et de l'élargir indéfiniment*"),¹¹⁶ which enables us to apprehend movement, and therefore to know life, i.e., reality.¹¹⁷

It is just here, that the analogy between the "Élan Vital" and the "Geistesleben" occurs. The conception of each author embraces *all reality*—past, present, and, in a sense, future; for both "L'Élan Vital" and "Das Geistesleben" are "in the making." Some of the passages already cited from Eucken may be referred to in this connection,¹¹⁸ but the following throw further light on their respective methods.

Bergson writes: ". . . La théorie de la connaissance devient une entreprise infiniment difficile, et qui passe les forces de la pure intelligence. Il ne suffit plus, en effet, de déterminer, par une analyse conduite avec prudence, les catégories de la pensée, *il s'agit de les engendrer*. En ce qui concerne l'espace, il faudrait, par un effort *sui generis* de l'esprit, suivre la progression ou plutôt la régression de l'extra-spatial se dégradant en spatialité."¹¹⁹

Eucken writes: "Wenn die Philosophie vom Ganzen des Geisteslebens zum Ganzen der Wirklichkeit strebt, so liegt ihre Arbeit nicht innerhalb eines gegebenen Raumes, sondern sie hat

¹¹⁵ See *L'Évolution Créatrice*, Paris, 1914. 15 éd., p. 169. "Bornons-nous à dire que le stable et l'immuable sont ce à quoi notre intelligence s'attache en vertu de sa disposition naturelle. *Notre intelligence ne se représente clairement que l'immobilité.*" Also p. 179. "*L'intelligence est caractérisée par une incompréhension naturelle de la vie.*" The italics in each case are Bergson's.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

¹¹⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 179: "C'est sur la forme même de la vie, au contraire, qu'est moulé l'instinct. . . il ne fait que continuer le travail par lequel la vie organise la matière."

¹¹⁸ See also *L'Évolution Créatrice*, p. 217 sq. "Un processus identique a dû tailler en même temps matière et intelligence dans une étoffe qui les contenait toutes deux. Dans cette réalité nous nous replacerons de plus en plus complètement, à mesure que nous nous efforcerons davantage de transcender l'intelligence pure;" and compare with *Geistige Strömungen*, op. cit., p. 31. "Zu einem solchen Ganzen gehört eine wie aller Mannigfaltigkeit so auch dem Gegensatz von Subjekt und Objekt überlegene Einheit. Dies Ganz entwickelt sich mittels des Gegensatzes von Subjekt und Objekt, von Kraft und Gegenstand, aber es bleibt ihm überlegen und hält beide Seiten auch in der Scheidung zusammen, auf geistigem Boden kann jede einzelne sich nur zusammen mit der anderen entfalten und ihre eigene Höhe finden. So sind hier nicht sowohl die beiden Seiten einander entgegengesetzt, als vielmehr der Stand ihrer Einigung, der Stand der Volltätigkeit dem der Spaltung, dem des halbseitigen und zugleich leeren Lebens . . ., nicht die Beziehung der einen Seite auf die andere, sondern nur die schöpferische Synthese erzeugt eine Innerlichkeit und zugleich eine volle, bei sich selbst befindliche Wirklichkeit; eine solche kann nie von draussen dargeboten werden."

¹¹⁹ *L'Évolution Créatrice*, p. 226. Italics ours.

diesen Raum erst herzustellen, sie findet nicht ihre Welt, sondern sie hat sie erst zu bilden; das Ganze, das sie sucht, tritt ihr nie von aussen her entgegen, es will von innen her entworfen sein, es verlangt eine *Synthese schöpferischer Art*. Zur Selbständigkeit wird dieses Weltbild der Philosophie namentlich dadurch getrieben, dass das von ihrer Synthese umspannte Dasein ohne Umwandlung nicht in sie einzugehen vermag. Denn was es bietet, ist viel zu verschiedenartig, um sich ohne weiteres zusammenzufügen. Namentlich das Zusammentreffen von Natur und Innenwelt in Einer Wirklichkeit treibt zwingend zur Umwandlung des ersten Anblicks. Schon dadurch ist namentlich der modernen Gedankenarbeit ein Trieb zur Metaphysik unzerstörbar eingepflanzt, dass die Neuzeit den Gegensatz von Natur und Seele zur vollen Klarheit gebracht hat, . . . Die Hilfe intellektueller Phantasie ist dabei unentbehrlich; *was aber diese Phantasie an Gestalten entwirft, das wird sie dem Menschen nicht eindringlich machen können, ohne eben der Erfahrungswelt Bilder zu entleihen, über welche die Philosophie hinausführt.*"¹²⁰

It seems to us that the analogy approaches a positive similarity, at least of function, in the conception of the Creative Synthesis in the one system, and the Engendered Thought-Categories in the other. This may be made clearer by quoting again from a passage already cited. In the *Meaning and Value of Life* Eucken says: ". . . the work of self-realization which we witnessed was the reality itself; and it was in and through this work of self-discovery that reality established its own foundations of belief."¹²¹

Nevertheless the systems, as wholes, offer, perhaps, more points of difference than agreement in fundamentals.¹²²

¹²⁰ *Geistige Strömungen*, pp. 97, 98. The italics are ours. A further point of analogy may be noticed in the Concentration Points of the Spiritual Life, or human foci, as one may term them, and the Bergsonian conception of personality as revealed in the following:

"Plus nous prenons conscience de notre progrès dans la pure durée, plus nous sentons les diverses parties de notre être entrer les unes dans les autres et notre personnalité tout entière se concentrer en un point, ou mieux en une pointe, qui s'insère dans l'avenir en l'entamant sans cesse. En cela consistent la vie et l'action libres. Laissons-nous aller, au contraire; au lieu d'agir, rêvons. Du même coup notre moi s'éparpille; notre passé, qui jusque-là se ramassait sur lui-même dans l'impulsion indivisible qu'il nous communiquait, se décompose en mille et mille souvenirs qui s'extériorisent les uns par rapport aux autres." *L'Évolution Créatrice*, pp. 219, 220.

¹²¹ *Meaning and Value of Life*, p. 120, op. cit.

¹²² E.G., all Eucken's works tend to a rejection of the objectivity of the universe: in *Main Currents of Modern Thought* (*Geistige Strömungen*) he tells us that nature is a lower form of inner life; and in *Meaning and Value of Life*, that "the sense-life sinks in importance, becomes insubstantial and problematic, and is reduced to the status of a mere phenomenon the truth of which has first to be discovered." See *Meaning and Value of Life*, pp. 33 sqq.

Bergson, on the other hand, argues forcibly for the objective value of

Eucken and the "Historical Mystics"

The second analogy that Booth seems to perceive, viz., "with the historical mystics," we claim to be non-existent if by "historical mystics" Booth refers to the recognized mystics of the Catholic Church. These were not anti-intellectualistic either in theory or practice. That they had infused knowledge and a more direct apprehension of God than is possible to ordinary human means, Catholics believe; but, that those who were thus favored ever sought of themselves to acquire knowledge thus, is disproved by their own writings. St. Teresa and St. John of the Cross, the two great mystics of the sixteenth century, warn the faithful against seeking or desiring such extraordinary manifestations, lest they become the dupes of their own imagination.¹²³

St. Teresa's Letters reveal to us a woman of excellent judgment, and "sound common-sense." Anything more unlike the works of anti-intellectualistics it would be hard to imagine.

The attitude of the Church is unmistakable on this point. She exhibits the utmost reserve in dealing with particular cases, and only after a prolonged and laboriously minute scrutiny will she give the sanction of her approval.¹²⁴

She values the "princely gift of Reason," with which man is endowed, too highly to advocate its abdication.

Again, the human faculty of reason is the *sine qua non* of all supernatural manifestations in man or to him. The descriptions which the saints have given of their mystic states point to the fact that their understanding was flooded with new light—to use a metaphor—and enlarged so as to apprehend what before, or under normal conditions, was "beyond its ken." Even in an ecstasy of love the saints *knew something* of the Beauty and Goodness that attracted them; otherwise how could they love? Men cannot love that of which they are absolutely ignorant, still less could they leave descriptions of the effects it produced in them.

Reason and *reasoning* are not synonymous terms, and this is what the anti-intellectualistics fail to grasp: they either deny the

sensation. References have been given on preceding pages. Again, Eucken rejects a vast body of truths on the ground that they are anthropomorphic, while Bergson errs by an exaggerated anthropomorphism.

¹²³ See *La Vie de St. Thérèse, écrite par elle-même*; also, St. John of the Cross—"La montée du Carmel."

¹²⁴ An examination of the process of canonization of any saint may prove an instructive study for those who find analogies between Anti-Intellectualists and Catholic mystics.

intuitive power of the mind or ascribe intuition to blind instinct, as with Bergson; or to a "mysterious" communication which is at the same time an "axiomatic certainty," as with Eucken.

It is not our purpose here to criticize Eucken's own view of Mysticism. It will suffice to say that his treatment, in our opinion, is weak and superficial, and that he allots to mysticism—to some extent—a rôle which would be better fulfilled by Prayer: prayer is one of the missing quantities in Eucken's religious system. We may add that his inability to recognize the infinite distance separating the misty philosophical speculations of Plotinus from Christian Mysticism is an unfavorable index of his trustworthiness as an authority on the subject.¹²⁵

Further Criticism

Henry C. Sheldon gives a clear and decisive criticism of Eucken's unwarrantable rejection of our rational cognitions. His words are: "A subordinate occasion for questioning the teaching of our philosopher is found in his treatment of the usual arguments for the divine existence—the cosmological, the teleological, and that from human nature taken as a basis of scientific induction. He rates them as incompetent to fulfil their purpose, and the ground of so rating them he expresses in these terms: 'We must not forget that no province can prove anything outside its own reach, and that an attempt to do this leads into anthropomorphism.' In so far as this proposition is meant to emphasize the truth that religion has evidences of peculiar efficacy in its own worthful content, and is not in any complete sense dependent upon the data of scientific study, it is to be cordially approved. But it is possible to make too emphatic an antithesis between the scientific and the religious. . . . Indeed, we do not see how the assumption of such disparate spheres between the two as is contained in the cited proposition and in its application in the context can be maintained without

¹²⁵ See *Problem of Human Life*, p. 122. "Plotinus . . . supplied Christianity with liberating forces, and preserved throughout the Middle Ages, in opposition to the externalising influence of the prevailing organisation, an undercurrent of pure emotional life." See also pp. 104–116. For references to other mystics see index, p. 579. (*Lebensanschauung* der G. Denker, op. cit., pp. 128, 129, 107–123; index, 520.) Consult also, "Life of Spirit," pp. 351 sqq., index, p. 406; *Life's Basis*, pp. 246, 247. (*Einführung in eine Phil. des Geisteslebens*, pp. 168 sqq, index, p. 196; *Grundlinien*, p. 104.) Compare also with passage p. 95 in *Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt*, Leipzig, 2nd ed., 1907; *Truth of Rel.*, index, p. 620. (*Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel.*, op. cit., p. 421.)

prejudicial results. . . . The supposition of the rationality of the world system—a supposition absolutely necessary to any security in intellectual procedure—implies a degree of correspondence between part and part. From any different point of view we are left inclosed by the limitations of the human province; and nothing can help us out. Not even the function of a supreme spiritual life can afford us an outlet, for we have no immediate knowledge of this transcendent reality. What we know immediately is certain effects in us which serve as a ground of rational inference—an inference none the less actual because possibly very swift and confident. . . . We take the sane and warrantable course in appealing to the rationality of the universe as involving a degree of correspondence between part and part, and so providing that data in one department may have more or less significance for another province.”¹²⁶

It was Boyce Gibson’s conviction when he published his interpretation of Eucken’s philosophy—November, 1906—that anti-intellectualism was not a necessary feature of the system; that the author’s premises, in fact, justified solutions doing truer justice to the dignity of our reason than those which he offered. He even held that Eucken was his own best critic; in support of this statement he quotes the following letter from him:

“You are perfectly right in supposing that my distrust of intellectualistic philosophies has prevented me from fully recognising the value of an intellectual and logical manipulation of ideas. The fact that the conflict with intellectualism plays so prominent a part in my treatment may be largely accounted for by the conditions which influence our thinking in Germany to-day. We are veritably deluged with intellectualism. A man will believe that he has won the good life when he has reached satisfactory ideas upon the subject.”¹²⁷

We must differ from Boyce Gibson in our estimate of Eucken’s power of self-criticism; the cited extract suggests a misapprehension on the part of the critic as to *what* “*Intellectualism*” really stands for. The intuitive power of reason is, surely, but ill described in the phrase “intellectual and logical manipulation of ideas;” indeed the expression indicates cross-division. Further, though Eucken is right in insisting on the necessity of good practical living, he is wrong in slighting the equally great need of knowing *what is good*.

¹²⁶ R. Eucken’s *Message to Our Age*, New York, pp. 47 sqq.

¹²⁷ See Boyce Gibson, *op. cit.*, pp. 10–14, 106.

"I can easier teach twenty what were good to be done, than be one of the twenty to follow mine own teaching,"¹²⁸ is a poet's statement of the profound psychological truth against which Eucken is rebelling, viz., that the will does not always follow the dictates of "right reason." One thing is certain, however,—if no one knows "what were good to be done," then no *good* can be done, though many useful actions may be accomplished; in order that an action may be *good*, in the true signification of the word, some sort of knowledge, either actual or habitual, must be possessed of its end.

Conclusion

The development of Eucken's thought has not turned in the direction of Intellectualism, on the contrary, the irrationalistic element seems more pronounced in his later works. The Theory of Knowledge which Boyce Gibson looked forward to as the "sole true remedy" for Eucken's "spiritual mysteries"¹²⁹ has appeared. Its advent, for those who accept the system, has but intensified the darkness enveloping the entire sphere of human knowledge. It reiterates the exorbitant, irrationalistic demands which Eucken makes upon our faith as the first step in the paths of knowledge. In the second part of *Erkennen und Leben* he writes:

"Unsere kritische Untersuchung lief in die Forderung aus, dass im Bereich des Menschen ein selbständiger Lebenskomplex, ja eine Welt entstehe; nur eine solche Welt, die ihm aus den Bewegungen seines eignen Lebens zugeht und ihm daher gegenwärtig bleibt, kann zum Standort seines Denkens und zum Vorwurf seines Erkennens werden. Ein derartiger Lebenszusammenhang wird nicht zu erreichen sein ohne eine wesentliche Umwandlung der vorgefundenen Lage, aber wenn er insofern neu ist, so fehlt ihm nicht eine Anknüpfung an den Gesamtstand des menschlichen Lebens."¹³⁰

In his summary he states:

1. Nur soweit wir an einem Beisichselbstsein des Lebens teilgewinnen, ist für uns Erkennen möglich. Es bleibt dabei viel Platz für andere intellektuelle Leistungen, aber Erkennen sind diese nicht.

¹²⁸ Shakespeare, *Merchant of Venice*, Act I, Sc. II (Portia).

¹²⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 114.

¹³⁰ *Erkennen und Leben*, p. 76, Leipzig, 1912. This volume gives the first formulation of the Theory. (*Knowledge and Life*, translated by Tudor Jones, London, 1913, p. 143.)

2. Ein solches Beisichselbstsein muss im Grunde unseres Wesens wirken, aber zu unserm vollen Eigentum wird es nur mit Hilfe der weltgeschichtlichen Arbeit; wer es durch blosse, Bewusstseinsanalyse glaubt unmittelbar ergreifen zu können, der unterschätzt den Tatcharakter unseres Lebens und verfällt unvermeidlich einem Intellektualismus, wenn auch feinerer Art."¹³¹

Even if we blindly bow before his dogmas we are as far off—in truth much further—from the knowledge we seek as we were before. A theoretical description of how knowledge is acquired, though it may win belief, or faith, does not necessitate practical results. It must be remembered that however much Eucken advocates action, he has still to *prove* that truth is won through action. Experience—whether popular or scientific—does not reveal any trace of the “Lebensprozess” of Eucken’s conception; reason rejects it as a contradiction. We must therefore either accept it in blind faith with a hope that knowledge will come “somehow or other,” or, turn our attention to “the widely held view of truth as a correspondence of thought with an external reality” which Eucken so “decidedly rejects.” In the next section we shall examine this “Life-Process”—which he considers to be at once the source and instrument of all true knowledge—more in detail. In connection with anti-intellectualism—whether of Activism or Bergsonism—it may be pointed out that a system of philosophy, based on the discrediting of the faculty which generically marks off man from brute, is a travesty of all scientific knowledge—and here we use “scientific” in its widest sense, to include, therefore, the philosophical as well as the empirical sciences. Yorke Fausset, in his criticism of Eucken’s religious position says:

“But a Christianity in which the Divine-Human personality of Jesus Christ is no longer the determining factor or, in New Testament language, the ‘chief corner-stone’ is not ‘another’ but a ‘different’ Gospel.”¹³²

With equal truth we may affirm that a world in which man’s intellect had ceased to be his means of knowledge and his guide through life would not be a *more modern* world, it would be an *absolutely different* one.

¹³¹ Ibid., p. 160.

¹³² W. Yorke Fausset, Neo-Christianity of R. Eucken, Ch. Quarterly Review, London, Oct., 1912, p. 32.

CHAPTER II

THE LIFE-PROCESS

The Life-Process (Der Lebensprozess) or Spiritual Life (Das Geistesleben) is, according to Eucken, the foundation of all reality and truth; it is more: it is itself reality and truth. The individual can win a spiritual content for his life and attain to true knowledge only through an "immediacy" of the Spiritual Life. In the inmost depth of his being man discovers the Spiritual Life, which is also "his own," present to him "as a possibility." By spiritual work ("geistige Arbeit") he appropriates it, and, in so doing, wins knowledge and truth.

Activism

"Durch die Tätigkeit und innerhalb der Tätigkeit erfolgt eine Scheidung zwischen Sinnlichem und Unsinnlichem; hier vermag das Unsinnliche sich rein zu entfalten und auch zu einem Ganzen zusammenzuschliessen, die Tätigkeit kann sich des Eindringens fremder Elemente erwehren, das Sinnliche aus dem Kern in die Aussenseite drängen und es zu einer nebensächlichen Begleitererscheinung herabsetzen. . . . Das Problem des Denkens ist aber nur ein Ausschnitt aus dem Problem des Lebens, überall kann die höhere Stufe eine Selbständigkeit wahren. . . . So wenig sich daher sagen lässt, dass reines Denken und reines Wollen als fertige Grössen vorhanden sind, sie sind Tatsachen, Wirklichkeiten im Reich der Tätigkeit, sie sind Triebkräfte geistigen Schaffens. . . . Begriffe wie die des Unendlichen, Unbedingten u.s.w. werden in der geistigen Arbeit positive Grössen; auch hat alle jene Bildlichkeit oder Negativität des Gottesbegriffes den Aufbau eines Reiches der Religion nicht gehindert; wie hätte sie von den grossen Ordnungen des Menschheitslebens bis ins innerste Gemüt des Individuums so mächtig wirken können, wenn nicht die Grössen innerhalb ihres Gebietes eine positive Bedeutung gewonnen hätten? Verständlich wird allerdings diese geistige Positivität erst vom Selbstleben aus; denn, wie wir sahen, kann erst dadurch, dass ein Selbst in den Betätigungen gegenwärtig bleibt, in ihnen Erfahrungen macht, aus ihnen zur Einheit zurückkehrt, *dem Leben ein Inhalt erwachsen.*"¹³³

"Die Welt selbständigen Geisteslebens kann unsere Welt nur werden, wenn sie auch bei uns entsteht; das aber heisst, dass ein ursprünglicher Lebensprozess in uns aufgehen und eine geistige

¹³³ Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt, op. cit., pp. 168-170. Italics are ours.

Wirklichkeit erzeugen muss. Ein solcher Prozess dürfte nicht Dinge ausser sich anerkennen und sich von draussen her an ihnen zu tun machen, sondern er müsste als Volltätigkeit in dem oben erörterten Sinne den Gegenstand in sich schliessen und aus sich entwickeln. Er dürfte ferner nicht eine blosser Leistung innerhalb einer gegebenen Welt, sondern er müsste ein selbsttätiges Leben gegenüber aller Gegebenheit sein; er dürfte nicht in einer vorgefundenen Welt nur dieses und jenes verbessern, sondern er hätte ein neues Sein mit eigentümlichen Grössen und Gütern zu schaffen."¹³⁴

Two questions require a satisfactory answer before we can rationally accept the new criterion of truth:

1. What, in last analysis, is the nature of this Life-Process?
2. How is it revealed to us? Under what conditions does the "immediacy" of the Spiritual Life occur? What makes us aware of the peculiarly objective¹³⁵ character of that which is experienced in the "Gemüt?" or "Unmittelbarkeit?"^{135a} Eucken has, himself, rejected the intellectualistic standpoint.¹³⁶

Nature of the Life-Process

The answer to the first question may be sought in citations from the philosopher's works. In "Meaning and Value of Life" he writes:

"The natural and the spiritual stages *both fall within an all-enveloping life* whose very process of self-development is to pass upward from the one to the other, and so come into full realization within our universe through the very impulse of its own movement."¹³⁷

"The links that mediate between the two show that natural and spiritual alike belong, in last resort, to one and the same world, and that there is a *Whole transcending all difference, and even all opposition.*"¹³⁸

¹³⁴ Ibid, p. 27.

¹³⁵ Eucken insists on the objective character of the Spiritual Life—even though it is "our own" life—and he draws a sharp contrast between "subjective" or merely "psychical states," and the spiritual life whereby the soul wins a "content."

^{135a} Eucken makes frequent use of this term in *Hauptprobleme der Religionsphilosophie der Gegenwart*; see esp. pp. 28–32.

¹³⁶ See Truth of Rel. passage cited chapter I. "The experience of history testifies to the particular *naïveté* of basing religion on thought, feeling, or will." p. 84. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 56: "Nach den Erfahrungen der Geschichte lässt sich nicht wohl aus Denken, Fühlen, Wollen Religion zusammensetzen," but the adjective "*naïve*" is found on p. 55.)

¹³⁷ Meaning and Value of Life, p. 86. Italics are ours. See Sinn und Wert des Lebens: Geistesleben und menschliches Dasein, pp. 91–101, especially p. 100.

¹³⁸ Ibid, pp. 115, 116. Italics ours.

From *Die Einheit des Geisteslebens* we have selected the following:

"Das Geisteswesen ist nicht eine punktuelle Existenz, welche erst nachträglich zu einem fremden All in Beziehungen tritt, sondern es hat an einem allumfassenden Ganzen unmittelbar Teil, und es entwickelt nur seine eigene Natur, wenn es seine Interessen ins Unermessliche ausdehnt, ohne auf eine Ganzheit verzichten zu wollen. Diese Thatsache erhält jetzt beim Problem des Personalseins eine weitere Bekräftigung und Entfaltung. Ein personales Lebenssystem kann es schlechterdings nur geben zusammen mit einem Ganzen personaler Wirklichkeit, einer personalen Welt. Diese aber lässt sich, da die Umfassung des Lebensprozesses von einer zentralen Einheit, *die Erhebung des Daseins zum Selbstleben*, hier die entscheidende Eigentümlichkeit ausmacht, nur gewinnen, wenn eine kosmische Einheit die Wirklichkeit umspannt, wenn alles Geschehen einen Einheitspunkt hat, wenn also ein universales Personalwesen die Grundlage der Entfaltung alles Personallebens bildet."¹³⁹

"Als allgemeinste These erscheinen in dem Zusammenhange unserer Untersuchung die Sätze, dass alles Sein in einem Selbstwesen wurzelt, dass aber verschiedene Stufen der Gegenwart des Selbst möglich sind, dass *mit dem Eintreten des Selbst in den Lebensprozess die Geistigkeit beginnt und mit der Entwicklung aller Wirklichkeit aus dem Selbst sich vollendet*. Was als Selbstwesen Voraussetzung, wird als Selbstleben Aufgabe; es handelt sich darum, ein zunächst in scheinbarer Jenseitigkeit befindliches Prinzip, ohne das einmal die Wirklichkeit keine Wahrheit erreichen kann, für uns und unsere Weltlage zu voller Entwicklung zu bringen. Dies aber kann nur geschehen, indem das Selbst sich zur That verkörpert, sich in ein Thun hineinlegt, dadurch das entgegengesetzte Dasein in sich zieht und in sein Werk verwandelt. Da das Selbst in dem kosmischen Sinne, wie es hier verstanden wird, nicht von draussen an die Wirklichkeit kommt, sondern innerhalb ihrer liegt und wirkt, so kann sein Fortgang zur That eine Erhebung der Dinge zu ihrem eigenen Wesen sein."¹⁴⁰

"Des weiteren haben uns auch darüber die Untersuchungen aufgeklärt, dass in der spezifischen Ausprägung des Geisteslebens zur Vernunft- und Personalwelt nicht eine nachträgliche Zuthat vorliegt, die man ablösen und fallen lassen könnte, um einen allgemeineren, minder problematischen Begriff desto sicherer festzuhalten, sondern jene Welt zeigte sich als die begründende Voraussetzung und als die treibende Kraft aller und jeder geistigen Wirklichkeit, mit dem Selbstleben steht und fällt die Geistigkeit."¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ *Einheit des Geisteslebens*, p. 355. Italics ours.

¹⁴⁰ *Op. cit.*, pp. 401 sqq. Italics ours.

¹⁴¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 463.

In the Truth of Religion we find: "There originates in nature in its wending towards the animal level numerous and clear traces of psychic life. . . . But the inner life remains scattered and bound, a mere piece of an alien world, empty in the midst of all the passion of the animal impulse. If now—not in man himself, but yet within the range of humanity—a clarification and a liberation arise, if here the inner life becomes independent and a depth of existence opens—that such a fact has happened from simple beginnings and by a very slow ascent does not alter the main fact in the least,—then nature cannot any more signify the whole of reality, but can only signify a special stage of it—a stage beyond which the world-process proceeds to an existence-for-self. This new fact is far too original and signifies far too much an inverted order of things to be understood as a mere furtherance of the mechanical movement of nature itself; rather must it be a cosmic life superior to nature which breaks forth thus—a cosmic life which works also in nature but which proceeds beyond it to a stage of self-completion. In such a connection the *Spiritual Life* cannot at all be viewed as only a result; it must also be valid as a principle; it can be the aim and the culmination of the world-process only if it also forms its foundation and presupposition, and if that which at first appears as a result works in and through the whole movement. An energy of the Whole must be active from the outset if the manifold is to be united into a Whole, and through such a union is to rise to a higher plane. How could an All bring forth an independent inner life if it were soulless in itself?

"*Nature and the unfolded spirit become herewith stages of the world-process which, beyond the juxtaposition of nature with its bare relations, progress to a total-life which overcomes the cleft between obscure substance and unsubstantial happening, by making the Life-process independent and developing all substance from it. At the same time, the All-life can no more be a stream flowing nobody knows whither and which nobody experiences.*"¹⁴²

"What happens here is *mysterious enough*. Life forges its way here, beyond the work of the world, to a persistency and duration in itself, to a new kind of being, but in all this it is at the outset split up into so many isolated appearances, and it falls easily into mere subjectivity. But some kind of unity seems present in the foundation, but it is not able to overcome the hindrance, and succeeds in bringing forth no more than poor results. . . . And here Characteristic religion steps in with its fundamental assertion that a '*becoming*' independence of pure inwardness and the unfolding of a new unity of life result, but this is shown to happen not through the energy of these qualities themselves but *through* the

¹⁴² Italics ours. Truth of Rel., pp. 164–166. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., pp. 113, 114.) Compare Sinn und Wert des Lebens, op. cit., pp. 60 sqq.

communication of the inmost nature of things—from the pure self-subsistence of reality."¹⁴³

In the Life of the Spirit we read:

"Where *Nature ranks as a stage of reality*, which remains even when the spiritual is developed, the *power which this stage contains must be enlisted in the service of the life-process*, in order that it may not become too weak. Not by withdrawing from nature, but only by overcoming, appropriating, and penetrating it can the *spiritual life* attain its full height and strength; only thus can life be brought from mere outline to the finished product."¹⁴⁴

"... man can participate in a cosmic life that forms the essence of things, and so gain possession of truth."¹⁴⁵

"If truth, if a life which fashions the world and partakes of the essence of things, are not in the first place incontestable facts for us, then all our trouble about them is wasted."¹⁴⁶

In Main Currents of Modern Thought occurs the following:

"In *spiritual life* we recognize a new development of the universe in which it unfolds a depth and gathers itself together to form a world-life. To participate in *spiritual life* means therefore to participate in a world-life. The experiences which the movements and changes of the spiritual life give rise to do not belong to any atomic self, but are appreciated only as revelations of reality as a whole.

"Moreover this new life has shown itself superior to the contrast between subject and object; it is no half-being needing to be complemented from without, but as fully active life it is raised above this contrast. It carries within itself the tracings of an independent reality, and *its movement is a struggle towards the complete development of this reality.*"¹⁴⁷

"Our concept of Spiritual life as the orientation of reality towards an inner life of its own [der Wendung der Wirklichkeit zu einem Eigen- und Innenleben], again reveals a passage between Scylla and Charybdis. For we look upon *spiritual life* as the '*coming to-itself*' of the world-process [Zusichselbstkommen des Weltprozesses], the winning of an essential being and meaning over against the meaningless network of relationships and self-preservative activities which result from the régime of the mere individual."¹⁴⁸

¹⁴³ Ibid., pp. 420 sqq. Italics ours. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, p. 292.)

¹⁴⁴ The Life of the Spirit, p. 272. Italics ours. (Einführung in eine Philosophie des Geisteslebens, p. 129.)

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 327. Italics ours. (Einführung, p. 156, "an einem wesensbildenden Weltleben.")

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 331. Italics ours. (Einführung, p. 158, "ein weltbildendes und wesenhaftes Leben.")

¹⁴⁷ Translated by Booth, New York, 1912, p. 132. Italics ours. (Geistige Strömungen, p. 96.)

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 390. Italics ours. (Geistige Strömungen, p. 326.)

In *Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt* Eucken writes:

"Einen weg, in der Einheit die Verschiedenheit festzuhalten, eröffnet aber die Idee, dass *Natur und Geist* die *Hauptstufen* einer *Bewegung des Alls* bilden, dass Ein begründendes und umfassendes Sein in ihnen und durch sie seine eigne Verwirklichung findet. In solchem Zusammenhange scheint erst mit der Wendung zum Geist das All ein Beisichselbstsein zu erreichen, sich zu einem inneren Zusammenhang und einem deutlichen Sinn aufzuringen."¹⁴⁹

"*Jene wesenhafte Geistigkeit . . . muss die erste und ursprüngliche Lebensquelle werden, die Kraft, die alles übrige trägt und treibt, der feste Punkt, woran sich alles andere hält. Dazu gehört an erster Stelle, dass ein Alleben wesenhafter Geistigkeit in uns unmittelbar durchbricht.*"¹⁵⁰

In *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, he states:

"*The life-process is . . . seen to be a movement that is neither from object to subject, nor from subject to object; neither the subject's attainment of content from the object, nor the object's becoming controlled by the subject, but an advance of a self-conscious life in and through the antithesis. Life, by this movement, ceases to be a single, thin thread; it wins breadth; it expands to an inner universality. At the same time a depth is manifested in that a persistent and comprehensive activity emerges which lives in the antithesis. In this manner life first becomes a life in a spiritual sense, a self-conscious and self-determining life, a self-consciousness.*"¹⁵¹

"*Nature, which there was a tendency to regard as the whole, is now of the essence of a wider reality and a stage in its development.*"¹⁵²

"The transition to an independent inwardness is not something which happens externally to the world but within it: no special sphere, separate from all the rest, is originated; but *reality itself evolves an inner life*: it is the world itself that reveals a *spiritual depth*, or, as we might say, a soul."¹⁵³

"It is necessary not only that the life-process achieve more, but also that it grow in itself, change that which is alien to it into its own, and display more reality within itself; life must experience every single activity as the manifestation of the activity of the whole, and thus, along with *unlimited extension*, preserve self-consciousness."¹⁵⁴

¹⁴⁹ Op. cit., pp. 24 sqq. Italics are ours.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 69. Italics ours.

¹⁵¹ Italics ours. *Life's Basis*, p. 146. (Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung, p. 73.)

¹⁵² Ibid., p. 149. Italics ours. (Grundlinien, p. 75, "die Natur, die sonst das Ganze scheinen mochte, wird jetzt zu einer Stufe einer weiteren Wirklichkeit.")

¹⁵³ Ibid., p. 148. Italics ours. (Grundlinien, p. 74.)

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., p. 213. Italics ours.

"The more necessary it is to insist upon an animation of reality through the development of self-conscious life, the more must we guard against the danger of anthropomorphism. . . . Only with much toil and with continual self-criticism can life be brought to the point where the transition to self-consciousness is possible; and even then the whole cannot, under human circumstances, be attained at one stroke; but at first life must endeavor to concentrate, to form a nucleus so that in this way it may acquire a firm basis, and from this take up a struggle for its further spiritualisation."¹⁵⁵

" . . . this life ["a world-transcendent spiritual life which is purely and absolutely self conscious"] must become man's own life, and spirituality in this way self-consciously advance towards divinity"[!]¹⁵⁶

In "Können wir noch Christen sein?" we find:

"So steigen mit der Wendung zur Geistigkeit die Ideen eines inneren Zusammenhanges und einer Ewigkeit auf und werden zu Mächten über das Leben. Aber die Wandlung greift noch tiefer in das innere Gewebe des Lebens ein. Schon die Betrachtung der Neuzeit zeigte, wie das geistige Leben eine Scheidung und Wieder-Verbindung vollzieht, wie es Kraft und Gegenstand, Subjekt und Objekt zunächst auseinanderrückt und sie dann durch erhöhendes Schaffen wieder zusammenbringt. Hier erscheint zunächst die geistige Bewegung nicht als ein blosses Hin- und Hergehen von einer Seite zur andern, sondern als eine Tätigkeit, die beide Seiten umfasst, und die mit ihrer Versetzung des ganzen Lebensumfanges in Bewegung Volltätigkeit heissen mag; ferner aber erscheint hier das geistige Wirken nicht als ein blosses Verwerthen gegebener Elemente, sondern als ein Quell selbständigen Lebens, als eine Kraft der inneren Erhöhung. Hier befindet sich das Leben noch mitten im Fluss und stellt sich dabei als ein Vordringen und Aufklimmen dar, die von ihm vollzogene Verbindung ist keine blosser Zusammensetzung, sondern ein Eröffnen neuer Tiefen, ein Sichentzündendes des Geistes im Zusammenstoss."¹⁵⁷

"Es gilt bei der Religion den Gewinn eines Lebens, das uns mit überwältigender Kraft ergreife und uns über den vorgefundenen Stand hinaus zu neuer Höhe erhebe, es tut hier ein gewaltiges Aufrütteln not, ein Abbrechen des Alten, ein Hervorbrechen ursprünglicher Lebensquellen."¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 214. Italics are ours.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 275. See Grundlinien, p. 132, "Es erscheint ein starkes Verlangen," etc., to "zur Göttlichkeit steigern."

¹⁵⁷ Op. cit., pp. 98 sqq. Italics ours. (Can we still be Christians?, p. 92.) R. Siebert in his interpretation of Eucken writes: "Zur Geistigkeit entwickelt sich die Menschheit und der Mensch auf dem Grunde einer ewigen Geisteswelt." Rudolf Eucken's geschichtsphilosophische Ansichten, Berlin, 1909, p. 70.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 145. (Can we still be Christians?, p. 135.)

In Erkennen und Leben we read:

“Dies Problem des Trägers aber führt unmittelbar zum Lebensproblem, und hier wird sofort ersichtlich, dass unser Leben nicht ein blosses Stück eines gegebenen Daseins ist, dass es sich nicht in das Verhältnis zur Umgebung erschöpft, sondern dass es *aus den Verkettungen des Daseins* herauszutreten, eine Selbständigkeit zu gewinnen, eine Selbsttätigkeit zu entwickeln und eine Tatwelt aufzubringen vermag. Solche Wendung ergibt einen völlig neuen Anblick der Wirklichkeit und stellt sie als eine grosse Aufgabe dar. . . . Dass hier grosse Verwicklungen entstehen, *dass die Welt, die von innen aufsteigt, und die Welt, welche wir um uns und auch in uns finden, in harte Konflikte miteinander geraten, das ist die gemeinsame Überzeugung aller Religionen, aber auch aller schaffenden Kunst und aller durchgreifenden Philosophie.* Sie alle bejahen nicht das gegebene Dasein, sondern *das Ja*, auf dem sie bestehen, *finden sie nur im Bruch mit jenem Dasein*, nur durch Erschütterung und Verneinung hindurch. *Die Verneinung wird ihnen damit bei allem Schmerz ein wesentlicher Faktor des geistigen Lebens*, ja sie erscheint als das Salz des Lebens, ohne das es schal und seelenlos wird. Erst die Verneinung führt das Leben zu rechter Bewegung, Kraft und Vertiefung.”¹⁵⁹

In *Christianity and the New Idealism* Eucken gives a warning which does not tend to lessen the difficulties in the way of the Life-Process as Truth-Standard; his words are:

“Only we must beware of confounding the form that religion takes among men—the *existential form*, in a word—with its *originating ground* or its spiritual substance.”¹⁶⁰

Such is the exposition, in the philosopher's own words, of the central conception of *Activism*.

Analysis and Criticism

A single reading suffices to show that the proposed basis is too insecure a foundation for the structure of human knowledge.

What reality can that have which, in itself, is *neither matter nor purely spirit, nor essentially different from either since each is a stage in its self-development?* Alban G. Widgery, in his Introduction to “Life's Basis and Life's Ideal” says:

“The careful reader cannot fail to see that, ultimately, the philosophy is essentially mystical.”¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁹ Erkennen und Leben, pp. 69 sqq. Italics ours. (Knowledge and Life, pp. 128 sqq.)

¹⁶⁰ Op. cit., p. 23. Italics ours. (Hauptprobleme, p. 25.)

¹⁶¹ Op. cit., p. XVIII.

It seems to us that Eucken's conception of the Life-Process is not so much "essentially mystical" as it is wholly unintelligible.¹⁶²

It does not baffle the Reason because it discloses a truth that is *above* Reason; it defies it because it seeks to unite elements which are essentially incompatible; it suggests a concept which is *contrary to Reason*, and, therefore, absolutely inconceivable. The doctrine of the Resurrection, which Eucken dismisses with the uncritical reflection that it is not necessary for Christianity,¹⁶³ is a mystery but it is not a contradiction. Life is a mystery, as the futile attempts of Burke, Pflüger and other experimenters in the cause of abiogenesis have testified; it is nevertheless, a reality. To hold that the Power which endowed the vital principle with the capability of developing a single cell into a human body, is also able to reunite the vital principle to the matter it once animated, is not opposed to reason, though reason perceives its difficulties all the more clearly from the fact that it cannot penetrate to the secret of Vitalism, but must acknowledge that the first living cell was the direct result of a Creative act, or, illogically, assume an Agnostic standpoint. But the "mystery" for which Eucken claims recognition is of a very different type.

He posits as "the true, primary, and all-comprehensive reality"¹⁶⁴ a Life which is not made known to us through Biology or Psychology, still less through Cosmology; a Life which can be reached only by a "noological" "supreme" or "sovereign" ("eigenständlich")¹⁶⁵ method which, by transcending the opposition between subject and object, treats *immediately* of the First and Final Cause—the All-Life (All-Leben) which contains within itself both nature and spirit.

Modern science has greatly increased our knowledge of matter and our power over the forces of nature, but it has not thereby lessened the opposition between the "material" and the "spiritual."

¹⁶² We use the term "conception" here for convenience sake: a conception that is unintelligible is, strictly speaking, an impossibility.

¹⁶³ See Truth of Rel., pp. 550–554 (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., pp. 370–373). In Truth of Rel., p. 553, he says: "Religion, which has already shown so much energy, will finally find the energy to subsist without sensuous signs and wonders." German text, p. 372 sqq. See also Prob. of Human Life, pp. 167 sqq. (Lebensanschauung der G. Denker, op. cit., pp. 168 sqq.)

¹⁶⁴ Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, p. 5. See Grundlinien, p. 2; the wording is changed.

¹⁶⁵ Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., pp. 123, 318. (Truth of Rel., pp. 178 sqq.; 455 sqq.) (Main Currents of Modern Thought, pp. 56, 421.) G. Strömungen, pp. 29, 354.

Empirical Psychology has brought out the contrast between sense-knowledge and the spiritual activity of thought in a still stronger light than was thrown on it by the older method—though the result is an indirect one, in no way aimed at by those who sought to separate the study of the mental activities from the study of the nature of the mind itself. Although Eucken, in dealing with Naturalism, distinguishes between the “material” and the “spiritual,”¹⁶⁶ he insists that we can only reach truth by transcending the antithesis between nature and spirit. We maintain that we have no faculty or power whereby to do so; we cannot even conceive of how it could be done. Matter and spirit are essentially different in nature and mode of action; how then can they be united so as to form a third “Whole” which is both their starting-point and goal in the evolutionary course upon which they enter? Even in purely chemical changes the new substance imprisons the gases which were contained in the old, but it was *in the nature of the gases* to enter into the fresh combination, otherwise the transformation of energy could not have taken place. Eucken’s statement about the implication of the “Geistesleben” may be recalled here:

“The spiritual life in itself is incomparably more than is represented by the customary conception of that life.”¹⁶⁷

“Within the soul itself there is a distinction between two levels, of which that other than nature may in agreement with established usage be called ‘spiritual,’ however little may be implied by this expression.”¹⁶⁸

If we were translated to a realm in which the sum of the component parts of a positive quantity equalled nothing, the transcendence which Eucken demands might be accomplished. One thing is certain: we have no present experience either of the transcendent reality itself—i.e., the reality of *Eucken’s conception*—or of the manner in which the transcendent viewpoint is gained.¹⁶⁹

¹⁶⁶ See *Life’s Basis and Life’s Ideal*, pp. 24 sqq. (*Grundlinien*, pp. 14 sqq.) *Main Currents*, pp. 227 sqq.; 232 sqq. (*G. Strömungen*, pp. 180 sqq.) *Meaning and Value of Life*, pp. 26 sqq. (*Sinn und Wert des Lebens*, pp. 19 sqq., esp. p. 24.) In most of his works the contrast is made, though it is destroyed by the exposition of the constructive portion.

¹⁶⁷ *Life’s Basis and Life’s Ideal*, p. 240. (*Grundlinien*, see pp. 104, 105, to “sein,” end of paragraph.)

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 131, 132. (*Grundlinien*, p. 63.)

¹⁶⁹ “Noological,” from *Nous* the spirit, is an adjective better applied to the methods of Rational Psychology than to the irrational system of Eucken. “Noeticism” is, strictly speaking, the equivalent for Rational Psychology or Philosophy of Mind—a science which has received careful development and elaboration in the scholastic and neo-scholastic philosophy. See *Truth of Rel.*, p. 235. (*Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel.*, p. 160.)

we have no knowledge of it through Science, Philosophy or Revelation. We cannot, therefore, stake our life on the hope that a self-evident contradiction may be "somehow or other" possible.

A closer examination of the "Geistesleben" or "Lebensprozess" shows it to be an eclectic conception, the borrowed elements being taken from conflicting systems of thought—even truths of Revelation are caught up, and become notes in this all-embracing concept. The result is that the philosopher who starts his constructive work by stating that the "fact" of a spiritual life is the "axiom of axioms," has hardly begun his exposition ere he negates the concept of the spiritual, and completely negatives his own position. An analysis of this complex conception reveals the following elements:

1. The "Absolute Spiritual" which is none other than the First Cause of Scholastic Philosophy and the God of Christian Theology.

This Absolute Spiritual possesses the plenitude of all being and is the Source (Ursprüngliche Quelle) of all reality. The Absolute Spiritual is according to Eucken, "Infinite Love" and unchanging Truth: a truth that would be valid only for a time he declares to be a contradiction:

"Change (and with it evolution) is absolutely out of the question as far as the substance of spiritual life is concerned. The concept of truth . . . tolerates neither growth nor change."¹⁷⁰

The concept may be compared with that of Parmenides and his school in that the *oneness* of reality is held both by Eucken and the Eleatics. Eucken differs from them in, illogically, passing on to the dynamism of Heraclitus, and holding the *reality* of *change*, without acknowledging a creative act of the First Cause or Absolute Spiritual.

2. The Life-Process.

This bears, in general outline, an unmistakable resemblance to the divine all-controlling world-fire of Heraclitus in Ancient Thought, and to the central conception in the systems of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel in the modern world. The resemblance does not, perhaps, extend to details; in fact in the exposition Eucken rather seeks to differ from his predecessors in the New Phil-

¹⁷⁰ Main Currents of Modern Thought, p. 274. (G. Strömungen, p. 223.)

osophy; *au fond*, however, the likeness remains. Fichte^{170a} insists on the importance of action, and of free action. Schelling maintains that the "Eternal Itself" is also nature, while Eucken states that nature is a stage in the development of the one reality. Hegel insists that the rational alone is real, Eucken—that the goal of human endeavor should be the overcoming of the irrationality of nature: the "spiritualization" of nature.

Eucken's striking point of difference lies in his recognition of evil and sin in the full Christian sense. This idea, however, does not belong to the concept of the Life-Process, strictly speaking; it is one of the interpolated elements wholly at variance with its environment.

3. The Christian concept of an offended Goodness and a guilty creature. In no portion of his inconsistent system is Eucken weaker than when attempting to deal with the problem of evil. Evil and *sin*, apart from the recognition of a free creative act of the First Cause, are insoluble mysteries: more, sin itself is wholly unintelligible. When *sin* is acknowledged, the mind must forthwith recognize a Being sinned against, but in Eucken's system "Sinned against" and "sinner" must, in last analysis, be one and the same. He asks, in the *Truth of Religion* (the passage is cited in chapter III, p. 78), whether we shall dare ascribe guilt to the Deity. But he offers no solution which will enable us to do otherwise.

4. The human spiritual, or the "existential form" of the Absolute Spiritual. This is an essentially Pantheistic conception; the influence of Kant¹⁷¹ and even of Spinoza¹⁷² are traceable in its development, which is at variance with its definition.

^{170a} For an inquiry into the relation between Eucken and Fichte see "Eucken's Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung und sein Verhältnis zu J. G. Fichte," by Paul Gabriel; pp. 35-44.

¹⁷¹ See *Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart*, op. cit., p. 32. "Erst Kant brachte die Wendung in Fluss, welche die geistige Arbeit des 19. Jahrhunderts beherrscht, die deutliche Abhebung eines Geisteslebens vom blossseelischen Getriebe. Denn bei ihm erscheint jenseit des Unterschiedes der Individuen eine gemeinsame geistige Struktur, ein Grundgewebe, das alle geistige Betätigung beherrscht und gestaltet. Aber die Sache blieb bei ihm insofern noch unvollendet, als sich weder das neue fest genug bei sich selbst zusammenschloss, noch eine deutliche Abgrenzung des Geistigen erfolgte." Eucken offers us his concept of the *Geistesleben* as the completion and perfection of Kant's work ("bei ihm . . . noch unvollendet") see *Der Grundbegriff des Geisteslebens*; *ibid.*, pp. 30 sqq.

¹⁷² Though Spinoza and Eucken may seem at first to have little in common a close comparison suggests distinct similarities. Compare, e.g., Spinoza's description of the life of passion, or, even of mere scientific pursuit, with Eucken's account of *blosse Menschen*, *blosse Menschenkultur*, *blossmenschliches*

In conclusion we must reject Eucken's "All-Leben" just as decidedly as we must keep certain of the concepts it seeks to unite. In the next chapter we shall examine into the second point of our inquiry.

Wohlsein, and of the *Kleinmenschlich*, *Blossmenschlich*, and *Das kleine Ich*: See, e. g., *Grundlinien*, op. cit., pp. 68, 186, 196, 210; *Die Einheit des Geisteslebens*, p. 460. Again the peculiarly *religious* rôle, as we may call it, which Eucken assigns to philosophy is surely not wholly uninfluenced by Spinoza's idea of the philosopher who, rising above the strife of passion and the life of worldly interest, views all things *sub specie aeternitatis*. See *Geistige Strömungen* (pp. 97-104) where Eucken unfolds the task of philosophy. On p. 99 we find "das alles ist eine Frage der Tatsächlichkeit, aber freilich einer Tatsächlichkeit, die nicht von aussen her zufallen kann, sondern in Zusammenfassung des Lebens, *im Aufklimmen zu einem Sehen und Messen vom Ganzen zum Ganzen* immer neu zu erringen ist." Italics are ours. See also *Grundlinien*, p. 177, where the words of Spinoza occur: "Wenn das Denken in seiner Arbeit eine Erhebung über die Zeit vollzieht, wenn es *sub specie aeternitatis* wirkt," etc.

CHAPTER III

THE "IMMEDIACY" OF THE SPIRITUAL LIFE

The inquiry into the nature of the "Immediacy" involves a double problem—the subjective *How*, the objective *What*.

The psychological question concerns us mainly here, but we cannot form a fair judgment of the satisfactoriness of the solution in the first case, without adverting to that offered in the second, for the reason that the "immediacy" under one aspect is the *how* of our knowledge of the Spiritual, under another aspect it is, *itself*, the spiritual which we know. Eucken's hybrid concept of the "Geistesleben" affects his exposition even of the "Absolute Spiritual:" hence the descriptions of the "immediacy" in his different works—sometimes in different parts of the same work—are in pointed contradiction.

In Christianity and the New Idealism he writes: "As we understand the Spiritual Life, it is not this or that feature of it which assures us of the presence of a transcendent Life and unites us to it, but rather the *totality of an underived and independent life within our own*." It is "the revelation of a world-transcending totality of life."¹⁷³

The force of the italicized passage is destroyed by the previous statement (p. 10). "It [i. e., the Spiritual Life] cannot be understood save as a development of the organized universe."

In Truth of Religion he writes in treating of the "Revelation of an Absolute Spiritual Life:" "We need not open any laborious and lengthy investigation in order to prove that a Spiritual Life superior to the world not only touches us with its effects, but that it is also present in us as cause with all the fulness of its energy. It is revealed to us as a great fact that a Spiritual Life can rise up as our *own* life: and this actually happens. The significance of this fact can be judged fully after we have recognized that a total-life presents itself in the Spiritual Life, and that in this total-life a new degree of reality arises, and an inverted order of the world-process takes place; such a turn could not proceed out of the potency of the individual elements of life, but has to proceed

¹⁷³ Christianity and the New Idealism, p. 16. (Hauptprob. der Religionsphilosophie, op. cit., p. 18.) Italics ours.

out of the energy of the Whole. Therefore this Whole must be, in a form of immediacy, present in us, and also, the great change shall ensue as a gain of our own life."¹⁷⁴

So far from recognizing that in the "Absolute Spiritual," or "Whole," "a new degree of reality" *rises up*, "and an inverted order of the world-process takes place," we hold that the statement is contrary to the *recognized signification* of the term "Absolute Spiritual."

In Main Currents of Modern Thought we find:

"It will not do for spiritual life to be communicated to him through the medium of his special nature (thus becoming alienated from itself); it must in some fashion be present to him as a whole in all its infinity [als Ganzes mit all seiner Unendlichkeit]."¹⁷⁵

It is needless to multiply quotations; one other passage, however, may be cited as instancing Eucken's view both of the human spiritual and the "immediacy." It occurs in the Problem of Human Life:

"And by personality is meant a concentration-center of the spiritual world, a point of convergence for countless threads of existence, a point, again, at which life acquires the immediate certainty of its own existence, is exalted to a state of pure self-immediacy, and can at the same time gather itself together for resolute action and energetically challenge such abuses as its environment offers."¹⁷⁶

There are two stages to be distinguished in our knowledge of the spiritual, according to Eucken's exposition:

1. The recognition of the existence of a Spiritual Life.
2. The realization of that Life as a personal experience; this latter constitutes the "immediacy."

Psychological Method

In the facts which he brings forward as the basis of the first stage he is practically at one with the scholastics—he differs from them in the wording and setting of the proofs. These facts may be stated as follows:

- a. (1) The unifying power of thought.

¹⁷⁴ Truth of Religion, p. 203 (cc). (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 141.)

¹⁷⁵ Op. cit., p. 60. (Geistige Strömungen, p. 33.)

¹⁷⁶ Problem of Human Life, p. 557. See Einheit des Geisteslebens: Das Personalsein als Weltwesen, pp. 354 sqq.; *ibid.*, pp. 463 sqq.

(2) Unity of consciousness.

b. Intellectual or Universal Ideas.

c. The Altruistic emotions and other forms of rational conation.

Most of Eucken's constructive works treat of this first revelation of a spiritual reality. The following citations will suffice for our present purpose:

a. (1) In *Christianity and the New Idealism* he writes:

"Thought refuses to be a mere link in the chain of causes and effects; it steps outside the series, confronts it, and seeks to unify it. Even when gauging the external world, the imaginative flight of thought, piercing infinity, reaches beyond all the bounds of sense-perception."¹⁷⁸

In *Main Currents of Modern Thought* he writes:

"Nothing is more characteristic of the distinctive nature of thought than the fact and power of the logical contradiction. It would be impossible to perceive this contradiction if, in thought, multiplicity was not comprehended within the scope of an all-inclusive activity, and it could not be so unendurable as it is if the desire for unity were not enormously powerful."¹⁷⁹

In *Ethics and Modern Thought* he states:

"Here ['wherever spiritual life develops'] life is not decomposed into a multitude of separate particles, but inner cohesions are formed, which embrace and dominate all achievement of individual beings. This is especially the case when human thought aspires towards Truth."¹⁸⁰

Eucken's peculiar view of spiritual life is suggested by the expression "inner cohesions."

(2) In *Main Currents* a good defense of the "Unity of Consciousness" and its import is found.

"Moreover it is necessary to call particular attention to the fact that above and beyond all intellectual processes there develops an inner life, a life which exhibits, in spite of all manifoldness, a permanent character, persisting through all changes and movements." "But is there not a unity of a spiritual kind which persists with living force in the face of all the changes and obscurations of consciousness, does not all progressive scientific and artistic creation work through this unity of the spiritual individuality, and is not this same unity the source of all thorough-going achievement also in the practical and technical domain?"¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 7. (*Hauptprobleme*, p. 9.)

¹⁷⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 183. (*Grundlinien*, p. 143.)

¹⁸⁰ *London and New York*, 1913, p. 28.

¹⁸¹ *Op. cit.*, pp. 52, 53, and footnote.

b. The Moral judgments—to which conscience testifies—and the ideas of the True, the Good and the Beautiful are phenomena inexplicable on any hypothesis except that of a spiritual reality. In Life's Basis Eucken writes:

"In the development of a self-consciousness and of a movement of life itself, we rise above the motive of utility, by which nature is swayed. It is a moral element in the widest sense; it is the consciousness of something objectively necessary, unconditionally transcending the ends of the narrowly human, that first gives to convictions axiomatic certainty and to conduct the right energy. This moral element attains to a more independent display in the moral self-judgment of man that is called 'conscience.'"¹⁸²

The expressions "movement of life itself," "narrowly human," point to the philosopher's inconsistent theory of the "human spiritual." Moral values and conscience are but contradictions if the spiritual nature of man is a "concentration-center" for the "Absolute Spiritual." Again, Eucken has identified necessary and moral truths. All moral truths are of an objective necessary character, but there are other necessary truths which cannot be termed moral.

In Truth of Religion we find:

"Also, all the darkness leaves no doubt that the Divine emerges, first of all, not from the outermost boundary of our life, but through a creativeness and activity in the inmost life itself. . . . This appears clearly in a twofold direction. On the one hand, it is seen in the power of logical thought, in which something superior to all human opinion and inclination appears which shows fearlessly the weal and woe of mere man."¹⁸³

We may point out again Eucken's peculiar view of man's spiritual nature. According to him the human spiritual is none other than the Absolute Spiritual finding self-expression in and through human psychic activities. It is not accurate therefore to conceive of man as possessing a spiritual soul; rather he may win a soul by "anchorage" in the Absolute Spiritual, the Soul of souls; the soul thus won will not be, however, distinct from the Absolute Spiritual itself.

c. In Christianity and the New Idealism we find: "In the case of the True and the Good, our effort is not concentrated on the external aspects of things, nor does it rest content with a merely

¹⁸² Op. cit., p. 129. (Grundlinien, pp. 61, 62.)

¹⁸³ Op. cit., p. 356. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 246.)

external contact. . . . Our feeling, again, through the exaltation of life above the natural level, can focus itself within the life of another, and, through righteousness and love, realise the being of another as a part of that larger and richer life in which we and it alike participate.”¹⁸⁴

In *Main Currents of Modern Thought* Eucken criticizes sharply those naturalistic systems which, while denying the existence of a spiritual activity, make full use of it in the construction of a theory. He does not grasp the fact that he is himself as inconsistent as any monist, and more so than most, for the very reason that he posits an *independent Spiritual Reality* as the Source of nature, and yet concludes that spirit and matter are, ultimately, belonging, essentially, to the one all-embracing Life.¹⁸⁵

Scholastic Influence

The influence of the Scholastic philosophy on Eucken at this juncture is too evident to escape detection. A comparison of some of the cited passages with the exposition of the scholastic theory will prove it beyond a doubt. St. Thomas establishes the spiritual nature of thought thus: “nullum enim corpus invenitur aliquid continere nisi per commensurationem quantitatis; unde, et si se toto totum aliquid continet, et partem parte continet, majorem quidem majore, minorem autem minore. Intellectus autem non comprehendit rem aliquam intellectam per aliquam quantitatis commensurationem, quum se toto intelligat et comprehendat totum et partem, majora in quantitate et minora. Nulla igitur substantia intelligens est corpus.”¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁴ Op. cit., p. 9.

¹⁸⁵ See G. Strömungen, pp. 185–191 [Main Currents, pp. 232–238]. For development of knowledge of spiritual, see also: G. Strömungen, pp. 27, 30, 104, 222 sqq., 265 sqq. [Main Currents, pp. 54, 57, 141, 273, 274, 322, 323]; Einführung in eine Phil. des Geisteslebens, pp. 7–14, 15, 47, 157 sqq.; Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., pp. 271–284 [Truth of Rel., Chap. XII, pp. 391–409]: the exposition here is *in parts* irreconcilable with the concept of an Absolute Spiritual Being; Der Kampf um einen geistigen Lebensinhalt, pp. 109–120. It is unnecessary to multiply references as an attentive reading of any one of Eucken’s constructive works gives a fairly complete view of his entire philosophy. Warner Fite has noticed this point in his article in the *Nation*; he writes: “Notwithstanding the systematic development announced in his tables of contents, a limited range of variations upon this theme [the independence of the Spiritual Life] constitutes (if we omit the historical works) the nearly unchanging content of every chapter, every volume and almost of every page.” (Eucken’s Philosophy of Life, *Nation*, Vol. 95, July 11, 1912, p. 29.)

¹⁸⁶ Contra Gent., Lib. II, Cap. XLIX. For a good brief exposition, see M. Maher, *Psychology*, 7th ed., 1911, Bk. I, Part II.

The remainder of the passage is condensed by Rickaby through the "commingling" of some of the arguments; in the English it is as follows:

"If the understanding were a corporeal substance, its action would not transcend the order of corporeal things, and therefore it would understand nothing but corporeal things, which is manifestly false, for we do understand many things that are not corporeal.

"There can be no infinite power in any finite body: but the power of the understanding is in a manner infinite in the exercise of intelligence: for it knows the universal, which is virtually infinite in its logical extension.

"Of no bodily substance is the action turned back upon the agent. But the understanding in its action does reflect and turn round upon itself: for as it understands an object, so also it understands that it does understand, and so endlessly."¹⁸⁷

The following is an extract from St. Thomas' proof of rational appetency:

"Ad secundum dicendum, quòd appetitus intellectivus, etsi feratur in res, quae sunt extra animam singulares, fertur tamen in eas secundum aliquam rationem universalem; sicut cum appetit aliquid, quia est bonum. Unde Philosophus dicit in sua Rhetorica (Lib. II, Cap. 4, circ. fin.), quòd odium potest esse de aliquo universali, puta cum odio habemus omne latronum genus. Similiter etiam per appetitum intellectivum appetere possumus immaterialia bona, quae sensus non apprehendit, sicut scientiam, virtutes, et alia hujusmodi."¹⁸⁸

Points of Difference between Scholasticism and Activism

Here, however, Eucken parts company with the Scholastics, posits unfounded assumptions as facts and involves himself in self-contradiction.

Whereas Christian philosophers have used the foregoing arguments as stepping stones in the ascent towards a more perfect knowledge of the First Cause, and have based natural religion on the intellectual perception of the True and the Good, and on the yearning of the will towards the Infinitely Beautiful, Eucken declares that religion cannot be based on thought, feeling, or will—neither on their individual nor *combined* revelations.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸⁷ Of God and His Creatures: a translation of Summa Contra Gentiles, by J. Rickaby, S. J., St. Louis, Mo.; London; 1905, Bk. II, Chap. XLIX.

¹⁸⁸ Summa Theologica I, q. LXXX, art. II.

¹⁸⁹ See Truth of Religion, pp. 72-85, esp. 84; p. 194. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., 49-57, esp. 56; p. 134.)

The point of vantage reached so far has but proved the reality of an independent Spiritual Life, however; "the mere existence of a power superior to man is a very insufficient basis for religion. Religion requires that this power *in all its fulness*, should be *livingly manifest in us* . . . and so far we have done no more than reach a starting-point for our quest. We have but shown the possibility of this manifestation: it still remains to prove its reality."¹⁹⁰

We do not propose to refute at length Eucken's inconsistent statement—that the combined manifestations of Thought, Feeling and Will afford us no evidence of the intimate relations subsisting between us and the Supreme Spiritual Reality. His own proofs for the existence of this Reality offer the best refutation of the illogical position he has taken up. If the spiritual activity of thought, transcending particulars and stretching out to infinity; if the moral judgment, proclaiming a truth objectively and necessarily valid; if the rational emotions of "righteousness and love" reveal the existence of an independent Spiritual Life, they thereby enable us to recognize that Life as being *for us* the Supreme and ultimate Reality—in the language of religion "our first beginning and our last end." If Eucken denies this fact we can but confront him with his own "Entweder-Oder." *Either*, distrusting the manifestations of intellect and will, take up a position of absolute subjectivism, *or*, acknowledging the existence of an independent Spiritual Life, acknowledge also the trustworthiness of those rational activities *which alone reveal it to us*.¹⁹¹

We may quote again here the apt criticism of Henry C. Sheldon: "What we know immediately is certain effects in us which serve as a ground of rational inference—an inference none the less actual because possibly very swift and confident."¹⁹²

The second fundamental point on which Eucken differs from the Scholastics is that concerning the nature of the human spiritual. It does not fall to our task here to prove at length that man's soul is an individual, spiritual substance. Two of the facts already adduced, viz., the unity of consciousness and the moral judgment, bear irrefragable witness to it. In addition we may

¹⁹⁰ Italics ours. Christianity and the New Idealism, p. 12. (Hauptprobleme, p. 14.)

¹⁹¹ We speak here of knowledge that can be acquired by Reason alone, apart from historical Revelation which Eucken denies.

¹⁹² Sheldon. R. Eucken's Message to Our Age, op. cit., pp. 47 sqq.

call attention to the incalculably grave implications which are contained in such a theory as Eucken propounds:

1. The view that the "human spiritual" is but the "existential form" of the "Absolute Spiritual" destroys the force of the epithet "Absolute," and negates the attribute of infinite perfection which Eucken himself ascribes to the "Geistesleben" as ultimate foundation of truth.

2. Man's freedom, on such an hypothesis, is an *impossibility*, not a "mystery" as Eucken suggests.

3. Moral evil is an absolute contradiction, if, indeed, we may use the term "absolute" in connection with a nonentity; and the moral values and the yearning towards the Good, which formed the basis of Eucken's proofs for the existence of a Spiritual Life, are vain, illusory phantoms. Finally, the universe is irrational from apex to foundation.

In no way affected by the irretrievable consequences which follow from his irrationalism, Eucken proceeds to the second point of his investigation, viz., the "personal immediacy" of the spiritual life. The criticism of Boyce Gibson is worthy of attention here: "Eucken's defective treatment of psychology is again answerable, in my opinion, for a strange doctrine of his that our psychical activities, whether of thought, feeling, or will, are mere existential appearances of the substantial oneness of the spiritual life. Eucken has not endeavored to follow up the pseudo-mystic implications of this view . . . but, with a happy disregard of all psychological inadequacies, proceeds to develop his philosophy of freedom in his own way."¹⁹³

Noology

A passage in the *Truth of Religion* gives in, perhaps, the clearest manner Eucken's teaching regarding the "immediacy: "At the very point where the negation had reached its climax and the *danger had reached the very brink of a precipice*, the conviction dawns with *axiomatic* certainty that there lives and stirs within us something which all obstacles and enmity can never destroy, and which signifies against all opposition a *kernel of our nature* that can never get lost."¹⁹⁴

¹⁹³ R. Eucken's *Phil. of Life*, note p. 160.

¹⁹⁴ *Truth of Rel.*, p. 62. (*Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel.*, p. 42.) Italics ours. The danger referred to is that of "the apparent total loss of what we dare not renounce—our best and most real treasures," i.e., the "inner elevation of human nature" and the winning of genuine happiness; *op. cit.*, p. 61.

There are three statements which call for special examination in this citation; the investigation will reveal three aspects of the philosophy of Activism.

1. What is the ground of this "axiomatic certainty?" An axiom is a self-evident necessary truth, objectively valid for all time. The hypothesis of innate ideas and the intuitional theory have been put forward to account for our knowledge of such.¹⁹⁵

Subjectivism

(a) Eucken's "axiomatic certainty" cannot be based on the rational intuition of our relations with a supreme Spiritual Being, since it is just at this point that he diverges from the Scholastic position, and asserts that we cannot ground religion on the knowledge we acquire through our faculties. His Anti-Intellectualism debars the possibility of explaining it by the hypothesis of innate ideas. Eucken holds that the axiomatic character of the conviction is due to the fact that the Absolute Spiritual Life is present to the soul in the moment of the "immediacy," and in the revelation of Itself makes man aware of his own spiritual possibilities. But this does not render the epistemological issue more satisfactory. If the psychic faculties through which—as Eucken himself acknowledges¹⁹⁶—the spiritual is revealed, are untrustworthy in their ordinary manifestations, what assurance can we have concerning the trustworthiness of extraordinary manifestations coming *through the same channels*? Even if we grant the truth of Eucken's arbitrary assumption that life, by its movement, develops its own norms—the fact remains that no "turn towards the Life-process" can help man to reach truth, as long as he distrusts the medium through which it is to be revealed to him—his own intellect. So far from having an "axiomatic certainty" we are left with an irrational belief and the dilemma is again inevitable. In the Truth of Religion Eucken writes:

"Finally, the position of our question contains also a raising of religion above the ramifications of the psychic life—above the so-called faculties of the soul; the question concerns itself with a particular development of a Spiritual Reality which certainly unfolds itself in thought, feeling, and will, but which proceeds not

¹⁹⁵ We omit the Associationist doctrine because it denies that any of our cognitions bear this character.

¹⁹⁶ See Truth of Religion, p. 194. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 134.)

from one or from a combination of them. All the strict fulfilment of religion in the provinces of the so-called faculties of the soul yield a formation of the periphery, behind which remains unexperienced and undeveloped a centre of life—the workshop of original moulding and creativeness . . . the whole man seems to have been won, and religion seems to have become the possession of his soul. But is it so in reality? Or remains there not unconceived behind all the expansion that which is really the fundamental fact—man as a superior Whole, as a participator in infinity, as a warrior for a spiritual self? This depth of his nature has now come to a full consciousness, and, along with this, it has become clear that such a fact alone grants him secure stability against unutterable dangers, tribulations, and doubts; so that he will found his religion upon this rock, weary throughout of the strife whether intellect, or will, or feeling, plays the main part in the concern.”¹⁹⁷

The italicised passage reveals once again Eucken’s pantheistic conception of the Absolute Spiritual Life; the phrases “centre” (“zentrum”) and “periphery” (“eine periphere Gestaltung”) point in the same direction: the metaphor of a “workshop” fits in well with his exposition of the “Life-process,” but radically destroys the idea of a supreme Spiritual Reality. The antithesis which he seeks to make between the psychic activities or “faculties,” of thought and will, and the spiritual life of man is fatal. If the spiritual character of thought and rational conation is acknowledged—and we have shown that Eucken does acknowledge this—the fact of a spiritual power, or mode of action, of the soul from which these activities issue is, at the same time, recognizable, and hence the spiritual, substantial nature of the human soul itself can be affirmed. These three facts are inseparable; we cannot accept one and reject the others, because they are but different aspects of the one truth, viz., man’s spiritual nature. The alternative which Eucken suggests—that the spiritual in man is no part of his human endowment, but results from a *direct participation* in the Divine Life, from *essential oneness* with the Godhead—is so far-reaching in its disastrous implications that we need not further comment on it, except to remark that Eucken *makes no attempt to prove it*.

The denial of the native spiritual activity of the Intellect, and of the *individual*, spiritual substantiality of the human soul, constitutes a *reductio ad absurdum* of Eucken’s system of philos-

¹⁹⁷ Truth of Religion, pp. 194, 195. Italics ours. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., pp. 134, 135.)

ophy, insisting, as it does, on a *negative* movement, and a religious conversion.

(b) Appealing to personal experience, who of us can say, with comprehension of the terms, that he has an immediate knowledge of God "in all" His "infinity?" That man's happiness, even in this life, consists in the knowledge and love of God and in union with His Will is the teaching of Christianity, but this knowledge is not constituted by the direct vision of the Deity. God is known through His works in the natural order, through His Grace in the supernatural,¹⁹⁸ but even in the supernatural order immediate vision is not attained. Such vision is the reward of the faithful soul after death; through it knowledge and love are perfected. The Apostle tells us "we see now as in a glass, darkly; but then face to face"¹⁹⁹; to ignore the distinction between the two kinds of knowledge is folly.

Eucken's error follows logically enough from his view of the "human spiritual" and of immortality. He insists that we need not relegate immortality to a "future" life, a "Beyond." His attitude towards this fundamental truth is shown in the following passages:

"Time is for us rather a problem than a rigid destiny. How far, however, life overcomes time and attains to a present superior to it depends, above everything else, on the spiritual power which it is capable of putting forth. *It rests with ourselves whether the centre of gravity of our being falls in the temporal or the eternal.* In any case, this action of ours in thus overcoming time has for its indispensable preliminary condition *the reality—and the inner presence of a spiritual world.* Even the most passionate excitation of the mere subject can never give rise to a spiritual content and with it a superiority to time, and it remains true that, for man, all creation is at the same time a reception, a drawing upon invisible relationships."²⁰⁰

"So hängt das Unsterblichkeitsproblem aufs engste mit der Frage eines Selbständigwerdens des Geisteslebens in unserem Bereich zusammen. Die Bejahung dieser Selbständigkeit muss daher auch das Problem der Unsterblichkeit in eine eigentümliche Beleuchtung stellen; der Unsterblichkeitsglaube zieht dann seine Kraft nicht aus den Wünschen und Bedürfnissen des blossen Menschen, sondern aus der Eröffnung eines ewigen und unendlichen

¹⁹⁸ Eucken does not recognize the existence of a supernatural order in the Christian signification of the term.

¹⁹⁹ Paul, Cor., Chap. XIII, V, 12.

²⁰⁰ Main Currents, pp. 327, 328. First italics are ours; second, Eucken's.

Lebens in ihm; wem sich solches Leben erschloss und was an ihm teilgewann, das kann nicht schlechthin der Zeit verfallen sein. Hat das Ganze des Geisteslebens eine Gegenwart in uns gewonnen und ein selbständiges Leben in uns geschaffen, so wird es dieses irgendwie auch erhalten, indem es damit sich selbst erhält. In diesem zusammenhange ist es das Geistesleben selbst, von dem aus sich die Überzeugung eines Beharrens begründet und aus dem sie ihre Gewissheit schöpft, das in ähnlichem Gedankengange, wie ihn Augustin in den Worten bekundet: 'Für sich selbst kann nicht untergehen, was für Gott nicht untergeht (sibi non perit quod deo non perit).' Dann dürfen wir aber die Ewigkeit nicht erst jenseits des Grabes beginnen lassen, sondern wir haben anzuerkennen, dass sie schon hier uns umfängt und sich von uns aneignen lässt."²⁰¹

The conclusion of this passage betrays the influence of Kant, and may be contrasted with the teaching of the Scholastics who hold that every soul is endowed with *personal and therefore individual* immortality, and is destined, if faithful to the Moral Law during its earthly term of existence, to lead after death a more complete and perfect life. Since the soul is immortal we may say in one sense that immortality does, in fact, begin in this life—i.e., the soul's immortality; nevertheless the full blessedness of immortality belongs to the state after death.

2. The second point to which we wish to call attention is the peculiarity of the circumstances under which the "Gemüt" is experienced.

Pessimism

The conviction "dawns," according to Eucken, when the "danger" is at "the very brink of a precipice." In this extreme of peril the fact of the Eternal Spiritual is an "axiomatic certainty." But *why* is it not self-evident before this drastic extreme is reached? Why may not man when his powers are developed have an "axiomatic certainty" of, i.e., intuit, the spiritual, even amid peace and harmony? Is it not true that for the artist, the contemplation of some scene of quiet beauty, with his own simultaneous conviction that his nature is capable of appreciating infinitely more than all that, is, at least, as ripe a moment for the dawning of the "axiomatic certainty" as the one which Eucken describes? The

²⁰¹ Grundlinien Einer Neuen Lebensanschauung, op. cit., pp. 158, 159. See also Essay on Immortality in Hibbert Journal, July, 1908, p. 836, and in Collected Essays, ed. by Booth, New York, 1914, pp. 193 sqq.

element of opposition which we find within ourselves may be a powerful factor in determining our knowledge of a spiritual reality, but it is not an essential attribute of the concept. Eucken exaggerates alike the difficulties of recognizing the existence of the spiritual, and of leading a life in accordance with such knowledge.

Every Christian, indeed every earnest man, must agree as to the imperative necessity of saying the powerful "nay" to the lower part of our nature, and of adding the energetic "yea"²⁰² which affirms the higher, but no true Christian will grant that "All doubt and sorrow . . . must fall with their whole energy on the soul of the individual after the inauguration of an Absolute Life within man's domain has immeasurably raised him,"²⁰³ nor that the man who realizes the fact of a spiritual reality "sees," thereby, "all his work and being placed under a pointed contradiction which limits his actions, which renders his feelings uncertain, and which makes his whole existence problematic."²⁰⁴ These passages breathe a pessimism which is unchristian. The recognition of the existence of the Absolute Spiritual, and of man's relation with Him,²⁰⁵ so far from rendering one's existence problematic, throws the necessary light upon it, and upon the entire world. History proves this: A St. Paul, a St. Augustine, a St. Francis of Assissi, a St. Teresa, a St. Ignatius Loyola found their problem solved as soon as they had made the Spiritual Life their one aim and end. The struggle against lower nature had not ceased but their ignorance of life's full meaning for themselves and others was dissipated. The Absolute Spiritual Life makes Itself felt in the soul as the Spirit of light and peace. It is true that Christ warns us against *false* peace: "Think ye, that I am come to give peace on earth? I tell you, no; but separation."²⁰⁶ We must take these words in their context, and understand them in the light of all His teachings. Sacrifices, bitter to nature, are demanded from him who would lead a truly spiritual²⁰⁷ life, and

²⁰² See Truth of Religion, op. cit., pp. 248, 353, 441, 528 (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., pp. 169, 244, 307, 355); Christianity and the New Idealism, pp. 75-79, op. cit. (Hauptprobleme, pp. 81-85); Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, op. cit., pp. 185-187 (Grundlinien, pp. 89, 95, 127, 128 sqq.; 140 sqq.).

²⁰³ Truth of Religion, p. 344. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 237.)

²⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 344. (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 238.)

²⁰⁵ We are using Christian terms, Eucken would say with *It*.

²⁰⁶ St. Luke, Chap. XII, 51.

²⁰⁷ We are following Eucken closely at this point into the field of religion: it is not necessary to remark that from a philosophical standpoint every human being must, to some extent, lead a spiritual life, whether he will it or not, for the reason that the spiritual is of his very nature.

hard conflicts must be endured, but accompanying them is a peace, and even a sweetness, which tempers the suffering. St. Paul alludes to it when he wishes the Faithful that "peace of God which surpasseth all understanding."

This is not the place for a treatise on the happiness of a truly Christian life: we merely seek to refute Eucken's statement as to the effect of what he terms "the inauguration of an Absolute Life."²⁰⁸

It is significant that Eucken's deepest and, according to some, most valuable work—*Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion*—from the English translation of which the above passage has been cited—is stamped by a dark and gloomy irrationalism. Hermann criticizes very mildly when he writes that it "leaves a cloud of misgiving upon the spirit."²⁰⁹

If it were true that we were engaged in a "*seemingly impossible* struggle for a spiritual self—for a soul and meaning of life,"²¹⁰ few indeed would be the number of those who would persevere until "a new wave of life universal . . . which carries man into entirely other bearings, and which is a flowing tide that heralds the inauguration of a better day" appeared.²¹¹

Eucken tells us that we not only can, but must be Christians: "Unsere Frage war, ob wir heute noch christen sein können? Unsere Antwort ist, dass wir es nicht nur können, sondern sein müssen."²¹²

To his disheartening exposition of our spiritual condition we oppose, therefore, the direct teaching of the Founder of Christianity: "Come to Me, all you that labor and are burdened, and I will refresh you. Take up My yoke upon you . . . and you shall find rest to your souls. For my yoke is sweet and my burden light,"²¹³ and again:

"Seek and you shall find."²¹⁴

²⁰⁸ The peculiar phraseology of the cited passage is indicative of Eucken's pantheistic tendency.

²⁰⁹ Eucken and Bergson, op. cit., p. 99.

²¹⁰ *Truth of Religion*, op. cit., p. 62. Italics ours. The German text runs "in dem schweren, äusserlich fast aussichtslosen Kampf um ein geistiges Selbst, um eine Seele und einen Sinn seines Lebens." *Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel.*, p. 42.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 62. (*Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel.*, p. 42.)

²¹² *Können Wir noch Christen Sein?* p. 236.

²¹³ Matthew, Chap. XI, verses 28-30.

²¹⁴ Matthew, Chap. VII, 7.

Perhaps no writer on philosophy in modern times has taken more pains to introduce a note of gladness into his work than Eucken. This strikes us forcibly in the *Problem of Human Life* (*Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker*). His allusions to joy of spirit, in one form or another, are numerous—although it is often impossible to endorse his application of the term—and they mark his approval of the man, or views, under consideration. The following phrases may be noted: “a fresh and glad spirit;”²¹⁵ “the whole of existence [becomes] filled with an exalted joy;”²¹⁶ “gladness and joy of life;”²¹⁷ “force and activity and joyous assertion;”²¹⁸ “activity, joy and love;”²¹⁹ “youthful freshness and joy;”²²⁰ “courageous and joyful outlook;”²²¹ “joyful gratitude;”²²² “A new joy,” “a larger gladness.”²²³

Luther is described as introducing a change from which springs “a new life full of fresh and glad activity.”²²⁴

Even a meagre knowledge of the facts of Luther’s life, and of the scenes of bitter party strife amid which he moved, is sufficient to debar assent to this statement, apart altogether from the consideration of his religious principles.²²⁵

²¹⁵ *Prob. of H. Life*, op. cit., p. 293 (*Lebensanschauung der G. Denker*: “ein Geist der Frische und Fröhlichkeit,” p. 280).

²¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 310.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 345.

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 370.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 377.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 418.

²²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 462.

²²² *Ibid.*, p. 475.

²²³ *Ibid.*, p. 475.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 276 (*Lebensabschauung der g. Denker*, p. 265).

²²⁵ For the historical Luther refer to works by Janssen, Denifle, and Herman Grisar on Catholic side; to the biography of Köstlein on non-Catholic. See also “Luther in the Light of Facts,” *Cath. Univ. Bull.*, Feb., 1914, in which occurs the following passage: “Right in the beginning it can be stated . . . that the very cardinal principle of his religious system was debasing to humanity as such. That cardinal principle was the doctrine of the utter corruption of human nature due to original sin, and the consequent denial of free will. ‘*Articulus omnium optimus et rerum nostrarum summa*’ in his own words. Along with these doctrines likewise went that other of Predestination. Man, according to him, was utterly incapable of doing good without supernatural grace: man has no freedom of choice even in the performance of works not connected with salvation. It is either God or the Devil that rules him. . . . Now with such a dismal and low estimate of human nature can Luther be legitimately regarded as in any sense an apostle of humanity, of human liberty, of human dignity or inherent worth? Pushed to its logical conclusion such a doctrine would debase man below the most devil-ridden superstitious savage. What becomes of human dignity or intrinsic natural nobility and daring and Promethean struggle upwards, of human development and progress, of aspirations for liberty, for light, for anything that mankind has ever attained

Of Zwingli he writes: "though his practical tendency might easily result in a confusion of religion and politics, indeed, of *religion and the constabulary*, still, the peculiar significance of this simple and healthy, fresh and buoyant Christianity should have permanent recognition."²²⁶ This is an excellent example of unconscious burlesque; it is also a good instance of one of Eucken's misnomers.

Notwithstanding the tremendous toil and arduous effort which the philosopher has bestowed on his system, "Activism" is a joyless creed, and the implications imbedded in its principles lead to a pessimism more extreme than that of Schopenhauer.

We have already referred²²⁷ to the weak treatment—or lack of treatment—of the most difficult and important problem which the philosopher of the spiritual has to face—the existence of evil; the following passage may be taken as typical of the manner in which Eucken recoils when confronted with fundamental issues: "Also, in spite of his guilt and in the midst of his guilt God must be near to man. Dare we for this reason ascribe guilt to God? *All dogmatic formulation of such fundamental truths of religion becomes inevitably a rationalism* and a treatment of the problem by means of human relationships and according to human standards. Such a rationalism would have injured religion for more than it has already done were not life itself raised beyond all the disputation of ideas through the inner abiding energy of the Divine. It is sufficient for the religious conviction to experience the nearness of God in human suffering and His help in the raising of life out of suffering into a new life beyond all the insufficiency of reason. Indeed, the more intuitively this necessary truth is grasped, the less does it combine into a dogmatic speculation, and the purer and more energetically is it able to work."²²⁸

in his age-long painful struggle from barbarism to civilization, if he were as Luther would have him—a hopelessly corrupt being, devoid of spiritual liberty as a mere animal, utterly incapable of himself of doing good, the mere sport of either a devil that mocks him or of a God that damns him without mercy, a plaything in the hands of fate, an automaton? Such doctrine *ipso facto* kills every aspiration of humanity. It halts human progress more effectually than Confucianism. It would paralyze every noble aspiration and stop every wheel of progress. Is it not, therefore, more correct to say that humanity has progressed since Luther's day in *spite of Lutheranism?*" (p. 108).

²²⁶ Prob. H. Life., op. cit., p. 293. Italics are ours. (Lebensanschauung der g. Denker, p. 280.)

²²⁷ P. 61.

²²⁸ Truth of Religion, op. cit., p. 434. Italics are ours. Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., pp. 301, 302:

This fallacious reasoning needs little criticism; the flaws are self-evident.

(1) As *rational beings* we cannot be content with an *irrational* religion wherein the sanctity of the Deity is in jeopardy.

(2) The "inner abiding energy of the Divine" cannot raise man "beyond all the disputation of ideas" in such a manner as to make contradictories reconcilable, because God is Eternal Truth.²²⁹

(3) Eucken has used "human suffering" and "guilt" as interchangeable terms.

(4) The last paragraph states gratuitous assumptions without any evidence to support them.

Materialism

3. The materialistic language which Eucken employs in describing the "Geistesleben" is too significant to pass unnoticed. A philosopher has the right to use a metaphor when by so doing he makes his meaning clearer, but he is not justified in giving an exposition of what he holds to be spiritual life in terms of materialism. This, however, is what Eucken does in a large majority of instances, as an examination of several of the passages already cited will show. If by "a kernel of our nature that can never get lost" ("ein unverlierbarer Kern unseres Wesens")²³⁰ Eucken refers to man's spiritual soul his language is most misleading: if he does not intend to imply that man possesses a spiritual soul,

"Auch die Religion kann nicht an der einen Stelle geben ohne an der anderen zu nehmen; so muss das unmittelbare Verhältnis zu Gott Schaden leiden, wenn das Heil von der Vermittlung erwartet wird; ja die Meinung, das Göttliche helfe nicht aus eigenem Wollen und Vermögen, sondern müsse erst durch besondere Mittel dazu angeregt sein, kann leicht die Grundlage aller Religion verdunkeln: die unmittelbare Gegenwart der unendlichen Liebe und Gnade. Auch wird eine Schuld dadurch nicht aufgehoben, dass ein anderer die Folgen auf sich nimmt, sondern nur durch die Schöpfung eines neuen Lebens. Alle dogmatische Formulierung der Probleme führt gegen die eigne Absicht leicht zu einer Rationalisierung, zugleich aber zu einer Behandlung aus den menschlichen Verhältnissen heraus und nach dem Masse des Menschen; dieser Rationalismus würde die Religion weit mehr geschädigt haben, als er es in Wirklichkeit tat, hätte nicht das Leben selbst immer wieder durch die ihm innewohnende göttliche Kraft alle Irrung der Begriffe überwunden. Der religiösen Überzeugung genügt die Nähe Gottes im Leid, seine Hilfe aus dem Leid durch die Erhebung in ein neues, aller Irrung überlegenes Leben; je einfacher diese notwendige Wahrheit gefasst wird, je weniger sie sich mit dogmatischer Spekulation verquickt, desto reiner und kräftiger kann sie wirken."

²²⁹ Refer to Truth of Rel., op. cit., p. 446, "All spiritual Life is here a struggle against the flux of time—an ascent to eternal and immortal truth." (Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel., p. 311.)

²³⁰ Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, op. cit., p. 42.

in the full and accepted meaning of the words, he is but restating one of the truths of science, viz., the indestructibility of matter: there is no need of a special revelation, whether in the form of "personal immediacy" or otherwise, to make us cognizant of the fact. The following citations may be studied in this connection: in our opinion they either fail to convey an idea owing to the conjunction of incompatible terms, or they suggest movements in matter:

"Nur bei der Richtung auf das Geistesleben befindet sich der Lebensprozess auch in dem Aufstreben bei sich selbst, denn er geht ja auf nichts anderes als auf das eigne innerste Wesen des Menschen."²³¹

"Werden wir damit zu freien Mitarbeitern, ja zu *Mitträgern des Alls berufen*" . . .²³²

"Mit jener Wendung gewinnt die ganze Wirklichkeit einen inneren Zusammenhang und eine Tiefe; der Fortgang unserer Welt aber erscheint, wenigstens in den entscheidenden Wendepunkten, nicht als ein einfaches Hervorgehen des Höheren aus dem Niederen, sondern als ein Weitergetriebenwerden und eine innere Erhöhung aus dem Ganzen des Alls."²³³

"Wie aber steht diese Welt, dieser Lebensprozess, an dem wir teilgewinnen, zum All, und was bedeutet sie ihm? Gewiss erfassen wir sie nur innerhalb des Bereichs des Menschen, aber dieser Bereich braucht keineswegs einen geschlossenen Sonderkreis zu bilden, ganz wohl könnte in ihn sich unendliches Leben erstrecken, und etwas, das in ihm vorgeht, zugleich *eine Bewegung des Alls* bedeuten."²³⁴

"Dass so innerhalb des Menschen sich eine Umwälzung vollzieht und ein neues Leben durchbricht, das muss auch sein Gesamtbild verändern, er ist nun nicht mehr ein blosser Punkt, sondern *ein Mitbesitzer der Welt*."²³⁵

It is needless to multiply passages from Eucken's various works since his entire system is expounded in this manner. His imagery is not conducive to ideas of the spiritual. Although the philosophic truths which he holds to be the corner-stone of Activism—viz, the existence of an independent Spiritual Life, and the reality of human freedom and responsibility—entitle him to a position far

²³¹ Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, op. cit., 118. (Truth of Religion, op. cit., p. 172.)

²³² Ibid., p. 119. Italics ours. (Truth of Religion, p. 173.)

²³³ Ibid., p. 169. (Truth of Religion, p. 274.)

²³⁴ Ibid., p. 109. Italics ours. (In Truth of Religion, 1911, this passage does not occur but the general purport of the section is unaffected. See part II, Chap. VII, 2a, pp. 156-163.)

²³⁵ Erkennen und Leben, op. cit., p. 125. Italics ours.

superior to that of Spinoza, nothing throughout his numerous volumes can be found so suggestive of the spiritual ideal as are the happy expressions of the earlier philosopher: *Sub specie aeternitatis*,²³⁶ *amor intellectus*; *beata immortalitas*.

It may be objected that Eucken insists on the reality of Infinite Love and Mercy; Redeeming Grace, etc.; this is true, but he does not employ these truths of Christianity in the exposition of the development of the Life-Process to self-realization: they are reverted to later for ethical purposes: moreover in his monistic system, as has been pointed out already, they can have no place; the words become vain phrases devoid of all real content. Indeed Eucken himself assures us that he is not referring to Christian dogma:

“Wir können auch die göttliche Liebe und Gnade nicht von der einen Erweisung in Jesus Christus abhängig machen, wir müssen weiter die Vorstellungen, welche den Aufbau jener dogmatischen Lehren tragen, namentlich die *von dem Zorne Gottes, den erst das Blut Seines Sohnes beschwichtigt*, als viel zu anthropomorph und mit reineren Begriffen von der Gottheit unvereinbar verwerfen.”²³⁷

Dr. Yorke Fausset, whom we have already cited, commenting on this passage writes: “To an English Churchman it seems passing strange that a profound German thinker should thus unconsciously travesty the doctrines of the Creed.” In the same article he criticizes Eucken’s “rather supercilious depreciation of the Christian documents.”²³⁸

What shadow of a meaning does Eucken wish to convey by the words “Redeeming Grace?” We can hardly look to them for light on the nature of the “unverlierbarer Kern unseres Wesens.” Hence even if the supposed “immediacy” were a trustworthy source of truth its revelations would be too vague and problematic to afford a rational basis for life or religion.

Further Consequences

Two other points may be noticed: (1) at the heightened tension at which the spiritual, according to Eucken, manifests itself in a form of “immediacy” the vicious man seems to have a better

²³⁶ This is to be found in some of his works—borrowed from Spinoza. The image suggested to the writer by the reading of certain passages in *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion* was that of a walk in a blinding storm of sleet, where one is obliged to force an advance in the teeth of a violent wind.

²³⁷ Können Wir noch Christen Sein? op. cit. p., 186. Italics ours.

²³⁸ Op. cit., pp. 33, 35.

chance of becoming a "self-conscious spirituality" than the virtuous: those attracted by kindness, goodness, love, appear to be the least favorably situated. (2) There is absolutely no place in Eucken's philosophy for the little ones whom Christ especially honored: "Suffer the little children to come unto Me and forbid them not, for of such is the kingdom of heaven."²³⁹

These, at least, have not encountered bitter oppositions and "intolerable contradictions" either within or without. Christ Himself, both by word and act, taught that children truly possess a spiritual life and are destined to immortality. The susceptibility of the child to religious influence, the quick response of the young heart to the teachings concerning the great Father of all are facts too well known to need development. The innocence and ingenuousness of childhood seem better able to lay hold on spiritual realities than is the philosophic research of maturer years as our Divine Lord tells us:

"I confess to Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them to little ones."²⁴⁰

We may note also those other words:

"And he that shall receive one such little child in My name, receiveth Me. But he that shall scandalize *one of these little ones that believe in me*, it were better for him that a mill-stone should be hanged about his neck, and that he should be drowned in the depth of the sea."^{240a}

"See that you despise not one of these little ones."²⁴¹

Yet Eucken's principles seem to necessitate the ranking of children among those whose "centre of gravity," according to him, falls in the "temporal," not in "the eternal."²⁴²

²³⁹ Matthew, Chap. XIX, Verse 14.

²⁴⁰ Matthew, XI, Verse 25.

^{240a} Matthew, XVIII, Verses 5, 6. We have italicized part of verse 6.

²⁴¹ Matthew, XVIII, Verse 10.

²⁴² See *Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart*, p. 271. "Wie weit aber das Leben sie überwindet und eine überzeitliche Gegenwart erreicht, das hängt vor allem an der geistigen Kraft, die es aufzubieten vermag; bei uns selbst steht es schliesslich ob der Schwerpunkt unseres Seins ins Vergängliche oder ins Unvergängliche fällt."

Conclusion

We reject the "immediacy" of *Activism* because, (1) in this theory it is necessarily a purely subjective phenomenon;²⁴³ (2) even if it were a trustworthy source of truth its revelations would be too vague and problematic, as has been already pointed out, to afford a solid basis for life or religion.

We must reject, further, Eucken's account of the circumstances under which the existence of the Supreme Spiritual Life is intimately realized by man, if the account is held to be complete and exhaustive. Doubt and keen mental suffering may sometimes be the antecedent states to such realization, but they are not always so: to maintain the contrary would be to deny the possibility of knowledge of the Spiritual Life to a large majority.

²⁴³ Cf. *Einheit des Geisteslebens: Das Gesamtbild des neuen Lebenssystems*, p. 471, where Eucken illogically refuses to accept the consequences of his theory: "Mehr noch als bis dahin wird damit das menschliche Leben auf die Innerlichkeit des Geistes gestellt, man könnte von einer Wirklichkeit des Gemütes sprechen, wenn darunter nicht leicht eine bloss subjektive und individuelle Begleitung des Lebensprozesses verstanden würde, während die Innenwelt des Geisteslebens und der Geistesarbeit notwendig eine zentrale und beherrschende Stellung verlangt."

CHAPTER IV

THE PROBLEM OF NATURE

In close connection with the genesis of our knowledge of the spiritual we may call attention to Eucken's extraordinary attitude with regard to nature. We have already dealt with the cosmological²⁴⁴ aspect, in so far as was necessary for our present purpose; we shall treat the matter very briefly from a teleological or religious standpoint.

The beauties of the material universe which have raised the hearts and minds of poets, artists, saints, in every age and every clime, swiftly and surely to spiritual realities find no home in this philosophy; they are not welcome even as stepping-stones to "higher things."

Hostility to Nature

In accordance with the entire trend of his thought Eucken's attention is arrested less by the continuous benefits which accrue to man from nature, than by the occasional calamities which befall him from the same source: the waving crop receives little notice until the advent of the sudden storm which destroys it. In *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion* he writes:

"Die Zwecke und Werte des Geisteslebens scheinen für das blinde Getriebe der Naturgewalten nicht vorhanden; diese kennen keinen Unterschied von gut und böse, von gerecht und ungerecht, von innerer Grösse und Kleinheit. Erdbeben und Wasserfluten vernichten blühendes Geistesleben wie im Spiel; Pest und Hungersnot halten ihre Ernte unbekümmert um menschliches Wohl und geistige Werte. Nirgends weist die Natur über sich selbst hinaus auf eine höhere Ordnung; . . . sie bildet ein geschlossenes, nur mit sich selbst befasstes Reich. Wie eine rätselhafte Sphinx steht sie vor unseren Augen: unermüdlich Leben gebärend und Leben zerstörend, langsam bereitend, rasch vernichtend, fürsorglich und gleichgültig, wohlwollend und grausam zugleich, die Geschöpfe bald einander befreundend, bald zu unerbittlichem Kampf gegeneinander hetzend, zugleich schützende und zerstörende Waffen schmiedend, nach einem alten Ausdruck weniger eine Mutter als eine Stiefmutter ihrer Kinder. Ein unverwüstlicher Trieb zum Leben, aber in aller Erregung und Bewegung kein Beisichselbstsein, kein Fürsichleben, daher kein echter

²⁴⁴ See Part II, Chap. II.

Ertrag, kein Sinn, keine Vernunft des Ganzen, ein leidenschaftliches Spiel um Nichts und abermals Nichts. Freilich nicht ohne alle Vernunft, denn es erfolgt ja alles Wirken der Natur in einfachen, unverbrüchlichen Grundformen und in strenger Verkettung des Geschehens, es erfolgt gesetzlich und kausal. Das ist eine Vernunft, gewiss, aber doch nur eine formale Vernunft, die gegen den Inhalt des Geschehens gleichgültig ist. Auch die schmerzlichste Zerstörung des Lebens, die Entstehung entsetzlicher Missbildungen, die Vererbung schwerer Krankheiten erfolgt gemäss jenen Gesetzen und in kausaler Ordnung. Was ist das aber für eine Vernunft, die so ihr Vermögen sachlicher unvernunft dienen lässt? . . . Könnten wir nur aller Unsicherheit der äusseren Lage ein festiges Innenleben entgegenhalten!"²⁴⁵

"Vor allem geht das Anliegen des Menschen darauf, durch die überweltliche Macht in seinem Streben zur Geistigkeit gefördert zu werden, gefördert namentlich *in dem harten Kampf gegen eine fremde, undurchsichtige, übermächtige Welt.*"²⁴⁶

"Kleine Zufälle zerstören Leben und Lebensglück, ein Augenblick vernichtet den Ertrag mühsamster Arbeit. Oft auch ein chaotisches Durcheinander, ein rasches Umschlagen der Geschicke, eine scheinbare Gleichgültigkeit gegen alles menschliche Wohl und Wehe, ein blindes Umhertappen; dabei stets verhängnisvolle Möglichkeiten wie dunkle Wolken über dem Menschen schwebend und bisweilen niederfahrend wie ein zerschmetternder Blitz."²⁴⁷

In *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal* he expresses the same views:

"We see now with complete clearness the indifference of the forces of nature towards the aims of the spirit; we see the incessant crossing of the work of reason by blind necessity; we see the spiritual life divided against itself, eminent spiritual powers drawn into the service of lower interests, and carried away by unrestrained passion."²⁴⁸

"If nature simply follows its own tendencies; if, indifferent to value and lack of value, without aim and ideal, nature lives its life of soulless movement, union with an order so alien and impenetrable must most seriously affect the spiritual life. The world goes on its course unconcerned with the weal or the woe, the persistence or the disappearance of spiritual being, of spiritual relations, indeed of spiritual life in general. Not only do great catastrophes, as in earthquakes, storms, and floods, show how indifferent the existence or the non-existence of spiritual life is to the forces of nature, but the commonplaces of everyday experience and of individual destiny also show the same indifference. In

²⁴⁵ Op. cit., pp. 201, 202. (Truth of Rel., pp. 292-294.)

²⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 224. Italics ours. (Truth of Rel., p. 326.)

²⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 226. (Truth of Rel., p. 328.)

²⁴⁸ Op. cit., p. 20. (Grundlinien Einer Neuen Lebensanschauung, p. 12, top.)

nature we find no difference of treatment in accordance with any distinction of good and evil, great and mean, noble and vulgar. Even the most eminent personality, who may be almost indispensable to our spiritual welfare, is subject to the same contingency, the same fate as all others. Regarded from the point of view of the world of sense, all spiritual life is a chaotic confusion of fleeting appearances, all of which are dependent; it is not an independent world, but a subsidiary addition to a world which is other than spiritual."²⁴⁹

"We feel the rigid actuality of occurrences, the indifference of the machinery of the world towards the aims of the spirit, and the contradictions of existence. . . . we . . . feel . . . *our bondage to obscure powers* and at the same time our insignificance."²⁵⁰

Identification of Nature and Human Nature

As we examine Eucken's account of nature we are struck by the suggestion of a certain wilfulness in its resistance to the claims of the spiritual. This suggestion is intensified by the practical identification of *nature* and *human nature* in his analysis of the "human spiritual." A passage in *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion* states his position:

"Auch die Stellung des Menschen verändert sich wesentlich, wo alle Grösse und alles Gelingen seines Lebens von der Teilnahme an einem übermenschlichen Geistesleben abhängt. Zunächst erscheint er stark gegen die übliche Fassung herabgesetzt. Pflügen wir bei ihm den Scheidepunkt der Welten anzunehmen und ihm in seiner eignen Natur einen unvergleichlichen Wert beizumessen, so wird das nun hinfällig. Denn das Neue und Höhere liegt in dem Geistesleben, als der Eröffnung einer selbständigen Innenwelt, *nicht in dem Menschen als solchem*. Lange, lange Zeiten verlässt er kaum den Bereich der Natur, und wenn schliesslich Geistesleben bei ihm erscheint, so ist es nicht sowohl sein eignes Werk als die Mitteilung jener überlegenen Stufe. Wenn sich ferner Geistesleben im Bereich des Menschen entwickelt, so wird keineswegs dieser ganze Bereich dafür gewonnen. Vielmehr verbleibt die niedere Art, leistet hartnäckigen Widerstand und zieht das Geistesleben zu sich herab; so wird der Durchschnittsstand der einer Halbgeistigkeit, dem eben das Grosse und Eigentümliche des Geisteslebens fehlt. Solche schärfere Scheidung des Menschen vom Geistesleben stellt auch die einzelnen Aufgaben in eine neue Beleuchtung und steigert überall die Spannung der Arbeit. So darf z. B. nun und nimmer die Moral als eine natürliche Eigen-

²⁴⁹ Ibid., pp. 263, 264. (Grundlinien, p. 123.)

²⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 301. Italics ours. (Grundlinien, p. 191.)

schaft des Menschen gelten . . . sie [echte Moral] aber wird erst möglich vom Geistesleben aus, und der Aufstieg zu ihr bleibt eine fortwährende Aufgabe, die nur zum kleinsten Teile gelingt. So erfolgt durchgängig *die entscheidende Wendung innerhalb des Menschenlebens, nicht schon mit seinem ersten Erscheinen*. Das alles besagt ohne Zweifel eine Demütigung des Menschen *als blossen Menschen*. Aber der Herabsetzung entspricht eine Erhöhung, insofern sich ihm die Möglichkeit des Teilhabens an einer neuen Stufe der Wirklichkeit und zugleich an einem Gesamt-leben eröffnet, *das über den Verwicklungen des menschlichen Kreises liegt*. Nun kann alles, was das Geistesleben auszeichnet; die Universalität, die Souveränität, die Autonomie, auch *zum Besitze des Menschen werden, der zu ihm vordringt*; nun können die geistigen Inhalte sich abheben von der blossmenschlichen Lebensform."²⁵¹

In *Life's Basis* we read: "we see *something grow up* within the human sphere *which leads man beyond himself*, and which is valid not simply for him but even in opposition to him. The whole matter bristles with problems: from the point of view of the life of nature this new life must appear to be an insoluble riddle; . . . Along with this detachment of life from the mere individual and the mere subjectivity of man, there is a liberation from external ties, and the development of a self-conscious spirituality."²⁵²

As at the level of nature life is spent in the development of relations with the environment, in action and reaction, so the form of life in man remains bound, since the life of the soul cannot dissociate itself from the experience of sense. *The apparent inwardness that is evolved at this level is simply an after-effect of sensuous feelings and desires*. So far as the life of nature extends, the forces and laws of the life of the soul will only refine what the external world exhibits in coarser features. The mechanism of nature also extends into human life; natural impulses of conduct, as well as association of ideas, reveal the fact that the life of the soul is in complete dependence upon natural conditions. From this point of view it seems impossible that inwardness should ever become independent. The actual experience of human life, however, shows that what is thus regarded as impossible is indisputably real."²⁵³

²⁵¹ Op. cit., pp. 116, 117. Italics are ours. (Truth of Rel., pp. 169, 170.)

²⁵² See Grundlinien, p. 58. The remainder of the passage is somewhat altered in the 2d German ed., 1913.

²⁵³ Op. cit., pp. 123, 124.

Consequences

We have not to criticize here Eucken's faulty analysis of human nature, nor his erroneous conception of man's spiritual endowment: the matter has been already briefly dealt with. Attention may be called, however, to the astounding assumptions which he makes in the above citations. If Eucken were correct we might well wonder who among our friends were "self-conscious spiritualities," and who were but "blosse Menschen." He, himself, finds nothing strange in such a problem. In *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion* he writes: "wie oft erlischt alle geistige Regung schon innerhalb des Lebens, die Geistigkeit wird stumpf und matt, sie erstirbt fast noch bei Lebzeit des Menschen."²⁵⁴ And in *Life's Basis* we read:

"There is no greater contrast than that between simple disposition and spiritual depth, between the *man of mere sentiment*, with *his dependence and vacillation*, and the *personality rooted in an inner infinity*."²⁵⁵

The contrast between a weak and a strong character is always striking; it is, however, a contrast in *degree*, not in nature as Eucken implies. A "*man of mere sentiment*," i. e., without a true, substantial, spiritual soul, which is the root of the sentiment, is a creation of the imagination, not a reality.

Eucken voices the suggestion most clearly, perhaps, when he complains of "*der Mangel an Liebe und Gerechtigkeit in der Welt und bei den Menschen*,"²⁵⁶ and elsewhere he refers to the "want of affection in things." Dr. Caldecott in his appreciation of Eucken's Philosophy writes as follows:

"We now come to a problem which looms large in Eucken's treatment: the lower levels of life, both in our human nature and in external nature, what are these? We might have thought that in a philosophy which begins so clearly with the One Cosmic Spirit who descends into finite spirits of the same nature we were dealing with the whole universe. But now there arises before us a realm to which we are not led by Eucken on this line of descent, but which presents itself unbidden, a non-spiritual range or kind of being. We call it Nature: as physical it envelops us, as 'mere human nature' it seems to be a part of ourselves. We know how difficult it was for the Classical German idealists to take nature into their account: how Hegel is alleged to have treated her as a

²⁵⁴ Op. cit., p. 201. Italics are ours. (Truth of Rel., p. 292.)

²⁵⁵ Op. cit., p. 72. Italics ours. (Grundlinien, p. 42, towards end.)

²⁵⁶ Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, op. cit., p. 42. Italics ours. (Truth of Rel., p. 61.)

stepchild in the cosmic family; how, indeed, his high philosophy led him to a positive contempt of all that nature can show . . . Eucken himself alleges this contempt as a reason for renouncing Hegel's lead; but how does nature fare in Eucken's own Activism? Here are vast ranges of cosmic being which are accounted sufficiently honourable to be taken in hand by 'Spirit,' and after transformation to be admitted, it would seem, even into the life. They lack high values of their own, certainly; they are manifold, particular, disconnected, conflicting; but at least they seem to have sufficient value to enable them to furnish material upon which 'Spirit' can work. Indeed, in the chapter 'Growth of Man beyond Nature' in *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal*, Eucken gives a very fine account of the way in which stage after stage of improvement and elevation is effected in them. But it is a very marked feature of Eucken that he regards Nature with distrust and melancholy. Sometimes he speaks sadly of its indifference to the requirements of Spirit; at others he rises to indignation, speaking of its 'alien' character, its 'opposition,' its 'hostility,' and flat refusal to submit to organization. And his general estimate of what natural civilization, even as assisted by Spirit, has so far accomplished is a very low one. . . . We are bound to ask, what is Eucken's view both of the origin and of the persistence of this alien part of the Cosmos? What has become of his Monism, his unity of the Cosmic Spirit? It seems to me that we have here the most serious deficiency in Eucken's philosophy as a system. The widespread indifference of nature has proved the rock on which many an Idealist has suffered shipwreck before, but in Eucken's case there seems to be an inexplicable unconsciousness on his part that his bark is in peril. Apart from physical nature the lower ranges of mental life are outside his system, and present themselves in this alien and even hostile guise. Mr. Boyce Gibson tells us that he has called Eucken's attention to this, and that the deficiency of his interest in psychology is acknowledged by him; but it is plain that the far-reaching effect of this is not appreciated by Eucken: otherwise he could not continue at once to proclaim the all-sufficiency of his Spiritualism and to give forth incessant lamentations over the immensity of the oppositions to be encountered, the grievous burden of the task of overcoming them, and the prevalence of failure over success in the history of culture and civilization."²⁵⁷

Eucken's Proposed Goal—Monism

Dr. Caldecott seems to us to touch the crux when he asks:

"What has become of his Monism, his unity of the Cosmic Spirit?" In truth Eucken has proposed an impossible task, viz.,

²⁵⁷ Church Quart. Review, Religious Phil. of R. Eucken, London, April, 1913, pp. 57-59.

the identifications of two Orders of reality which are, *in se*, ultimately irreducible: there is absolute irreconcilability between his fundamental assumptions and his final goal. Insisting, often with the vigor of a Scholastic, on a *real duality* of nature²⁵⁸ and spirit, he holds that the task of spirit is to overcome nature by assimilating and thus spiritualizing it. The following passage from *Geistige Strömungen* is an unmistakably clear statement of the proposed goal: "im Streben zu sich selbst bleibt das Geistesleben zugleich mit der grossen Welt befasst, *es kann sich selbst nicht finden, ohne diese an sich zu ziehen, es kann nicht ruhen und rasten, bis es sie vollauf überwunden und in sich aufgenommen hat.* Darum ist all sein Gehalt zugleich eine Behauptung, die Behauptung, das Letzte, Ganze, Allumfassende, der Kern der gesamten Wirklichkeit zu sein. Dies aber kann es nur sein, wenn die Weiterbildung, die es an den Dingen durch die Aneignung bewirkt, diese zur Höhe ihres eigenen Wesens führt, wenn der Gehalt des Geisteslebens die eigene Wahrheit der Dinge bedeutet. Das Geistesleben wird in sich selbst ein unerträglicher Widerspruch, wenn es neben und gegenüber der Welt, nicht innerhalb ihrer steht, wenn nicht in der Wendung zu ihm sich die Wirklichkeit selbst vollendet. Die Anerkennung dessen versetzt unsere Welt in Fluss und verwandelt sie in ein Reich von aufsteigender Bewegung."²⁵⁹

There can be no doubt as to the literal meaning which Eucken intends these words to bear: the same thought is conveyed in similar language in his various works; and he recognizes, according to Boyce Gibson, the applicability of the term "Idealism" to his system. Gibson writes:

"The following extract, which Professor Eucken kindly permits me to quote from a letter of April 19, 1907, sets this step of his [viz, the adoption of 'the activist label as a distinctive philosophical badge'] in a clear light. 'I fully recognize,' he writes, 'the advantages of the term 'Religious Idealism.' But the expression 'Activism' has peculiar significance in relation to the spiritual condition of Germany today. . . . But the name is, after all, of little consequence; what matters is the meaning we attach to it.'"²⁶⁰

Idealism is an ambiguous term being applied to such widely

²⁵⁸ By "nature" Eucken understands the *non-spiritual*. As well as the material universe, therefore, including human organisms, man's sensuous, psychic life falls under the term. We hold that owing to the fact that sensuous and spiritual activities are, alike, modes of action of the one, indivisible, spiritual soul, it is practically impossible for any mental state of an adult to be wholly sensuous.

²⁵⁹ *Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart*, pp. 30, 31. Italics ours.

²⁶⁰ Rudolph Eucken's *Philosophy of Life*, op. cit., Appendix, p. 170, footnote.

different systems of thought as those of Plato and Hegel,²⁶¹ but in the present instance, the meaning is evident; the "name" stands for spiritualistic monism as Booth points out in the Introductory Note to Main Currents of Modern Thought:

"Eucken's ultimate goal is a *monism*—not naturalistic, as it is hardly necessary to point out, but spiritualistic in character."²⁶²

Metaphysical Idealism even in its most favorable aspect—i.e., when, as with Berkely, it is grounded on the assumption that God and finite spirits alone exist²⁶³—defies alike popular and scientific experience; but when it starts from the Aristotelico-Scholastic principle of a *duality* of nature²⁶⁴ and spirit, it presents—borrowing language from Eucken—"an *unendurable contradiction*."²⁶⁵

We may remark that Eucken recoils, baffled, from his attempt, and weakly acknowledges his failure in the following passage: "To be sure, *the world of sense retains a certain independence*; it resists a complete transformation into spiritual magnitudes, and our life, therefore, retains a certain restriction and impenetrability."²⁶⁶ In these words he practically yields the entire situation, and yet, as Dr. Caldecott observes, on his part "there seems to be an inexplicable unconsciousness . . . that his bark is in peril."²⁶⁷

²⁶¹ See article on *Idealism* by Otto Wilmann in Catholic Encyclopedia; Professor Creighton has also called attention to the point in his article in the Americana under this heading.

²⁶² Op. cit., p. 12.

²⁶³ As Father Maher points out, "God, without the intervention of a material world, could *potentia absoluta* immediately produce in men's minds states like to those which they experience in the present order. The only demonstrative argument against the Theistic Immateralist is, that such a hypothesis is in conflict with the attribute of veracity which he must ascribe to the Deity. God could not be the author of such a fraud." Maher, Psychology, 1911, p. 109, footnote.

²⁶⁴ We use "nature" here in Eucken's signification of the term, i.e., to designate the non-spiritual. The Scholastics prefer to speak of matter and *its forces*. Eucken in *der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion* writes:

"Das ist ein anderer Gegensatz als der von Körper und Seele, von Ausserem und Innerem, von räumlicher Ausdehnung und bewusster Tätigkeit, wie die Aufklärung ihn in den Vordergrund rückte." op. cit., p. 58. (Truth of Rel., p. 86.) See also *Einheit des Geisteslebens*, p. 3. The consideration of *material forces* under the concept of the non-spiritual, whether these operate within or without the organism, renders the field covered by the term in each system practically co-extensive. Cf. Note 258.

²⁶⁵ Geistige Strömungen, op. cit., p. 30, "unerträglicher Widerspruch." Problem of Human Life, p. 286. (Lebensanschauung der g. Denker, op. cit., p. 273.)

²⁶⁶ Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, op. cit., p. 238. Italics ours. In the second German edition the wording and arrangement are much changed through here, Cf. Part II (Grundlegender Teil), but the ideas are the same. The reason of the change is indicated in the Preface to this edition.

²⁶⁷ Loc. cit.

From the effort to bridge this impassable chasm spring the most serious of the errors which disfigure Eucken's thought. The most telling in its effects is that which makes the spiritual nature of man the "existential form" of the Absolute Spiritual Life. Such a tenet, as has been already pointed out, must logically ascribe all guilt to the supreme Being, as to its source. Moral evil can result only through *freedom*, and freedom can come only from the spiritual life. Eucken terms freedom "die Grundbedingung alles Geisteslebens."²⁶⁸

Where, however, the human spiritual is but a "centre-point" or a "concentration-point"—"einen Mittel- und Konzentrationspunkt,"²⁶⁹ of the Absolute Spiritual, *the Absolute Spiritual, the only Free Being*, is necessarily made responsible for the crime of the universe. On such an hypothesis crime, guilt and moral law are terms wholly devoid of meaning: the following passages reveal the Pantheism underlying it:

Der Zusammenhang unserer Betrachtung verlangt eine Weiterbewegung zunächst deshalb, weil der Mensch nicht in die Stufe der geistigen Individualität aufgeht, die uns bis dahin beschäftigte. Auch bei glänzendster Leistung umfängt diese Stufe ihn nicht ganz und gar, er kann darüber hinausblicken, sich in andere Individualitäten versetzen und durch sie ergänzen, er muss das tun, um dem Zufälligen und Problematischen seiner eignen Natur überlegen zu werden, um bei sich selbst das Unechte ausscheiden, das Echte stärken zu können. *Von hier aus gelangt das Leben auf einen Standort, wo es die verschiedenen Kreise überschaut und ihrer aller Gehalt in eignen Besitz verwandelt, wo sich ihm die ganze Unendlichkeit zusammenfasst und zu einem Beisichselbstsein wird.* Hier bleibt das Leben auch in scheinbarer Wendung nach aussen immer mit sich selbst befasst, hier ist die Stufe der blossen Leistung sicher überwunden, und es bildet die eigne Erhöhung des Lebens das beherrschende Ziel alles Mühens. Das entspricht der christlichen Überzeugung von einem unermesslichen Werte des Menschen in seiner reinen Innerlichkeit, der Überzeugung, 'dass für den Preis der ganzen Welt, nicht eine einzige Seele erkaufte werden kann' (Luther); wie aber liesse sich solche Schätzung rechtfertigen, stiege nicht in jener Tiefe der Seele eine neue Art des Lebens auf, erhöbe sich hier nicht ein neues Reich, das den innersten Kern der gesamten Wirklichkeit bildet? Wie die Sache gewöhnlich gefasst wird, als Empfehlung einer bloss subjektiven, von der grossen

²⁶⁸ "Wie das möglich sei, wie aus Gnade Freiheit . . . entspringen könne, das übersteigt als ein Urphänomen alle Erklärung, es ist, als die Grundbedingung alles Geisteslebens, durchaus axiomatischer Art." Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, op. cit., p. 155. (Truth of Rel., p. 223.)

²⁶⁹ Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, op. cit., p. 108.

Welt sich in eine private Klausur zurückziehenden und dort tatlos verharrenden Gesinnung, hat sie keinen genügenden Grund, ja droht sie zu einer leeren Floskel und Phrase zu werden. Jene Schätzung erlangt ein gutes Recht nur, wenn in der Tiefe des Seelenlebens eine neue Stufe der Wirklichkeit aufgeht, und dies kann nicht aus der Kraft des blossen Punktes, sondern nur dadurch geschehen, dass *hier unendliches Leben unendlichem Leben begegnet, dass sich an dieser Stelle ein Kreuzungs- und Konzentrationspunkt unendlichen Lebens bildet*. Ähnliches scheint Goethe in jenen merkwürdigen Worten vorzuschweben: 'Gott begegnet sich immer selbst; Gott im Menschen sich selbst wieder im Menschen. Daher keiner Ursache hat, sich gegen die Grössten gering zu achten.'

Handlet es sich also nicht darum, das Leben auf einen besonderen Punkt zu beziehen und dessen Eigentümlichkeit zu unterwerfen, sondern darum, *es auf seine eigne Tiefe zu bringen und ihm einen Halt in sich selbst zu geben*, so wird die Sache gewaltig schwer. Vollauf eignes Leben kann nur entstehen, wenn sich die Tätigkeit in Selbstbetätigung verwandelt, wenn sie ein lebendiges Selbst zum Ausdruck bringt, *wenn die umfassende Einheit durch Herausarbeitung eines durchgehenden und beharrenden Lebens einen Kern, ein Wesen gewinnt und damit zum übrigen Leben wirkt, es darauf bezieht, es daran misst*. Nur eine solche Scheidung und Wiederverbindung, eine solche innere Abstufung und Zurückbeziehung des Lebens lässt die Frage nach einem Inhalt entstehen, *nur wenn das umfassende Ganze sich die zerstreute Mannigfaltigkeit unterwirft und sich selbst in sie hineinlegt, erwächst eine in sich selbst beruhende Wirklichkeit*. Ob solches Leben persönliches Leben heissen darf, darüber lässt sich streiten. . . . es wäre also keine Absonderung, sondern das gerade Gegenteil: innerste Verbindung mit den Dingen, ja mit der Unendlichkeit. . . . So empfiehlt es sich vielleicht mehr, von autonomem Leben und von Autonomien zu sprechen; und liegt vornehmlich an der Tatsache, dass *im Geistesleben selbst eine Bewegung zur Bildung eines Kernes und zur Verwandlung in Selbstleben im Gange ist*, und dass mit solcher Wendung des Lebensprozesses eine Innenwelt entsteht, die etwas ganz anderes bedeutet als die schattenhafte Innerlichkeit des auf sich beschränkten Subjekts."²⁷⁰

"Wohl hat auch sie anzuerkennen, dass ein beisichselbst befindliches Leben und eine zeitüberlegene Wahrheit im Menschenwesen irgendwie angelegt sein, als treibende Kraft in ihm wirken und ein Mass seines Unternehmens bilden muss." "Lebenskonzentrationen entstehen und wachsen zu Autonomien."²⁷¹

²⁷⁰ Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion, op. cit., pp. 103-105. Italics are ours. (Truth of Rel., 150-153.)

²⁷¹ Erkennen und Leben, pp. 98, 99.

Conclusion

The reflex of this peculiar form of Pantheism is found in Eucken's hostility to the physical world. Having failed to grapple with the problem of evil,²⁷² the suffering and misery in the world, which he so graphically describes, confront him as a baffling puzzle. He makes no distinction between the pain or loss which accrues to a man from the forces of Nature, and the wrong which a fellow-man deliberately inflicts on him except that the presence of the Spiritual Life in the second case makes the doer responsible and therefore renders the act more reprehensible. In each case, however, he finds a similar inappreciation of spiritual values, a similar "lack of righteousness," "der mangel an Liebe und Gerechtigkeit."²⁷³

The uniformity of nature, which has uplifted countless minds to the unchanging Truth, proves an insuperable stumbling block to Eucken. Kant compared the Moral Law to the starry heavens "and found them both sublime," but Eucken rails at what he terms the *blind mechanism of the natural process*, "das blinde Getriebe der Naturgewalten."²⁷⁴

It is not surprising therefore, that the account which he gives of the genesis of our knowledge of the spiritual is unsatisfactory. The ideas of the Sublime, the Beautiful, the Infinite are essential elements in the content of our concept of a Supreme Spiritual Reality, but these are gathered from Nature. Christ Himself drew his similitudes from the physical universe, and called attention to its beauty:

"Consider the lilies . . . I say to you, not even Solomon in

²⁷² We are aware that Eucken devotes a large portion of his work *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion* to this problem, but he makes no attempt at a solution. He exaggerates the misery of our human lot, and leaves his student in the most painful doubt as to the cause of the suffering. Although he draws so copiously from Sacred Truth on other occasions he refuses to accept its teaching on this point. He refers to the doctrine of original sin as "jene unglückliche Lehre von der Erbsünde, welche das Christentum zum Manichäismus herabzieht." *Wahrheitsgehalt der Rel.*, p. 155. The reference to Manichaeism, however, and in fact the entire context show how erroneous his ideas of the Christian doctrine are. The allusion to Luther ("jene bedenkliche Meinung Luthers, dass der mensch die Gerechtigkeit nicht sowohl erlange als nur zugerechnet erhalte, eine Meinung, die, zu Ende gedacht, den grossen Weltkampf in blossen Schein und Spiel verwandeln würde," op. cit.) may be compared with a passage already cited from *Luther in the Light of Facts*, vide footnote 225, p. 77.

²⁷³ *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion*, op. cit., p. 42.

²⁷⁴ *Der Wahrheitsgehalt der Religion*, op. cit., p. 201.

all his glory was clothed like one of these."²⁷⁵ "Consider the ravens, for they sow not, neither do they reap, neither have they storehouse nor barn, and God feedeth them. How much are you more valuable than they?"²⁷⁶

We may note here that Our Saviour uses the comparative degree. Man is more the object of the Creator's solicitude than all material objects, nevertheless these have a value in themselves, apart altogether from their spiritual cognition by man. Boyce Gibson holds that "Eucken's philosophy is essentially a Christian philosophy of life; a restatement and development in philosophical form of the religious teaching of Jesus."²⁷⁷

We do not propose to criticize such a view at any length: Eucken certainly borrows from the Gospel, and from the Fathers even, when it suits his purpose, but his own contribution renders the Gospel narrative void of all meaning, "Benedicite omnia opera Domini Domino" breathes the spirit of Christ, but the canticle²⁷⁸ has no place in Eucken's system where nature and spirit are in an internecine warfare. Our English poet is nearer the Gospel spirit when he tells us that we may find:

"tongues in trees, books in the running brooks, sermons in stones, and good in everything."²⁷⁹

²⁷⁵ Luke XII, Verse 27.

²⁷⁶ Luke XII, Verse 24.

²⁷⁷ R. Eucken's *Philosophy of Life*, op. cit., p. 166.

²⁷⁸ Canticum, Dan. III.

²⁷⁹ Shakespeare, *As You Like It*, Act II, Sc. I.

CONCLUSION

Eucken's epistemological position is aptly criticized by Baron von Hügel as follows: "Everywhere in this philosophy we find the assumption of a strictly Idealist Epistemology, and an insistence . . . upon this Idealism as the starting-point of every philosophy that has a right to count at all. . . . in Epistemology, the present writer has been driven to think that an unprejudiced analysis of our actual knowing, the discoveries and requirements of modern times, the history of Epistemology itself and the evidences and needs of the spiritual life, conjointly clamor for a frank reconsideration of the entire question, and even for some critically Realist conclusion. . . . in knowledge we have the irreducible trinity of knower, known and knowing, since the distinctness and independence of the known from the knower and the knowing ever appears as a fundamental condition of anything being known, and as part of the information yielded by the analysis of the knowledge thus achieved."²⁸⁰

Although Eucken speaks of Von Hügel in terms which he intends to be the highest praise, and has even devoted a special essay to a warm appreciation of his work,²⁸¹ the first formulation of his theory of knowledge, *Erkennen und Leben*, which appeared some months later than the article from which we have just cited, does not indicate that he profited by the criticism more than he did by the earlier one of Boyce Gibson. In the works since published or revised there is the same insistence on the overcoming (*überwindung*) of the difference between subject and object by a transcendence of the antithesis.²⁸² It is quite evident, however, that his desired goal is *not ontological but religious*. This accounts for his friendly acknowledgment of, yet entire disregard for, just criticism.

Eucken is neither a natural philosopher nor a metaphysician. A cursory examination of Activism suffices to show the unfitness of the first title; his impatience of, and even contempt for ontology debars him from the second. Metaphysics without careful ontological speculation is an impossibility; hence the charge of

²⁸⁰ Religious Philosophy of Rudolf Eucken, *Hibbert Journal*, April, 1912, pp. 667, 668.

²⁸¹ Collected Essays, op. cit., VIII, p. 115.

²⁸² See Grundlinien, 2te Aufl., 1913, p. 73.

German critics that his philosophy is not *Wissenschaft* but *Kunst*,²⁸³ hence Von Hügel's complaint that he treats "an abstraction as though, of itself, the most fruitful of realities."²⁸⁴

In so far as Eucken can be called a philosopher he must be ranked with the Moralists: we say "in so far as" because a system in which so many incompatible elements find a home is not strictly speaking philosophy at all. M. Alden points out that "his phraseology as an open air prophet often contradicts the most essential formulations of his philosophy."²⁸⁵

He himself, points out the ethical character (einen ethischen Charakter) of Activism.²⁸⁶ He knows that he is morally right in recognizing the reality and claims of the Spiritual Life and heeds little whether he be metaphysically and psychologically wrong in his exposition of the same. He describes his own frame of mind in a passage already cited²⁸⁷ from the Truth of Religion "so that he will found his religion upon this rock [i. e., 'the fundamental fact—man as a superior Whole'], weary throughout of the strife whether intellect, or will, or feeling, plays the main part in the concern."

We have dealt with Eucken from the philosophical standpoint and have found that his theory is equally unsatisfactory in the fields of psychology, ethics, metaphysics and epistemology. In concluding we shall touch on its religious aspect.

Eucken's motto might be *Excelsior*, so often and with such vehemence does he insist on the necessity of *transcendence*. It cannot possibly be any ontological unity that he is interested in for the reasons already pointed out: the "inner life he identifies with religion,"²⁸⁸ and "man's deepest life" with "a kind of Theistic Absolutism."²⁸⁹

The transcendence which Eucken is striving after and vigorously, though incoherently, preaching is not only possible in the field of religion but has been perfectly accomplished wherever and whenever a Saint has lived. It is held up to us by the Church, is luminously explained in ascetic theology, and is mirrored most

²⁸³ G. Wunderle, op. cit., p. 30 and footnote.

²⁸⁴ Op. cit., p. 669.

²⁸⁵ Op. cit., p. 61.

²⁸⁶ Grundlinien, p. 144.

²⁸⁷ See p. 72.

²⁸⁸ H. M. Alden, op. cit., p. 58.

²⁸⁹ Von Hügel, op. cit., p. 665.

vividly in the epistles of St. Paul.^{289a} There is not any possibility of literally transcending the antithesis between subject and object, e.g., between a flower and the one who admires it, so that the difference between the two would not exist; but just as "the life" is "more than the food and the body more than the raiment,"²⁹⁰ so the soul is incomparably more than earth's most precious treasures, and man can rise above created objects to contemplate their Infinite Source Who is Himself the Cause of all, Whose Divine Ideas are the prototypes of all, in Whom all Being is One and undifferentiated. The more the human spirit transcends all finite things by thought and desire and yearns for better knowledge of—even in the natural order—and closer union of will with the Supreme Infinite Spiritual Life, God, the more is the entire man perfected. It is true that even in the natural order such a life would bring an independence of the trivial, the "pettily human," and would be filled with a profound peace and a solid happiness unknown to the victims of passion and appetite.

Nevertheless we have on the one hand an individual, substantial, spiritual soul, and on the other its Infinite Creator—not one, therefore, but two; and if we take into our calculation the material goods that man has risen above we have three. Metaphysical monism of Eucken's type is an intrinsic impossibility. What matter is, in last analysis, we do not know, but that it is not, and never can be, spirit, we do know. Monism of purpose is a necessity, and the union of the soul with its Creator by conformity of thought and will is, even in the natural order, the supreme end of human life. Moreover it is the only fount of all true activism.

A St. Peter Damien transcending the differences between himself and the shapeless mass of hideous disease in whom he recognizes a fellow being, a brother, is no isolated example of Christ-like Activism, and in the spheres of Art, Letters, even Science, *Geistige Arbeit* spiritually inspired in the manner indicated, has ever been the preserving leaven.

Christ Himself pointed out the path of transcendence when asked what was necessary for salvation, *Thou shalt love the Lord thy*

^{289a} Our analysis of the *Geistesleben* shows, however, how little we agree with the following statement of Richard Roberts: "I cannot help feeling that the Pauline conception 'in Christ' is identical in all essential respects with Eucken's idea of the universal spiritual life." Rudolf Eucken and St. Paul, *Contemporary Review*, Vol. 97, Jan., 1910, p. 71.

²⁹⁰ Matthew, Chap. VI, 25.

God with thy whole heart and with thy whole soul and with all thy mind and with all thy strength and thy neighbor as thyself for the love of God. The man who strives to fulfill these "two great commandments of the Law" is continually transcending the difference between subject and object, in that every attraction, every sweetness, every goodness, every loveliness, every beauty and perfection whatsoever of created objects he refers back to their Infinite Uncreated Source, and loves them because of their Source, and loves the Creator ever more because of the ever new knowledge acquired of Him through these created perfections. Thomas à Kempis in the twenty-first chapter of the third book of the Imitation unfolds this transcendence when praying to find his rest in the Absolute Spiritual Life:

"Above all creatures, above all health and beauty, above all glory, all honor, all power, all dignity, all science, all penetration of mind, all riches; above all arts; above all joy and all diversions; above all reputation, all praise, all sweetness, all consolations, all hopes, all promises, all merits and all desires; above all the gifts and all the graces that You can give; . . . above all things visible and invisible; above all that is not what Thou art, Oh God!"

PART III

THE "PERMANENT FOUNDATION" OF A PHILOSOPHY OF THE SPIRITUAL

*In Which the Basic Principles of Knowledge and the Necessary
Ground of All Truth and Reality are Exposed*

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

Eucken's theory has failed all along the line. The question arises—Is there then no knowledge possible? No satisfactory solution of life and the universe?

Eucken claims that Scholasticism will not meet the requirements of today: he considers that it will not measure up to the needs of the modern thought-world.

We recall here what has been already said (Part I, Chap. IV)—that the fundamental laws which govern the working of the human mind are unchangeable. If, therefore, the psychology and metaphysics of Scholasticism *did really offer* a satisfactory interpretation of life and the universe in the Middle Ages—and Eucken practically grants that they did—it follows that that solution holds good today.

In the two following chapters we shall unfold the Scholastic theory of knowledge and idea of truth: in Chapter III we shall give the Scholastic teaching with regard to the Foundation of all truth and reality: in Chapter IV we shall direct attention again to Eucken's challenge and point out its answer.

CHAPTER I

INQUIRY INTO THE CONDITIONS OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

GENERAL SURVEY

It may be well to point out that the question at issue is not the existence of a Spiritual Life, since Eucken is one with us in affirming this truth and in asserting that an Absolute Spiritual Life forms "the ultimate basis of all reality:" our inquiry here is concerned with the *necessary conditions of that existence*.

It must be clearly borne in mind that Eucken has posited an *Absolute Spiritual Life*. The spiritual is that which is wholly distinct from and essentially opposed to matter,²⁹¹ hence materialism and pantheism in any and every form are eliminated from our examination.

Eucken has also posited the "human spiritual," and has called on us energetically to "fight a battle for the preservation of the human soul."²⁹²

He has, further, posited higher knowledge and unchangeable truth as within man's reach.

We saw in Part II that he did not develop his theory in accordance with the necessary conditions of spiritual existence and, therefore, his system results in a complete failure. The Scholastic philosophy does recognize these conditions and offers in consequence a system which is consistent, rational and in harmony with the implication of the term *spiritual*. All that is best in Eucken's thought may be found here freed from the incompatible elements with which it was encased in *Activism*.

The Scholastic teaching with regard to the "human spiritual" has been already dealt with.²⁹³ The human soul is a spiritual substance, wholly distinct in essence, though depending for existence upon the Absolute Spiritual Life: the very words "Absolute Spiritual" and "human spiritual" imply this. Only *on this condition* can man's individuality, abiding identity, freedom and personality be safeguarded. A philosophy, such as Eucken's, which makes the "human spiritual" the "existential form" of the Absolute Spiritual; which regards man's spiritual soul not as a

²⁹¹ Refer to Part I.

²⁹² Main Currents of Modern Thought, op. cit., p. 129.

²⁹³ Part II, Chap. III.

really distinct entity but as a focus or "concentration point," whereat the Absolute Spiritual Life finds self-expression, sacrifices, at one stroke, God's integrity and sanctity and man's individuality and freedom and destroys the entire spiritual structure it sought to raise.

In this and the following chapters we shall deal with the other points of our investigation.

Discussion of the "immediacy"

Eucken insists, as we have seen, that all higher knowledge is due to an "immediacy" of the spiritual life. In this he is not originating any distinctively new idea. The bent of contemporary philosophy is to lay great stress on the native energy of man's soul. The "reality-feelings" of James, the "instinct" of Bergson, the "Gemüt" of Eucken all point in the same direction, and may be looked on as outlying wavelets of the reaction against the intellectual absolutism of the Hegelian school—wavelets, moreover, of a common distinctive character in that they are left from the ebb of two tides. The Materialism which followed Hegelianism with quick reactionary flow was itself counter-crossed by new currents: the resultant gives two antithetical movements in present-day thought—the Absolutist, or that of "Objective Idealism," and the Pragmatic in which may be classed generically the humanistic and anti-intellectualistic systems whatever may be their specific differences.

Eucken will not call himself a Pragmatist, yet his assertion that the "human point of departure" is "the only possible [one] for the work of Knowledge,"²⁹⁴ his denial of the trustworthiness of our sense perceptions and his insistence on action as the indispensable instrument of truth connect him intimately with the pragmatic leaders. He acknowledges his affinities with them and even goes so far as to say "we are at one with the main atmosphere of Pragmatism."²⁹⁵ On the other hand he touches the Absolutist

²⁹⁴ Knowledge and Life, p. 86. Erkennen und Leben, op. cit., p. 46.

²⁹⁵ Knowledge and Life, p. 94. Erkennen und Leben, p. 51. Eucken has treated, at some length, of Pragmatism. See in particular Geistige Strömungen; Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung; Einführung in eine Philosophie des Geisteslebens; Erkennen und Leben. The following passages give a fair indication of his attitude towards it.

In Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung he writes: "Bei socher inneren Erhöhung und mit solcher Forderung einer neuen Welt trennt sich der Aktivismus von allem blossen Voluntarismus und Pragmatismus, denen er

position when he maintains that truth is reached by a transcendence of the difference between subject and object.²⁹⁶

We are not concerned here with intellectualistic Absolutism. The Scholastic doctrine of the real duality between subject and object, which we shall touch on again later, is a refutation of the theory. The third distinct system which offers us an interpretation of reality today lies in the "via media" between the other two: it is indeed that "golden mean" which is so attractive to the sane man of every age, whether in philosophy or outside of it. This third—Scholastic Realism—in its theory of knowledge falls in no way short of Pragmatism in emphasizing the native energy of the soul; here, too, "immediacies" find a prominent place, but they are ascribed to a different activity from that to which Pragmatists attribute them. And it is just at this point that the line of demarcation between Scholastics and Anti-Intellectualists is strongly drawn. The "immediacy" of the Scholastic system is held to issue *not from the lower activities of the soul but from the higher*—not from instinct, therefore, nor from feeling but from *reason*.

We shall compare, by carefully chosen selections, the Scholastic position on this point with the Pragmatic, and then estimate the

nahestehen scheint, und mit denen er die Verneinung gemeinsam hat. Denn er teilt mit ihnen die Ablehnung einer intellektualistischen Lebensgestaltung, die den Intellekt aus eigenem Vermögen Wahrheit finden und sie dem übrigen Leben zuführen lässt, mit ihnen will er die Wahrheit auf ein ursprünglicheres und wesenhafteres Tun begründen. . . . Auch der Pragmatismus gestaltet die Welt und das Leben mehr aus der Lage und den Bedürfnissen des Menschen, als dass er die geistige Tätigkeit zur Selbständigkeit gegenüber dem Menschen erhöhe und von hier aus eine Prüfung und Sichtung seines Lebensbefundes vollzöge." Op. cit., p. 144. (*Life's Basis*, pp. 256, 257.)

In Erkennen und Leben he discusses the subject more fully: two selections will suffice for our purpose: "Aber es ist nicht zu verkennen, dass dem starken Eindruck, den der Pragmatismus eine Zeitlang machte, schon wieder ein Rückschlag gefolgt ist, und dass sich mehr und mehr Bedenken wider ihn erheben. Diese Bedenken dringen von einzelnen Punkten schliesslich zum Kern der Behauptung vor, und es ist überall eben das, worin der Pragmatismus seine Stärke sieht, was sich ihm schliesslich zum Nachteil wendet." Erkennen und Leben, op. cit., pp. 39 sqq. *Knowledge and Life*, p. 74.

"Wir sind überzeugt, mit solcher Aufstellung der Lebenserhöhung als eines Prüfsteins der Wahrheit mit vielen Pragmatisten, ja mit dem Hauptzuge des Pragmatismus zusammenzugehen. Aber dann müssen wir ihm den Vorwurf machen, dass er Lebenspflege und Lebenserhöhung, Ausschmückung einer gegebenen und Erringung einer neuen Welt, Nützliches und Gutes nicht zur Genüge scheidet." Op. cit., p. 51. *Knowledge and Life*, pp. 94, 95.

²⁹⁶ The affinity between the "Geistesleben" and the central conception of Absolutism has been already pointed out. We are now dealing with the theory of knowledge and it is here that Eucken is pragmatic.

relative value of the "immediacy" in each. In our exposition of Scholasticism we have taken the extracts from Cardinal Newman because he has treated of the point in detail; as the exponent of Pragmatism we have elected James as being a good representative of the current tendency to make feeling of paramount importance in philosophy.

Scholastic Theory of Intuition, or Reason—"Immediacies"

That intuition is our highest and surest means of reaching truth needs no demonstration. Cardinal Newman, in his *Grammar of Assent*, has dwelt at length on the difference between the process of formal reasoning and the intuitive power by which truths are immediately apprehended. When the intuition is due directly to the special nature of the data presented to the mind he terms it Speculation: "Speculation is one of those words which, in the vernacular, have so different a sense from what they bear in philosophy. It is commonly taken to mean a conjecture, or a venture on chances; but its proper meaning is mental sight, or the contemplation of mental operations and their results as opposed to experience, experiment, or sense, analogous to its meaning in Shakespeare's line, 'Thou hast no speculation in those eyes.' . . . Of course mathematical investigations and truths are the subjects of this speculative assent. So are legal judgments, and constitutional maxims, as far as they appeal to us for assent. So are the determinations of science; so are the principles, disputations, and doctrines of theology."²⁹⁷

When the intuition does not arise from the intrinsic nature of the things under consideration but is realized in consciousness "without conscious media," even "without conscious antecedents," in a way that defies analysis, it is, according to Newman, an exercise of what he terms the Illative Sense or Faculty.²⁹⁸

"Judgment . . . in all concrete matter is the architectonic faculty; and what may be called the Illative Sense, or right judgment in ratiocination, is one branch of it."²⁹⁹

²⁹⁷ Newman, *Grammar of Assent*, p. 73. It must be noticed that Newman attaches a signification to speculation which is wider than that of intuition, in the strict sense.

²⁹⁸ "Illative Sense, a use of the word 'sense' parallel to our use of it in 'good sense,' 'common sense,' 'a sense of beauty.'" Newman, *op. cit.*, p. 345. It is thus an intellectual activity.

²⁹⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 342.

The following extracts throw light upon this second class of reason—"immediacies." As the personal element enters in they have not necessarily the marks of objectivity and universality which characterize the philosophical intuitions in the stricter sense: in fact though they are reason-immediacies they are not always *truth-immediacies*: in other words, man may err.

"I say, then, that our most natural mode of reasoning is, not from propositions to propositions, but from things to things, from concrete to concrete, from wholes to wholes. Whether the consequents, at which we arrive from the antecedents with which we start, lead us to assent or only towards assent, those antecedents commonly are not recognized by us as subjects for analysis; nay, often are only indirectly recognized as antecedents at all. Not only is the inference with its process ignored, but the antecedent also. *To the mind itself the reasoning is a simple divination or prediction*; as it literally is in the instance of enthusiasts, who mistake their own thoughts for inspirations. This is the mode in which we ordinarily reason, dealing with things directly, and as they stand, one by one, in the concrete, with an intrinsic and personal power, not a conscious adoption of an artificial instrument or expedient; and it is especially exemplified both in uneducated men, and in men of genius,—in those who know nothing of intellectual aids and rules, and in those who care nothing for them,—in those who are either without or above mental discipline. . . . Sometimes, I say, this illative faculty is nothing short of genius. Such seems to have been Newton's perception of truths mathematical and physical, though proof was absent. . . . Such is the gift of the calculating boys who now and then make their appearance, who seem to have certain short-cuts to conclusions, which they cannot explain to themselves."³⁰⁰

"It is to the living mind that we must look for the means of using correctly principles of whatever kind, facts or doctrines, experiences or testimonies, true or probable, and of discerning what conclusion from these is necessary, suitable, or expedient, when they are taken for granted; and this, either by means of a natural gift, or from mental formation and practise and a long familiarity with those various starting-points. . . . *The mind contemplates them without the use of words, by a process which cannot be analyzed.* Thus it was that Bacon separated the physical system of the world from the theological; thus that Butler connected together the moral system with the religious. Logical formulas could never have sustained the reasonings involved in such investigations."³⁰¹

³⁰⁰ Op. cit., pp. 330-333. Italics ours.

³⁰¹ Op. cit., pp. 360, 361. Italics ours.

We may also notice the following:

" . . . thought is too keen and manifold, its sources are too remote and hidden, its path too personal, delicate, and circuitous, its subject-matter too various and intricate, to admit of the trammels of any language, of whatever subtlety and of whatever compass."³⁰²

"That there are cases, in which evidence, not sufficient for a scientific proof, is nevertheless sufficient for assent and certitude, is the doctrine of Locke, as of most men. . . . that *supra-logical judgment*, which is the warrant for our certitude about them, is not mere common-sense, but the true healthy action of our ratiocinative powers, an action more subtle and more comprehensive than the mere appreciation of a syllogistic argument."³⁰³

Pragmatic Theory of Feeling—"Immediacies"

In Varieties of Religious Experience James writes:

"But the whole array of our instances leads to a conclusion something like this: It is as if there were in the human consciousness a *sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception* of what we may call '*something there*,' more deep and more general than any of the special and particular 'senses' by which the current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed. . . . So far as religious conceptions were able to touch this reality-feeling, they would be believed in in spite of criticism, even though they might be so vague and remote as to be almost unimaginable, even though they might be such non-entities in point of *whatness*, as Kant makes the objects of his moral theology to be. [Examples of what he terms "sense of presence" follow.] . . . If we look on man's whole mental life as it exists, on the life of men that lies in them apart from their learning and science, and that they inwardly and privately follow, we have to confess that the part of it of which rationalism can give an account is relatively superficial. It is the part that has the *prestige* undoubtedly, for it has the loquacity, it can challenge you for proofs, and chop logic, and put you down with words. But it will fail to convince or convert you all the same, if your dumb intuitions are opposed to its conclusions. If you have intuitions at all, they come from a deeper level of your nature than the loquacious level which rationalism inhabits. Your whole sub-conscious life, your impulses, your faiths, your needs, your divinations, have prepared the premises, of which your consciousness now feels the weight of the result; and something in you absolutely *knows* that that result must be truer than any logic-chopping

³⁰² Op. cit., 284.

³⁰³ Op. cit., pp. 316 sqq. Italics ours.

rationalistic talk, however clever, that may contradict it. . . . The unreasoned and immediate assurance is the deep thing in us, the reasoned argument is but a surface exhibition. Instinct leads intelligence does but follow."³⁰⁴

In Essays on Popular Philosophy we find:

"What, in short, has authority to debar us from trusting our religious demands? Science as such assuredly has no authority, for she can only say what is, not what is not; . . . now, when I speak of trusting our religious demands, just what do I mean by 'trusting?' . . . to trust our religious demands means first of all to live in the light of them, and to act as if the invisible world which they suggest were real. . . . If this life be not a real fight, in which something is eternally gained for the universe by success, it is no better than a game of private theatricals from which one may withdraw at will. But it *feels* like a real fight. . . . The deepest thing in our nature is this *Binnenleben* (as a German doctor lately has called it), this dumb region of the heart in which we dwell alone with our willingnesses and unwillingnesses, our faiths and fears. As through the cracks and crannies of caverns those waters exude from the earth's bosom which then form the fountain-heads of springs, so in these crepuscular depths of personality the sources of all our outer deeds and decisions take their rise. Here is our deepest organ of communication with the nature of things; and compared with these concrete movements of our soul all abstract statements and scientific arguments—the veto, for example, which the strict positivist pronounces upon our faith—sound to us like mere chatterings of the teeth."³⁰⁵

A comparison of the extracts from Cardinal Newman with those from Professor James reveals how closely, at moments, the later writer approaches the earlier. James recognized the native energy of the human mind, but his anti-intellectualism forced him to attribute to *blind feeling* what could result only from reason. When he states that "your impulses, your faiths, your needs, your divinations, have prepared the premises, of which your consciousness now feels the weight of the result; and something in you absolutely *knows* that that result must be truer than any logic-chopping rationalistic talk, however clever, that may contradict it," he is but repeating what Newman has already said about that "supra-logical judgment" which is "the true healthy action of our ratiocinative powers," and he is undoubtedly right; but when he

³⁰⁴ Varieties of Religious Experience, New York, 1902, pp. 58-74. Italics are those of the author.

³⁰⁵ Essays in Popular Philosophy. Is Life Worth Living? New York, 1899, pp. 57-62. Italics are those of the author.

passes on further to describe "intuitions" as "inarticulate feelings of reality" we are upon the error of Bergson and Pragmatists in general.

We have not to undertake a criticism of Pragmatism here; the work has been ably done by others: one point, however, may be briefly referred to—it is the denial of the power of the intellect to reach objective truth. James is unmistakably clear in the expression of his views:

"Objective evidence and certitude are doubtless very fine ideals to play with, but where on this moonlit and dream-visited planet are they found? I am, therefore, myself a complete empiricist so far as my theory of human knowledge goes. . . . There is but one indefectibly certain truth, and that is the truth that pyrrhonic scepticism itself leaves standing—the truth that the present phenomenon of consciousness exists."³⁰⁶

It is interesting to find, in *Geistige Strömungen*, the following trenchant criticism of the pragmatic notion of truth, from Eucken himself:

"Der starke Eindruck des Pragmatismus stammt namentlich daher, dass hier die gewöhnliche Betrachtungsweise umgekehrt wird; *wie aber, wenn dabei der Begriff der Wahrheit selbst auf den Kopf zu stehen kommt? So aber geschieht es in Wahrheit . . . Wahrheit ist nur als Selbstzweck möglich, eine 'instrumentale' Wahrheit ist keine Wahrheit.*"³⁰⁷

We fully endorse the critic's words—that in Pragmatism "the idea of truth itself is reversed and ends by standing on its head;"

³⁰⁶ *Essays in Popular Philosophy*, op. cit., pp. 14 sqq.

He saw fit to modify his dogmatic assertion, somewhat, in his volume on Pragmatism: "Our ready-made ideal framework for all sorts of possible objects follows from the very structure of our thinking. We can no more play fast and loose with these abstract relations than we can do so with our sense-experiences. *They coerce us*; we must treat them consistently, whether or not we like the results." *Pragmatism*, New York, 1907, pp. 210 sqq. Italics ours.

Lovejoy, in the journal of *Philosophy*, commenting on this writes:

"This obviously, is no doctrine that axioms are postulates, or that behind every 'can't' there lies a 'won't'; it is the doctrine that axioms are necessities and that the action of voluntary choice in belief is always limited by a permanent system of *a priori* principles of possibility and impossibility inhering in the nature of intellect. . . . It is compatible, at most, with the opinion that there are not so numerous, nor so useful, axioms as some dogmatic philosophers have supposed, and that, when axioms fail us, postulates must in many cases be resorted to." *The Thirteen Pragmatisms* (II); *Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods*, vol. 5, 1908, Jan., p. 29.

³⁰⁷ *Op. cit.*, pp. 49, 50. Italics ours. (*Main Currents of Modern Thought*, pp. 77, 78.)

but while so doing we are irresistibly drawn to think of the man of fable who, though living in a glass house, would throw stones.

Conclusion Drawn

Eucken condemns with justice the pragmatic conception of truth and objects, in particular, to the subjective character of the religious basis of pragmatism, but his own truth-standard and his method of reaching it are condemned *a fortiori* by his words, since the "immediacies" described by James are at least more intelligible than that on which Eucken seeks to ground religion.

He is at one with James in denying the power of the intellect but insists, most illogically, as has been already pointed out, on the axiomatic character and the objective value of the *Gemüt* or *Unmittelbarkeit*.

We are here confronted with three systems of thought—Scholastic Realism, Pragmatism and Activism.³⁰⁸

The first, following the Scholastics, owns

- 1 that there are necessary, universal truths;
- 2 that there are contingent truths, objectively valid;
- 3 that the human intellect by the power of reason is able
 - (a) to reach both classes of truths, i. e., to attain to certainty;
 - (b) to know that it has reached truth—this is certitude.

The second denies

- 1 all necessary truths;
- 2 the power of the intellect to reach truth;
- 3 all philosophical certainty; nevertheless it claims *certitude*, based on the revelations of *supposed* feelings, and reached by a deliberate act of the will. *Faith*, not in supernatural revelation, but in the supremacy of feeling as the guide of life, is the pet maxim of Pragmatism.³⁰⁹

The third maintains

- 1 that truth is eternal and unchangeable, yet in the exposition of the *Geistesleben* destroys the significance of the word "truth;"

³⁰⁸ It has been objected that Pragmatism is not a system but we use the word for convenience sake.

³⁰⁹ For the extent to which the criterion is pushed see *Essays in Popular Philosophy*—The Sentiment of Rationality, pp. 63 sqq., op. cit.

- 2 that *neither intellect, feeling, nor will*, whether in isolation, or in combination, can serve as the basis of philosophy or religion: they cannot reach objective truth;
- 3 that man can and does, although imperfectly, lay hold on eternal truth. Certainty, therefore, is here based on—?

Eucken has, in fact, cut the ground from under his own feet in the philosophic field: certainty cannot be attained until the *sods* are restored, in other words, until the general trustworthiness of the revelations of our faculties is re-affirmed.

A comparison of the above theories reveals the first and most essential condition of all knowledge: it is certainty—certainty of some facts, some truths. Unless this foundation is solid beneath our feet we cannot take a step forward. James insists on personal certitude regarding the “reality-feelings;” Eucken proclaims the certainty of the “*Gemüt*”: “*the corner stone of all philosophical thought and the axiom of axioms is the fact of a world-embracing spiritual life.*”³¹⁰ This may be called the objective point of view, but the subjective is inseparable from it, i. e., in this certainty is implied the trustworthiness of the mental state through which the “fact” is known. Eucken’s “corner stone” has itself to rest on something: this something, as has been repeatedly pointed out, is the general trustworthiness of our faculties. Here we have indeed, a “double-aspect” fact, for the trustworthiness of our faculties and the certainty that their revelations are trustworthy are but subjective and objective “aspects” of a fundamental and inevitable necessity of our very nature. James is willing to “trust” his “reality-feelings,” but on what grounds does he elect one species of mental activity as “trustworthy,” while discriminating against the others? This is wholly unphilosophical. The Scholastics posit the general trustworthiness of our faculties, both sensuous and intellectual, and by so doing offer an interpretation of reality based on the necessary conditions of human knowledge. By this first affirmation they posit, indirectly, the existence of objects external to us, revealed through the senses; also universal, necessary truths disclosed through the intellect and a vast body of contingent truths made known through experience. Thus the universe, secured from *theoretical* destruc-

³¹⁰ Main Currents of Modern Thought, op. cit., p. 133. (G. Strömungen, p. 97.)

tion, exists in its own right, independent of man's theories, though fit object for them; the structure of human knowledge rests on an unshakeable foundation; we ourselves are saved from mental bankruptcy and moral bewilderment. The natural law, evincing itself in the laws of science, the moral law revealing itself in the conscience of man are seen to be parallel manifestations of that one eternal law which governs alike the tiniest leaf, fluttering to the earth, and the planets revolving in unswerving course, and which is itself the Will of Divine Wisdom that creation be a cosmos, not a chaos.

Lest we should seem to be drawing conclusions too wide for our premise we cite the words of Balmes:

"All philosophical questions are in some manner involved in that of certainty. When we have completely unfolded this, we have examined under one aspect or another all that human reason can conceive of God, man, and the universe. At first sight it may perhaps seem to be the simple foundation of the scientific structure; but in this foundation, if we carefully examine it, we shall see the whole edifice represented: it is a plane whereon is projected, visibly and in fair perspective, the whole body it is to support."³¹¹

Having taken for granted the general trustworthiness of our faculties we may, if we will, inquire into the nature of certainty and its basis—not *question it*, however, or we would approach the vicious circles of Descartes.

Nature and Basis of Certainty

According to Balmes certainty is "the spontaneous product of man's nature, and is annexed to the direct act of the intellectual and sensitive faculties. It is a condition necessary to the exercise of both, and without it life were a chaos."³¹²

And again:

"The certainty which is prior to all examination is not blind; on the contrary, it springs either from the clearness of the intellectual vision, or from an instinct conformable to reason: it is not opposed to reason, but is its basis."³¹³

The following passage throws so much light on the question that we cite it at length:

"That we have certainty, common sense assures us, but what is

³¹¹ Fundamental Philosophy, translated by Brownson, Vol. I, p. 4, New York, 1903.

³¹² Op. cit., p. 14.

³¹³ Op. cit., pp. 12, 13.

its basis, and how it is acquired, are two difficult questions, which it is for philosophy to answer. . . . It will greatly conduce to the due determination of our ideas, carefully to distinguish between the existence of certainty, its basis, and the mode in which it is acquired. Its existence is an indisputable fact; its basis the object of philosophical researches, and the mode of acquiring it frequently a concealed phenomenon not open to observation. That bodies exist is a fact that no man of sane mind can doubt. No questions raised upon this point can ever shake our firm conviction in the existence, without us, of what we call the corporeal world. This conviction is a phenomenon of our existence. Explain it, perhaps we cannot; but we certainly cannot deny it; we submit to it as to an inevitable necessity. What is the basis of certainty? Here we have not a simple fact, but a question solved by every philosopher in his own way. Descartes and Malebranche recur to the veracity of God; Locke and Condillac to the peculiar character and evolution of certain sensations. How does man acquire this certainty? He knows not: he had it before reflecting on it; he is astounded to hear it made a matter of dispute, and he might never have suspected it could be asked, why we are certain that what affects our senses exists. . . . Philosophy should begin by explaining, not by disputing the fact of certainty. If we are certain of nothing, it is absolutely impossible for us to advance a single step in any science, or to take any part whatever in the affairs of life. . . . Certainty is to us a happy necessity; nature imposes it, and philosophers do not cast off nature. . . . In sound philosophy, then, the question turns not upon the existence of certainty, but upon its motives, and the means of acquiring it. It is an inheritance of which we cannot divest ourselves, although we repudiate those very titles which guaranty its possession to us. . . . Prior to all systems, humanity was in possession of this certainty, so, also, is every individual, although he may never during his whole life have once asked himself what the world is, what bodies are, or in what sensation, thought, and will consist. . . . Since inquiries with regard to certainty were first instituted, it has remained the same with all men, even with those who disputed it. . . . We must, in discussing certainty, guard against the feverish desire of shaking the foundations of human reason. We should, in this class of questions, seek a thorough knowledge of the principles of science, and the laws which govern the development of our mind. To labor to destroy them is to mistake the object of true philosophy: we have only to make them a matter of observation, just as we do those of the material world, without any intention of disturbing the admirable order prevailing in the universe."³¹⁴

Our purpose here is not to make a detailed examination of Scholasticism, but rather to expose its basic principles and direct

³¹⁴ Op. cit., pp. 7-12.

attention to the broad outline. We shall not therefore investigate the question of sense perception, nor unfold the theory of the active and passive intellect (*intellectus agens, intellectus patiens*), nor inquire into the metaphysical conditions of knowledge "*ex parte objecti*." All these points are indirectly, but satisfactorily, posited in the general affirmation of the trustworthiness of our faculties. If the senses reveal an object to us, and the intellect seizes upon its *quiditas* or, in other words, discloses its essential nature, it follows that the object thus made known is in itself *et unum et cognoscibile*. The mode of action of the intellect in cognition has been treated of extensively; moreover, Eucken, whose challenge we are answering, does not attack the *explanation* of the activity of the intellect, but rather *the activity itself* as a means of objective truth. He does not concern himself with the *how* of our intellectual knowledge since he denies that truth is reached *through the intellect*; hence his main assault on Scholasticism is directed towards the traditional conception of truth.³¹⁵ Since our aim is to afford an opportunity of comparison between the system which Eucken deems *naïve* and the *Activism* brought forward to supplant it we shall cite at some length from Scholastics, both mediaeval and modern. We have chosen this method of exposition as the fairest. Scholastic writings are most frequently criticised *en masse* and condemned unread.

Kleutgen in his *Exposition and Defence of Scholastic Philosophy* has treated at length of the subject now under discussion—the basis of certainty. We have selected three extracts dealing chiefly with certainty in the matter of necessary truths and first principles.

(1) According to Scholastic teaching truth itself is the constraining force: it is impossible for us not to hold them true: moreover, we know these truths to be such that no one not deprived of reason can doubt them. St. Thomas points out that not only are these principles essentially true, but also we have necessarily the knowledge of their truth.

"Avant tout *la pensée pure*, qui fait abstraction de toute connaissance expérimentale, est en nous accompagnée d'une adhésion

³¹⁵ For mode of activity of the intellect refer to St. Thomas: Sum. I; q. 85; Sum I, q. 54, a. 4 (in response). Quaest., q. 2, art. 6; q. 10, a. 4, 5, 6. See also Maher, op. cit., pp. 305–313 (bibliography is given on p. 313). and Kleutgen, Phil. Scolastique, Vol. I, Chap. I, IV, and for a more detailed account of Scholastic theory of Knowledge refer to Theories of Knowledge, L. Walker, S. J. London and New York, 1910, pp. 346 sqq.

ou d'un assentiment ferme et inébranlable. Or, si nous demandons pourquoi nous devons tenir ces pensées pour vraies, nous trouvons d'abord . . . [que] c'est qu'elles sont conformes aux principes d'après lesquelles nous devons penser. Mais pourquoi regardons-nous comme vrais ces principes eux-mêmes? . . . Le motif pour lequel nous les admettons, c'est leur vérité qui apparaît manifestement à notre raison, c'est à-dire leur évidence et pas autre chose. Aussitôt que nous nous les représentons, nous sommes contraints de les tenir pour vrais; toutefois ce n'est pas en vertu d'une propension aveugle de notre nature, ni à cause de la connaissance de quelque autre chose qui nous en garantisserait la vérité, mais parce que nous percevons cette vérité elle-même et qu'il nous est impossible de ne pas la percevoir . . . Supposé, par exemple, que nous ne sachions pas si dans la réalité il existe des lignes droites, nous savons néanmoins que des lignes droites, s'il en existe, ne peuvent se couper qu'en un seul point. . . . Nous sommes certains de la vérité de ces jugements, dis-je, parce que nous voyons cette vérité nous-mêmes et que nous ne pouvons pas nous empêcher de la voir, toutes les fois que nous nous représentons ces jugements; mais ce n'est d'aucune manière, parce que nous savons que tous les autres hommes les tiennent pour vrais. Au contraire, nous concluons plutôt de l'évidence de ces vérités que nous ne sommes pas seuls à les regarder comme vraies, mais que tous les autres pensent comme nous: car nous connaissons en même temps ces vérités comme telles que tout être capable de les concevoir doit en comprendre l'évidence et que personne ne peut les nier, à moins d'être privé de l'usage de la raison. Si donc nous regardons comme atteint de folie l'homme qui nierait ces principes ou prétendrait en douter, ce n'est pas . . . parce qu'il pense autrement que le reste des hommes, mais parce qu'il ne comprend pas ce que tout homme jouissant de la raison doit nécessairement comprendre. . . . Voilà ce que disait Saint Thomas . . . , quand il soutenait que l'esprit ne connaît pas seulement des choses vraies, mais encore la vérité de sa connaissance, en comprenant qu'il est conforme à la nature de sa raison de connaître les choses telles qu'elles sont. Tant qu'il ne s'agit que de la pensée pure et abstraite, on ne peut révoquer en doute la vérité de cette assertion. Aussi le saint docteur relève-t-il que non-seulement ces principes de la pensée sont essentiellement vrais, mais encore que nous avons nécessairement la connaissance de leur vérité.³¹⁶

(2) Certainty springs from the intimate perception that our thought is true, i. e., corresponds to the being possible and actual of things. St. Thomas further points out what St. Augustine had already spoken of, viz., that characteristic of intellectual knowl-

³¹⁶ La Philosophie Scolastique Exposée et Défendue, translated by Sierp, Paris, 1868, Vol. I, pp. 507-509.

edge which causes us not only to perceive the truth but by the same light of reason by which we perceive it to know that we perceive it. As Suarez says, true science only exists if we know that we know.

“Quelle est donc la raison qui me force à juger que des lignes droites peuvent coïncider, ou, si elles se coupent, que ce ne peut être que par un seul point? Évidemment, il n’y en a point d’autre, sinon parce que je vois que la chose est ainsi et qu’elle ne peut être autrement. N’avons-nous pas la conscience claire et distincte que nous connaissons et que par cette connaissance, et non par d’autres raisons, nous sommes forcés de croire que les lignes droites sont possibles et que les propositions citées doivent se vérifier en elles, dès qu’elles existent en réalité? La nécessité de penser ainsi ne résulte donc que de la perception intime dont nous avons conscience que cette pensée, et non une autre, est vraie, c’est-à-dire répond à l’être (possible ou actuel) des choses. Il est aussi absolument faux que, pour être certains, nous ayons besoin de soumettre nos pensées nécessaires à l’examen d’une autre pensée qui ne serait également que subjectivement nécessaire, et qu’ainsi nous ne puissions jamais parvenir au terme de ces examens successifs. Sans doute, si nos concepts étaient composés de plusieurs autres concepts, si les jugements qu’il s’agit d’examiner étaient dérivés d’autres jugements, nous devrions revenir aux concepts simples et aux principes qu’ils forment; mais parvenus à ces principes nous constatons en nous non-seulement la nécessité de les penser, mais encore la raison de cette nécessité, la perception claire de leur vérité. Voilà pourquoi Saint Thomas dit dans un passage déjà cité: *Proprium est horum principiorum, quod non solum necesse sit, ea per se vera esse, sed etiam necesse est videre quod sint per se vera*. Longtemps avant le Docteur angélique, S. Augustin avait parlé de ce caractère de la connaissance intellectuelle en disant que dans la même lumière de la raison dans laquelle nous percevons le vrai, nous comprenons en même temps que nous percevons le vrai. Les scolastiques postérieurs n’ont pas perdu de vue ce commencement de toute connaissance certaine. ‘La véritable science,’ dit Suarez, ‘n’existe que si l’on sait que l’on sait; car la perfection de la connaissance intellectuelle consiste en ce que (ramenée à ces premiers commencements) elle se révèle (dans ceux-ci) à elle-même (comme vraie).’”³¹⁷

(3) According to St. Augustine the rule and motive of all our natural knowledge is to be sought for in reason itself, because reason can take its own nature and its knowledge as objects of its reflexion. We find absolutely the same principle in St. Thomas.

³¹⁷ Op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 57, 58. “Nunquam acquiritur vera scientia, nisi quis sciat se scire: nam scientia debet esse perfectum intellectuale lumen, quod seipsum manifestat.” Metaph., disp. I, sect. 4.

It is by the light of reason that the mind knows—the light of reason which renders the mind an image of the uncreated Truth. St. Thomas finds the cause of certitude in the *reasonable nature* of every man.

“Tout ce que nous connaissons des choses qui dépassent les sens, disait St. Augustin, nous le connaissons dans la lumière qui brille *au-dedans* de l’homme, et tout ce que nous apprenons de ces objets par le témoignage d’autrui, nous le jugeons, pour l’admettre ou le rejeter, par cette même lumière inhérente à notre nature. Or, cette lumière qui *demeure au-dedans de tout* homme, qu’est-elle autre chose que la raison individuelle? C’est par conséquent dans la raison individuelle que St. Augustin trouve la règle par laquelle nous discernons la vérité de l’erreur en tout ce que d’autres nous apprennent sur les choses supersensibles. En d’autres endroits le même docteur de l’Église, revenant sur ce sujet, ajoute que tout ce que nous disons de la raison elle-même ne nous est connu que par la même lumière de la raison; car par cette lumière nous ne connaissons pas seulement la vérité, mais nous savons aussi que nous possédons cette connaissance. Il enseigne de la manière la plus nette que la règle et le motif de toutes nos connaissances naturelles doivent être cherchées dans la raison elle-même, parce qu’elle peut prendre pour objet de ses réflexions sa propre nature et sa connaissance. Nous retrouvons absolument les mêmes principes dans les écrits de saint Thomas. Suivant lui, toute science se forme en nous, parce que, partant des premiers principes, nous progressons dans la connaissance par le moyen des déductions. . . . C’est en effet par les principes que nous percevons intimement non-seulement leur propre vérité et leur propre certitude, mais encore la nécessité d’adhérer avec certitude à tout ce qui en découle nécessairement et de rejeter tout ce qui y est contraire, tandis que le reste est du domaine des opinions libres. Or, la faculté par laquelle l’esprit connaît ces principes, c’est la lumière de la raison que Dieu lui a donnée et qui le rend image de la vérité incréée. Toute certitude de notre science a donc sa source dans la lumière de la raison que Dieu nous a donnée au-dedans de nous-mêmes. . . . Nous avons déjà examiné la doctrine du Docteur Angélique, selon laquelle notre intelligence ne possède pleinement la vérité que si elle connaît non-seulement la chose connue et sa propre connaissance, mais aussi l’accord de sa connaissance avec l’objet. Or, d’après St. Thomas toujours, l’esprit est apte à connaître cet accord, parce que non-seulement il perçoit sa connaissance, c’est-à-dire, le phénomène par lequel il connaît, mais qu’il se connaît encore lui-même, ou sa nature propre. . . . [Saint Thomas] en trouve la cause [i. e., de certitude] dans la nature raisonnable de chaque homme.”³¹⁸

³¹⁸ Op. cit., I, pp. 541–543.

Means of Perceiving Truth

According to Balmes he who seeks to acquire complete and accurate ideas upon matters relating to the first principles of human knowledge must distinguish between the different means by which truth is perceived.

These means are of different orders: to them correspond truths of different orders. The three means are consciousness, evidence, and intellectual instinct or common sense; to which correspond truths of consciousness, necessary truths, and common-sense truths.

"That means which we have called consciousness, or the intimate sense of that which passes within us, that which we experience, is independent of all others. Destroy evidence, destroy intellectual instinct, yet consciousness remains. In order to feel, and to be sure that we feel, and what we feel, we need only experience . . . Consciousness is independent of all extrinsic testimony, its necessity is inevitable, its force irresistible in producing certainty; it is infallible in what concerns only itself; if it exist it must give testimony of itself; if it does not exist it cannot give it."³¹⁹

The "intellectual light" or evidence by which necessary truths are known is contrasted with the subjective testimony of consciousness in the following passage.

"Evidence is always accompanied by the necessity, and consequently, by the universality, of the truths which it attests. There is no evidence of the contingent, except in so far as subjected to a necessary principle. . . . That there is in me a being which thinks, I know, not by evidence, but by consciousness. That whatever thinks exists, I know, not by consciousness, but by evidence. In both cases the certainty is absolute, irresistible; but in the first it rests upon a particular, contingent fact; in the second upon a universal and necessary truth. That I think is certain for me, but not necessarily so for others; the disappearance of my thought does not overturn the world of intelligences. . . . But it is very different with the truths which are the object of evidence. It is not necessary for me to think; but it is so necessary for whatever thinks to exist, that no efforts of mine could suffice to abstract this necessity for one moment. If, taking an absurd position, I suppose the contrary, and imagine for an instant the relation between thought and being to be cut short,

³¹⁹ Op. cit., pp. 93 sqq.

I break the chain which supports the order of the entire universe; everything is reversed, thrown into confusion; and I know not if what I see be chaos or nonentity. What has taken place? The intellect has only suffered a contradiction, at the same time affirming and denying thought, because it affirmed a thought to which it denied existence. It has violated a universal and absolutely necessary law, the violation of which throws everything into chaos. Not the certainty of the soul's existence, supported by the testimony of consciousness, suffices to prevent the confusion: the intellect by contradicting itself has denied itself; from its insensate words, not being, but nonentity has resulted, not light, but darkness; and this darkness cast over whatever exists or is possible turns back upon it and involves it in eternal night."³²⁰

The third means of acquiring truth—"intellectual instinct" or "common sense," is one which Eucken holds in particular suspicion. This is our apology for the lengthy passages we are about to cite. The difference of attitude with regard to matters of general belief—arising logically from the different valuation of the power of the human mind in the two systems—will be brought out by comparing the following with the Scholastic doctrine of "common sense." *In Life's Basis and Life's Ideal* Eucken writes:

"The fact that man feels—as an immediate impression—free in cases of hesitation between different possibilities has lost its power to convince the individual of the Modern Age. For the new mode of thought has evolved point for point along with an increasing divergence from the naïve manner of representation, and it has won its greatest victories in opposition to this manner of representation. The revolution that Copernicus accomplished in the representation of the world has become typical of the whole of modern work; and as regards our problem [viz., the nature of Freedom] also, *dissent from ordinary opinion is less a cause for doubt than a recommendation.*"³²¹

If Eucken consistently followed out the principle implied in the italicized sentence he would promptly reach the "nihilisme intellectuel" to which P. Pègues refers (vide, cit., p. 138.)

The Scholastic position is well indicated by Balmes:

"*Common sense* is an exceedingly vague expression. . . . We must not, in order duly to appreciate the meaning of such expressions, confine ourselves to their philosophical, and condemn their vulgar meaning. In the latter there is often a profound philosophy; for, in such cases, the vulgar sense is a kind of precious sediment

³²⁰ Op. cit., 97-99.

³²¹ *Life's Basis*, op. cit., p. 175. Italics ours. Cf. also Part I, Chap. IV, pp. 27, 28.

left by the flow of reason upon the word during many ages. . . . The word *common* shows the objects of this criterion to be common to all men, and consequently referable to the objective order, since the purely subjective, as such, is limited to the individual, and in no wise affects what is general. . . . I believe the expression *common sense* to denote a law of our mind, apparently differing according to the different cases to which it applies, but in reality and apart from its modifications, only one, always the same, consisting in a natural inclination of our mind to give its assent to some truths not attested by consciousness nor demonstrated by reason, necessary to all men in order to satisfy the wants of sensitive, intellectual, and moral life. . . . We at once detect it in the case of truths immediately evident. The understanding neither does nor can prove them, and yet it must assent to them, or perish like a flame that has nothing to feed upon. The possession of one or more of these primitive truths is an indispensable condition to intellectual life; without them intelligence is an absurdity. Here, then, we find all that is comprised in the definition of common sense: the impossibility of proof, an intellectual necessity, which must be satisfied by assent, and an irresistible and universal inclination to give this assent. Is there any objection to calling this inclination common sense? . . . I shall not dispute upon words; I mark the fact, and this is all I need do in philosophy. I grant that the inclination to assent is not, in treating of immediate evidence, usually called common sense . . . In order that the word sense may be properly applied to it, the understanding ought to feel rather than know: but in immediate evidence it knows rather than feels. However this may be, I repeat that the name is of no account. . . . What I wish is to establish this law of our nature inclining us to give our assent to certain truths, independently of consciousness and ratiocination. Not immediate evidence alone has this irresistible inclination in its favor; mediate evidence also has it. Our understanding necessarily assents, not only to first principles, but also to all propositions clearly connected with them. The natural inclination to assent is not limited to the subjective value of ideas; it also extends to their objective value. . . . What we have said of immediate and mediate evidence relatively to the objective value of ideas, is true, not only in the purely intellectual, but also in the moral order. The soul, endowed as it is with free will, needs rules for its direction: if first intellectual principles are necessary in order to know, moral principles are not less so in order to will and work. What truth and error are to the understanding, good and evil are to the will. Besides the life of the understanding, there is a life of the will; the one, without principles on which to rest, is annihilated; the other, as a moral being, perishes, or becomes an inconceivable absurdity, if it have no rule, the observation or violation of which constitutes its perfec-

tion or imperfection. Here is another necessity for the assent to certain moral truths, and another reason of this irresistible and universal inclination to assent. I would here remark, that as *it is not enough in the intellectual order to know, but it is also necessary to act*, and one of the principles of action is perception by the senses; so moral truths are not only known but felt. When they are offered to the mind the understanding assents to them as unshaken, and the heart embraces them with enthusiasm and love."³²²

The italics in the closing paragraph are ours. Which promises better fruits: the enlightened Activism of the Intellectualist, which is guided by reason, or, the blind Activism of Eucken, which seeks to replace reason? Surely the answer is not hard to find.

Conditions upon which the Criterion of Common-sense is Infallible

Man's weakness may often turn his natural inclinations from their object, the result being that they are distorted and lead to error instead of truth; nevertheless a natural inclination, simply because it is natural, "is in the eyes of philosophy something highly respectable:" it is the province of reason and free will not to allow it to go astray. The following conditions are laid down by Balmes as being those of true and never-erring common-sense.

"*First Condition.*—That the inclination be every way irresistible, so that one cannot, even by the aid of reflection, resist or avoid it.

"*Second Condition.*—That every truth of common sense be absolutely certain to the whole human race. This condition follows from the first.

"*Third Condition.*—That every truth of common sense stand the test of reason.

"*Fourth Condition.*—That every truth of common sense have for its object the satisfaction of some great necessity of sensitive, intellectual, or moral life.

"When possessed of all these characters, the criterion of common sense is absolutely infallible, and may defy skeptics to assign a case wherein it has failed."³²³

Objectivity of Ideas

In close connection with the criterion of common sense we shall touch upon the "problem which vexes fundamental philosophy," i. e., the transition from subject to object, from subjective appearance to objective reality.

³²² Op. cit., pp. 219 sqq.

³²³ Op. cit., 226, 227.

Eucken denies its possibility in emphatic terms, with more determination than strength of argument however. He is impatient that men with such "a naïve mode of thought" as to conceive it possible, are still in the front ranks. So much has been written on this point that it is not our intention to enter upon it in detail.

Balmes shows that the natural inclination which men have to make the transition has all the characteristics necessary to elevate it to the rank of an infallible criterion: it is irresistible, universal, satisfies a great necessity of life, and stands the test of reason. The connection of evidence with reality, and consequently, the transition from the idea to the object, are "primitive facts of our nature, a necessary law of our understanding, the foundation of all that it contains—a foundation which in its turn rests, and can rest only on God, the Creator of our soul." We are now "at the foundation of reason; this is the *ne plus ultra* of the human understanding; philosophy can go no farther."

Against Eucken's illogical affirmation of the axiomatic certainty of the "Gemüt," as against James' "reality-feelings," we cite the following:

"We must observe the contradiction into which those philosophers fall who say: I cannot doubt what is subjective, what affects myself, . . . but I have no right to go out of myself, and affirm that what I think is in reality as I think. Do you know that you feel, that you think, that you have within you such or such an appearance? Can you prove it? Evidently you cannot. You yield to a fact, to an internal necessity . . . ; but then there is equal necessity in the connection of the object with the idea, . . . Neither case admits of demonstration; in both there is an inevitable necessity: where, then, is philosophy, when it is attempted to establish so great a difference between things which admit of none? . . . To take from ideas their objective value, to reduce them to mere subjective phenomena, to resist that internal necessity which obliges us to admit the correspondence of the soul to objects, is to destroy the very consciousness of the soul."³²⁴

"They who oppose objectiveness, attack a fundamental law of our mind, destroy thought, even consciousness, and everything subjective which could serve as its basis."³²⁵

³²⁴ Op. cit., pp. 161-166. For detailed proof of the objectiveness of ideas vide entire Chap. XXIV.

³²⁵ Op. cit., p. 170.

St. George Mivart, who followed so closely the Scholastic tradition, says:

" . . . it is intellect and not sense which is the final judge and criterion of our certainty; and though the ultimate facts of sensation are as certain and indisputable as the other ultimate declarations of our faculties, yet they are often misinterpreted. Though the facts of sensation are self-evident, we may judge wrongly as to what they point to. On the other hand, the harmony which exists amongst the several senses, is ever giving us stronger and stronger grounds for trusting them. Everyone knows how constantly his sense of touch or sight confirms a testimony previously given by his sight or his hearing; nor will any one, *who has not some eccentric theory to maintain*, deem it probable that our senses thus harmoniously conspire to lead us into one and the same error, since truth is one, whilst error is manifold."³²⁶

Primary and Secondary Qualities of Matter

The Scholastics note carefully, however, the difference between the primary and secondary qualities of matter—between the subjective and the objective in sensation. The *cause* of the sensations of smell, taste, color, sound, exist in the objective world, but not the sensations as such. "As to qualities, the direct objects of sensation, it is not necessary for us that they exist in bodies themselves; it is enough that these bodies have something which produces in us, in some way or other, a corresponding impression The ordinary wants of life are not at all affected by this question; and man's relations with the sensible world would not be disturbed by the generalization of philosophical analysis. There is, perhaps, a kind of disenchantment of nature, since, despoiled of sensations, it is not nearly so beautiful; but the enchantment still continues with most men; and philosophy itself, except in brief moments of reflection, is subject to it; and even in these moments it experiences an enchantment of a different kind, as it considers how much of the beauty attributed to objects, belongs to man in his own right, and that the simple exercise of a sensible being's harmonious faculties suffices to make the whole universe glow with splendor and glory."³²⁷

St. George Mivart does not grant that the disenchantment necessarily takes place. He writes:

"Our intellect, then, seems to tell us that, through our sensa-

³²⁶ Mivart on Truth, pp. 126, 127. Op. cit. Italics ours.

³²⁷ Op. cit., p. 229.

tions, we perceive secondary as well as primary qualities of different kinds and orders, which are different from the sensations themselves but yet give us a practically serviceable and not mendacious knowledge of such qualities. And the correctness of this belief is, as we shall see, at least so far incontestable that the common belief must be nearer the truth than the negation of it can possibly be. Yet we are sometimes told that in the absence of organs of sense, silence and darkness would envelope the world. Now, our idea of 'light' may probably be quite inadequate to make the essence of light known to us as we may conceive of its being known by some nature much higher than ours. But, nevertheless, our idea of 'light' is, at any rate, more like objective light than is our idea of darkness. . . . For since we suppose the sun, moon, and stars, meteors, volcanoes, and phosphorescent organisms to exist in it as now they do, all the objective conditions of light, save sense-organs, would, by the hypothesis, be present, while the objective conditions of what, to our senses, is darkness, would not be present. Though all 'sensations' would, of course, vanish from an insentient universe, yet the objective qualities those sensations make known to us would continue to exist."³²⁸

"And, indeed, if our intellect has, *as we know it has*, the power of making external objects present to it, it is not wonderful that it should also have the power of making the qualities of objects present to it—i. e., to the intellect. Nor is it a bit more wonderful that, not the sensations, but the apprehensions they give rise to, should have a certain real likeness to the objective qualities themselves, than that our apprehensions of the objects which have the qualities should be like the objects themselves."³²⁹

Subjoined is the text of St. Thomas:

"Sic patet quod videns est tamquam coloratum, inquam habet similitudinem coloris. Et non solum videns est tamquam coloratum, et simile colorato; sed etiam actus cujuslibet sensus, est unus et idem subjecto cum actu sensibilis, sed ratione non est unus. Et dico autem sensus, sicut auditum secundum actum; et actum sensibilis, sicut sonum secundum actum. *Non enim semper sunt in actu: quia contingit habentia auditum non audire, et habens sonum non semper sonare. Sed cum potens audire habet suam operationem, et potens sonare habet sonare, tunc simul fit sonus secundum actum qui vocatur sonatio, et auditus secundum actum, qui vocatur auditio. . . .* Necesse est quod auditus dictus secundum actum, et sonus dictus secundum actum, simul salventur et corrumpantur: et similiter est de sapore et gustu, et aliis sensibilibus et sensibus. Sed si dicantur secundum potentiam, non necesse est quod simul corrumpantur et salventur.

³²⁸ Op. cit., pp. 115 sqq.

³²⁹ Op. cit., p. 127. Italics ours.

Ex hac autem ratione excludit opinionem antiquorum naturalium . . . dicens quod priores naturales non bene dicebant in hoc, quia opinabantur nihil esse album, aut nigrum, nisi quando videtur; neque saporem esse, nisi quando gustatur; et similiter de aliis sensibilibus et sensibus. *Et quia non credebant esse alia entia, nisi sensibilia, neque aliam virtutem cognoscitivam, nisi sensum, credebant quod totum esse et veritas rerum esset in apparere.* Et ex hoc deducebantur ad credendum contradictoria simul esse vera, propter hoc quod diversi contradictoria opinantur. Dicebant autem quodammodo recte, et quodammodo non. Cum enim dupliciter dicatur sensus et sensibile; scilicet secundum potentiam et secundum actum; de sensu et sensibili secundum actum accidit quod ipsi dicebant, quod non est sensibile sine sensu. Non autem hoc verum est de sensu et sensibili secundum potentiam. Sed ipsi loquebantur simpliciter, id est sine distinctione, de his quae dicuntur multipliciter.”³³⁰

“Magnitudo et figura et huiusmodi, quae dicuntur communia sensibilia, sunt media inter sensibilia per accidens et sensibilia propria, quae sunt objecta sensuum. Nam sensibilia propria primo et per se immutant sensum, cum sint qualitates alterantes; sensibilia vero communia omnia reducuntur ad quantitatem . . . Quantitas autem est proximum subjectum qualitatis alterativae, ut superficies est subjectum coloris. Et ideo sensibilia communia non movent sensum primo et per se, sed ratione sensibilis qualitatis, ut superficies ratione coloris. Nec tamen sunt sensibilia per accidens, quia huiusmodi sensibilia aliquam diversitatem faciunt in immutatione sensus.”³³¹

Distinction between Natural and Supernatural Knowledge

Before entering upon this point we shall cite a passage giving the Scholastic view of the “immediacy” in the religious sense.

“Il faut . . . qu’il y ait une autre connaissance de Dieu que la connaissance philosophique, une connaissance si facile à acquérir et si certaine que l’ignorance et le doute à cet égard ne puissent s’expliquer, si ce n’est par une légèreté coupable ou par une obstination orgueilleuse. Telle est aussi . . . la doctrine commune des Saints Pères. Ils distinguaient la connaissance de Dieu qu’on obtient au moyen de recherches savantes de celle qui naît spontanément en tout homme, au seul spectacle de la création.”

Let the thoughtful man compare this exposition of the “immediacy” of the supreme Spiritual Life with that offered by Eucken.

³³⁰ Comm. de Anima, Lib. III, lectio 2.

³³¹ Summa, I, q. 78, a. 3, ad. 2.

“Cette dernière connaissance est appelée par eux un *témoignage* que Dieu a donné de lui-même à l’âme en la créant, une *dot de la nature*, une *connaissance infuse*, inhérente à tout homme sans instruction préalable, connaissance qui naît, en quelque sorte, d’elle-même en même temps que la raison se développe et qui ne peut manquer que dans l’homme privé de l’usage de la raison ou livré aux vices qui ont corrompu la nature avec laquelle Dieu l’a créé . . . Dieu a mis dans notre nature raisonnable tout ce qui est nécessaire pour le connaître et même pour le connaître avec facilité. . . . L’homme ne parvient pas à sa fin sans se servir des forces que Dieu lui a données, mais l’auteur de ces dons prête encore à l’homme son concours pour qu’il puisse s’en servir. Comme cette vie morale et religieuse, pour laquelle il a été créé, est fondée sur la connaissance des vérités dont nous parlons, Dieu veille sur l’homme pour que sa raison, en se développant, parvienne à les connaître avec facilité et certitude. Remarquons toutefois qu’il n’est pas question ici de la grâce surnaturelle, mais de ce concours ou de cette assistance par laquelle Dieu est, même dans l’ordre de la nature, le premier et principal maître de toutes les créatures raisonnables.”³³²

Eucken has confused the natural and supernatural orders in such a manner as to render it very difficult to “see clear” in his system. On the one hand he denies to the natural order much that belongs to it by right, on the other, he includes under the term “supernatural” truths which may be reached by the natural activity of the mind, and rejects the great body of supernatural truths communicated by Revelation. Furthermore he makes constant use of the Christian terms—Redeeming Love, Grace, Salvation, etc.—which, as has been already indicated, can have no true significance on his premises.

That the “human spiritual,” i.e., man’s soul, has direct, supernatural relations with the *Absolute Spiritual Life*, i.e., God, Catholics not only may, but must grant, since it is an article of Christian Faith; but “*Supernatural*” in this case is used in a very different signification from that which Eucken attaches to it. This interior life of the soul does not fall into the domain of philosophy, but into that of ascetic theology. The Scholastic position is unfolded in the following passage:

“Il doit vraiment paraître étrange que certains écrivains modernes, en parlant de la nécessité d’une révélation, passent si légèrement sur la distinction que Saint Thomas fait ressortir dans les premières questions de ses plus célèbres ouvrages, distinc-

³³² Klentgen, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 438-441.

tion que toute l'école admet. Pour les vérités de l'ordre naturel . . . on peut, il est vrai, soutenir une certaine nécessité de la révélation, mais on ne peut pas regarder cette nécessité comme absolue. Car ces vérités peuvent être connues par le spectacle de la nature et, par conséquent, elles ne dépassent pas les forces naturelles de la raison humaine. Les obstacles que nous rencontrons dans cette connaissance viennent du dehors, et ont leur source, pour la plus grande partie, dans les égarements volontaires des hommes. . . . Mais, pour connaître les vérités de l'ordre surnaturel, aucune raison créée ne peut suffire, quelque libre et puissant qu'on la suppose; ce sont des mystères cachés dans les décrets divins et qu'aucune oeuvre visible, mais la parole exprime de Dieu peut seule manifester. La révélation ne peut donc être regardée comme absolument nécessaire que pour la connaissance de ces vérités. Voilà ce qui, avant toute autre considération, montre son excellence et l'estime que nous en devons faire. Si, en effet, nous devons y attacher la plus grande valeur, ce n'est pas parce que sans elle nous ne pourrions parvenir à aucune connaissance du créateur, mais plutôt parce qu'elle élève l'homme au dessus de lui-même et le rend capable de connaissances nouvelles et bien supérieures à toutes celles qu'il aurait pu acquérir par ses propres forces . . . quoique la foi ne puisse exister sans quelque connaissance de la raison qui précède, la foi, devenue possible par cette connaissance, peut transporter l'esprit en des régions qu'il n'aurait pu atteindre par aucun essor de sa pensée."³³³

The text of St. Thomas is as follows:

"Quia verò non omnis veritatis manifestandae modus est idem, 'disciplinati autem hominis est tantum de unoquoque fidem capere tentare, quantum natura rei permittit,' ut a Philosopho optime dictum est (Ethic, I, c. 2), et ut Boetius introducit (De Trin., c. 2), necesse est prius ostendere quis modus possibilis sit ad veritatem propositam manifestandam. Est autem in his, quae de Deo confitemur, duplex veritatis modus. Quaedam namque vera sunt de Deo, quae omnem facultatem humanae rationis excedunt, ut Deum esse trinum et unum. Quaedam vero sunt, ad quae etiam ratio naturalis pertingere potest, sicut est Deum esse, Deum esse unum, et alia hujusmodi; quae etiam philosophi demonstrative de Deo probaverunt, ducti naturalis lumine rationis. Quod autem sint aliqua intelligibilium divinorum, quae humanae rationis penitus excedant ingenium, evidentissime apparet. Quod enim principium totius scientiae, quam de aliqua re ratio percipit, sit intellectus substantiae ipsius, eo quod, secundum doctrinam Philosophi (Anal. post. II, text. comm. 2), demonstrationis principium est *quod quid est*, oportet quod, secundum modum quo substantia rei intelligitur, sit eorum modus, quae de re illa

³³³ Loc. cit., pp. 549, 550.

cognoscuntur. Unde, si intellectus humanus alicujus rei substantiam comprehendit, puta lapidis vel trianguli, nullum intelligibile illius rei facultatem humanae rationis excedet. Quod quidem nobis circa Deum non accidit. Nam, ad substantiam ipsius capiendam, intellectus humanus non potest naturali virtute pertingere, quum intellectus nostri, secundum modum praesentis vitae, cognitio a sensu incipiat. Et ideo ea quae in sensu non cadunt non possunt humano intellectu capi, nisi quatenus ex sensibus eorum cognitio colligitur. Sensibilia autem ad hoc ducere intellectum nostrum non possunt, ut in eis divina substantia videatur *quid sit*, quum sint effectus causae virtutem non aequantes. Ducitur tamen ex sensibilibus intellectus noster in divinam cognitionem, ut cognoscat de Deo *quia est*, et alia hujusmodi, quae oportet attribui primo principio. Sunt igitur quaedam intelligibilia divinorum, quae humanae rationi sunt pervia; quaedam vero, quae omnino vim humanae rationis excedunt . . . Idem manifeste apparet ex defectu, quem in rebus cognoscendis quotidie experimur. Rerum enim sensibilibus plurimas proprietates ignoramus, earumque proprietatum, quas sensu apprehendimus, rationem perfecte in pluribus invenire non possumus. Multo igitur amplius illius excellentissimae substantiae, transcendentis omnia intelligibilia humana ratio investigare non sufficit. Huic etiam consonat dictum Philosophi, qui asserit, quod 'intellectus noster sic se habet ad prima entium, quae sunt manifestissima in natura, sicut oculus vespertilionis ad solem' (Metaphys., II, text, comm. I). Huic etiam veritati sacra Scriptura testimonium perhibet. Dicitur enim: *Forsitan vestigia Dei comprehendes, et usque ad perfectum omnipotentem reperiēs?* (Job II, 7). Et: *Ecce Deus magnus, vincens scientiam nostram* (XXXVI, 26). Et: *Ex parte cognoscimus* (1 Cor. XIII, 9). Non igitur omne quod de Deo dicitur, quamvis ratione investigari non possit, statim quasi falsum est abjiciendum, ut Manichaei et plures infidelium putaverunt (S. Aug., Retr. I., 14)."³³⁴

Necessity of Divine Revelation

That Eucken rejects historical revelation has been already indicated. Beyond the personal "immediacy," which we have shown to be wholly subjective in character, and the revelation of some distinct phase of the Spiritual Life in each age—as the "Geistesleben" advances to self-realization—man has neither the means nor the need of knowledge of God. Yet even this much is not easily obtained, according to Eucken himself, who insists that man must *wrest a content from the age*, and force the

³³⁴ Summa contra Gentiles I. c. 111. See also Summa I, q. I; a. I.

age to yield up its content. St. Thomas, in the following extract, explains the necessity of Divine Revelation:

“Duplici igitur veritate divinatorum intelligibilium existente, una ad quam rationis inquisitio pertingere potest, altera quae omne ingenium humanae rationis excedit, utraque convenienter divinitus homini credenda proponitur. Hoc autem de illa primo ostendendum est, quae inquisitioni rationis pervia esse potest; ne forte alicui videatur, ex quo ratione haberi potest, frustra id supernaturali inspiratione credendum traditum esse. Sequentur tamen tria inconvenientia, si hujusmodi veritas solummodo rationi inquirenda relinqueretur. Unum est, quod paucis hominibus Dei cognitio inesset. A fructu enim studiosae inquisitionis, qui est veritatis inventio, plurimi impediuntur tribus de causis. Quidam siquidem impediuntur propter complexionis indispositionem, ex qua multi naturaliter sunt indispositi ad sciendum. Unde nullo studio ad hoc pertingere possent, ut summum gradum humanae cognitionis attingerent, qui in cognoscendo Deum consistit. Quidam vero impediuntur necessitate rei familiaris. Oportet enim esse, inter homines, aliquos qui temporalibus administrandis insistant, qui tantum tempus in otio contemplativae inquisitionis non possent expendere, ut ad summum fastigium humanae inquisitionis pertingerent, scilicet Dei cognitionem. Quidam autem impediuntur pigritia. Ad cognitionem enim eorum quae de Deo ratio investigare potest, multa praecognoscere oportet, quum fere totius philosophiae consideratio ad Dei cognitionem ordinetur. Propter quod metaphysica, quae circa divina versatur, inter philosophiae partes ultima remanet addiscenda. Sic ergo nonnisi cum magno labore studii ad praedictae veritatis inquisitionem perveniri potest: quem quidem laborem pauci subire volunt pro amore scientiae, cujus tamen mentibus hominum naturalem Deus inseruit appetitum. Secundum inconveniens est, quod illi qui ad praedictae veritatis cognitionem vel inventionem pervenirent, vix post longum tempus pertingerent, tum propter hujusmodi veritatis profunditatem, ad quam capiendam per viam rationis nonnisi post longum exercitium intellectus humanus idoneus invenitur; tum etiam propter multa quae praexiguntur, ut dictum est . . . Tertium inconveniens est, quod investigationi rationis humanae plerumque falsitas admiscetur, propter debilitatem intellectus nostri in judicando et phantasmatum permixtionem. *Et ideo apud multos in dubitatione remanerent ea, quae sunt verissime etiam demonstrata, dum vim demonstrationis ignorant, et praecipue quum videant a diversis, qui sapientes dicuntur, diversa doceri.* Inter multa etiam vera, quae demonstrantur, immiscetur aliquando aliquid falsum, quod non demonstratur, sed aliqua probabili vel sophistica ratione asseritur, quae interdum demonstratio reputatur. Et ideo oportuit par viam fidei, fixa certitudine, ipsam veritatem de rebus divinis

hominibus exhiberi. Salubriter ergo divina providit clementia, ut ea etiam quae ratio investigare potest, fide tenenda praeciperet; ut *sic omnes de facili possent divinae cognitionis participes esse et absque dubitatione et errore.*"³³⁵

We have to direct attention, in particular, to the italicised passages. In the first St. Thomas defends the power of the mind to discover and comprehend religious truths of the natural order, although *some minds* may fail to grasp the full force of the arguments and proofs brought before them. In the second he states the reason for which God, in His mercy, has given men a Divine Revelation—viz., that all his creatures may become easily partakers of divine knowledge.

In *Present Estimate of Value of Human Life* Eucken says, "The veil which conceals the destiny of man will not be lifted. But, after all, is this indispensable to true faith in our mission and the cheerful performance thereof?"³³⁶ We hold that the veil *has been lifted*, and that without some light on man's final destiny even if it be only that obtained by the exercise of reason, true faith would be impossible.

Which is to be held—that an Intelligent First Cause, Infinite Source of all Goodness and Truth, has abandoned minds, capable of knowing Him, to the most painful toil and anxiety, and to such uncertainty when truth is gained that "doubt is ever sapping the foundations anew;" or, that He Who created men to know and love Him has Himself revealed to them all that is necessary to perfectly accomplish that purpose?

Our citations, so far, have enunciated and supported three principles of Scholastic teaching: (1) that certainty exists; (2) that the human mind can attain to truth; (3) that, apart from Divine Revelation, truth is reached by the exercise of man's rational activity, whether immediately (i.e., by intuition or intellectual instinct), or mediately (i.e., by reasoning).

In our next chapter we shall inquire into the nature of truth *in itself*.

³³⁵ Op. cit., I, I, c. IV. Italics ours. See also loc. cit., c. VI; De Verit., q. XIV, Art. 11.

³³⁶ Forum, XXXIV, April-June, 1903, p. 615.

CHAPTER II

NATURE OF TRUTH

With the exception of having given the Scholastic definition and Eucken's rejection thereof, we have not yet entered directly upon the question of the nature of truth.

What is truth?

Eucken defines truth as "an upward elevation of life to its own unity," and "an advance of life to its own perfection."³³⁷ Surely these are cases of *ignotum per ignotius*.

An examination of the section in *Life's Basis and Life's Ideal* entitled *Problem of Truth and Reality* will show how very closely he approaches the pragmatic doctrine on this point; the fact that he insists on an *absolute truth* while exposing very subjective views of truth does not increase the value of his philosophy.

Eucken further informs us that "if the turning to the life-process puts the question, the assertion of an *independent spiritual life gives the answer to it*."³³⁸

We have shown

1 the Life-Process of Eucken's system to be not only an impossibility but an inconceivability;

2 the supposed "immediacy," alleged to result from the turn to the Life-Process, to be valueless as a philosophical solution:

(a) *in se* because of the distrust (in this system) of the ordinary

³³⁷ Life's Basis, op. cit., pp. 217, 219.

³³⁸ Life's Basis and Life's Ideal, op. cit., p. 307. In the latest German edition this phrase does not occur but the idea is retained: "Sie [die Philosophie] erstrebt einen Aufbau namentlich durch die Verbindung von drei Forderungen und Angriffspunkten. Sie verlangt ein Zurückgehen auf den Lebensprozess, sie verlangt die Anerkennung einer geistigen Welt in unserem Bereich, sie verlangt endlich, dass das Leben eine Tiefe gewinne und von ihr aus eine Wirklichkeit entwickle. Das zusammen fordert eine wesentliche Veränderung der vorhandenen Lage, es macht vieles unzulänglich, was bisher genügend schien, aber es eröffnet auch eine Fülle neuer Ausblicke und die Möglichkeit einer durchgängigen Erhöhung. . . . Dass nur vom Leben aus wir uns über uns selbst und unser Verhältnis zur Welt zu orientieren vermögen, das war ein leitender Gedanke unserer ganzen Untersuchung und das entspricht zweifellos einem Verlangen der Gegenwart. Denn überall hören wir *den Ruf nach einem Zurückgehen auf das Leben*, nach einer Belebung im besonderen der Erkenntnisarbeit von daher . . . ; wir müssen verlangen, dass das Leben sich in ein Ganzes fasse, als ein solches eigne Kräfte und eigne Gesetze erweise und damit ein *gestaltendes Wirken an aller Mannigfaltigkeit übe*. Daher kam es, dass wir gern von einem Lebensprozesse sprachen, um die Überlegenheit des Lebens gegen das individuelle Dasein zum Ausdruck zu bringen." Grundlinien einer neuen Lebensanschauung, 2te Auflage, Leipzig, 1913. Op. cit., p. 195. Italics ours.

revelations of the faculties through which the "immediacy" must come,

(b) in its source which is *non-existent*;

3 the *Spiritual Life*,^{338a} such as Eucken describes it—and the identification of which with the Life-Process is necessitated by his Monism—to be worthless as standard or ground of truth. We have rejected the *Geistesleben* on the very grounds on which Eucken himself condemns another system, viz., that "it is fundamentally established on conflicting principles."³³⁹

It remains for us to expose the Scholastic theory which here, as elsewhere, is clear and direct.

Scholastic Theory of Truth

Truth is a correspondence of our thought with its object: it is *Adequatio intellectus et rei*.

In the precise sense of the word it is a just judgment of the intellect. When the truth of an object is spoken of the presence in the object of its proper form, nature or quality is indicated. In this sense truth is the conformity of the object with the intelligence on which it depends.

Everything which exists is true, in so far as its being is in conformity with the Divine Intelligence. In so far as man has faculties capable of reaching truth he can, therefore, know both himself and other existing objects.

Père Thomas Pègues gives an excellent summary of the teaching of St. Thomas on this point, which we cite:

"Pour préciser encore la doctrine, fort délicate, exposée dans cet article, nous pouvons nous demander, d'un mot, à son sujet, ce qu'est la vérité. Qu'est-ce que la vérité? Distinguons tout de suite entre la vérité d'un objet, et la vérité, d'une façon absolue. La vérité d'un objet n'est rien autre que la présence, en cet objet, de la forme ou de la nature ou de la qualité qu'il doit avoir. C'est la conformité de cet objet avec l'intelligence dont il dépend. La vérité, d'une façon absolue, c'est la qualité d'une intelligence disant d'une chose qu'elle est ou qu'elle est telle, quand, en effet, cette chose est et est telle, ou disant qu'elle n'est pas et qu'elle n'est pas telle, quand, en réalité, elle n'est pas et n'est pas telle. C'est la conformité de l'intelligence qui affirme ou qui nie avec

^{338a} Perhaps the best description of the "Spiritual Life" of which Eucken strives to give us a concept is that it is a *static aspect of the Life-Process*. This suggests a contradiction, but contradiction is inevitable in Monism.

³³⁹ Philosophy of Friedrich Froebel by R. Eucken, Forum, Vol. XXX, Oct., 1900, p. 179.

ce qu'elle nie ou affirme. Et donc la vérité, d'une façon absolue, la vérité, au sens premier de ce mot, la vérité, en tant que bien ou perfection de l'intelligence, la vérité, au sens pur et simple, la vérité tout court ne peut être que dans l'intelligence qui nie ou qui affirme (formellement, ou éminemment, comme nous l'expliquerons quand il s'agira de la vérité en Dieu); mais elle peut être et elle est (elle, ou son contraire, . . .) dans toute intelligence qui affirme ou qui nie. C'est une propriété, c'est la propriété de cette intelligence. Dès là qu'une intelligence nie ou affirme, elle a la vérité (ou son contraire); et elle l'a comme chose possédée, comme bien propre, comme sa perfection (ou sa dégradation, s'il s'agissait de l'erreur); elle l'a, pour garder l'expression de St. Thomas, comme chose connue. Car cette expression 'comme chose connue' ne doit pas s'entendre en ce sens seulement qu'on s'apercevrait que la chose est, quand on dit qu'elle est, ou qu'elle n'est pas quand on dit qu'elle n'est pas, ce qui ne mettrait la vérité que dans une opération réflexe de l'intelligence. La vérité se trouve aussi dans l'opération directe de l'intelligence, et la vérité en tant que bien de l'intelligence possédée par elle. Il suffit qu'on dise d'une chose qu'elle est, quand elle est, ou qu'elle n'est pas quand elle n'est pas, pour que la vérité, bien propre de l'intelligence, soit en elle à titre de bien possédé, quoique non peut-être de bien conscient. La vérité est alors dans l'intelligence comme chose connue, en ce sens que la connaissance que l'on a est une vérité, la vérité consistant dans l'affirmation juste ou la négation exacte de l'intelligence. On prendra conscience de cette vérité que l'on a, que l'on possède, quand on se justifiera à soi-même l'exactitude de son affirmation ou de sa négation. La vérité est donc, au sens précis du mot, un jugement juste de l'intelligence. [C. F. le Commentaire de Cajétan sur le présent article] Voilà ce qu'est la vérité prise en elle-même."³⁴⁰

And again:

"Au corps de l'article, saint Thomas commence par nous rappeler ce qu'est la vérité, en nous disant où elle se trouve. 'La vérité se trouve et dans l'intelligence selon qu'elle saisit la chose comme elle est, et dans les choses selon qu'elles ont un être qui peut s'adapter à l'intelligence. Or cela, c'est en Dieu qu'on le trouve au souverain degré. En effet, son être n'est pas seulement conforme à son acte d'intellection; il est cet acte même. Et son acte d'intellection est la mesure et la cause de tout autre être et de tout autre acte d'intellection. Et Il est Lui-même son être et son acte d'intellection. De telle sorte que non seulement la vérité est en Lui, mais Il est encore la Vérité elle-même souveraine et première."³⁴¹

³⁴⁰ R. P. Pègues, O.P. Commentaire Français Littéral de la Somme Théologique, I., Traité de Dieu, II, pp. 174-176, Toulouse, 1907.

³⁴¹ Op. cit., p. 183.

In God, then, Being not only corresponds, in a sovereign degree, to His act of "intellection," It is this act. And His act of "intellection" is the cause and the measure of every other existence and of every other act of intelligence.

If we start from these truths we may find Eucken's words that "the turn to the Life-Process puts the question" and "the spiritual life gives the answer" very full of meaning. In order to know, man must turn to what is within and without him, he must examine the created objects which are, as well as he himself is, reflections and imperfect manifestations of God Himself, Who is the Living Truth. Since the truth of objects depends absolutely on His Infinite Wisdom, which sets to each its proper being, the assertion of an Independent Spiritual Life does give the answer to the problem. *How do we know objects possess truth?* We know it through our knowledge that they are the work of an All Wise and All Powerful Creator—Who is the Fulness of the Uncreated Spiritual Life. As "Life-process" does not with us include the whole universe we should get a more comprehensive word which would comprise the inanimate: then within the conditions we have pointed out we would endorse Eucken's statement.

We add another extract directed against the pragmatic doctrines with which Eucken has so much in common.

"Il (le P. Janssens) fait remarquer que cette immutabilité de la vérité dont nous parle saint Thomas au sujet de la vérité divine et de la vérité des choses, ruine par la base la théorie chère à beaucoup d'esprits, même parmi les catholiques, et qui consiste à supposer dans toutes les sciences, même dans la science sacrée, même dans les dogmes les plus essentiels de notre foi, une sorte d'évolution indéfinie. Nous avons déjà signalé cette tendance à propos de la connaissance que nous avons de Dieu et de la manière dont nous le nommons. Et sans doute . . . l'intelligence humaine par elle-même n'est pas immuablement fixée dans la vérité, mais cela ne veut pas dire qu'elle ne puisse pas s'établir d'une façon stable dans telles et telles vérités démontrées à la lumière des premiers principes; et à plus forte raison, qu'elle ne puisse pas être fixée par Dieu d'une façon surnaturelle dans telles et telles vérités révélées. Ces vérités, une fois connues, ne changent pas; il faudrait, pour qu'elles changent, que l'homme perde la raison ou la foi. Elles sont immuables à tout jamais. Elles le sont pour chaque individu; à plus forte raison, pour l'universalité du genre humain et pour l'Église dans sa totalité. Rêver d'une doctrine, soit philosophique, soit théologique, qui changerait sans cesse et où il n'y aurait rien de fixe, non pas même les grands

principes de la raison ou les doctrines fondamentales qui en découlent, ni les articles du Symbole ou les définitions de l'Église et le corps de doctrine qui n'est que la résultante de ces définitions ou de ces articles et des principes de la raison ou de ses doctrines fondamentales,—n'est pas seulement une chimère, c'est une folie et une impiété. Et il ne sert de rien, pour justifier de telles prétentions, d'en appeler à telle doctrine philosophique plus ou moins en vogue de nos jours . . . ou à l'histoire des multiples opinions des hommes tant parmi les théologiens que parmi les philosophes. Car à cela nous répondrons qu'une doctrine philosophique, même très en vogue, peut être radicalement fausse; . . . La vérité de Dieu est immuable; et par conséquent lorsque Dieu a parlé, ce qu'Il a dit ne changera pas. De même la vérité que reflètent les choses et qui n'est encore, en un sens, que la vérité de Dieu, sera toujours nécessairement elle-même. Et quand nos esprits s'y adaptent par la vue directe ou par le raisonnement sage, eux aussi participent à la même immutabilité. Ce qui n'est pas à dire que nous excluons tout progrès du côté de nos intelligences. Car *pour tant que nous l'étudions, nous n'arriverons jamais à saisir dans toute son étendue la vérité de la nature ni à scruter dans toute sa profondeur la vérité de Dieu. Mais ce qui est acquis, est acquis.* Et ce n'est pas à remettre toujours tout en question ou à douter de tout, que peut consister le vrai progrès de la raison. L'évolution, ainsi entendue, n'est rien autre que l'agnosticisme, et conduit tout droit au nihilisme intellectuel."³⁴²

Truth then is eternal and unchangeable; and for man a necessary truth once perceived is as changeless as for God Himself.

Our concluding passage is from an author to whom we have already made abundant reference. In the summary of his treatise on *Certainty* Balmes writes:

"Complete truth, like perfect good, exists only with harmony. This is a necessary law, and to it man is subject. Since we do not intuitively see the infinite truth in which all truths are one, and all good is one; and as we are in relation with a world of finite, and consequently multiple beings, we need different powers to place us in contact, so to speak, with this variety of truths and finite goods; but as they, in their turn, spring from *one* same principle, and are directed to *one* same end, they are submitted to harmony, which is the unity of multiplicity. With these doctrines we believe philosophy without skepticism to be possible. Examination is not excluded: on the contrary, it is extended and completed. This method has another advantage; it does not make philosophy extravagant and philosophers exceptional.

³⁴² Op. cit., pp. 198–200. Italics are ours. Those who wish to pursue the treatment of St. Thomas in the original may consult *Quaestiones Disputatae* 3; *De Veritate*, q. s, 1 5.

Philosophy cannot be so generalized as to become popular; human nature is opposed to this, but there is not on the other hand any necessity of condemning it to a misanthropic isolation by force of extravagant professions. In such a case philosophy degenerates into philosophism. Exposition of facts, conscientious examination, clear language; such we conceive sound philosophy to be. This does not require it to cease to be profound, unless by profoundness be meant darkness. The rays of the sun light up the remotest depths of space. I am aware that some philosophers of our age think otherwise, that they deem it necessary, when they examine the fundamental questions of philosophy, to shake the foundations of the world; and yet I have never been able to persuade myself that it was necessary to destroy in order to examine, or that in order to become philosophers we ought to become madmen."³⁴³

If this is *naïveté* most thinking men will choose to be *naïve*.

³⁴³ Fundamental Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 242, 243.

CHAPTER III

THE ABSOLUTE SPIRITUAL LIFE IN SE

In the preceding chapters we have dwelt mainly on the theory of knowledge and the nature of truth. We propose to give here a brief exposition of the Scholastic teaching with regard to the Foundation of all truth and reality—the *Absolute Spiritual Life*.

(a) This Absolute Spiritual Life is “a God who is numerically One, who is Personal; the Author, Sustainer, and Finisher of all things, the life of Law and Order, the Moral Governor; One who is Supreme and Sole; like Himself, unlike all things besides Himself which all are but His creatures; distinct from, independent of them all; One who is self-existing, absolutely infinite, who has ever been and ever will be, to whom nothing is past or future; who is all perfection, and the fulness and archetype of every possible excellence, the Truth Itself, Wisdom, Love, Justice, Holiness; One who is All-powerful, All-knowing, Omnipresent, Incomprehensible. These are some of the distinctive prerogatives” to be ascribed “unconditionally and unreservedly to the great Being . . . God,” the Absolute Spiritual Life.³⁴⁴

This supreme Spiritual Life is *immutable*: St. Thomas proves this truth thus:

“*Prima* autem, et manifestior via est, quae sumitur ex parte motus. Certum est enim, et sensu constat, aliqua moveri in hoc mundo: omne autem, quod movetur, ab alio movetur. Nihil enim movetur, nisi secundum quod est in potentia ad illud, ad quod movetur: movet autem aliquid, secundum quod est actu. Movere enim nihil aliud est, quam educere aliquid de potentia in actum. De potentia autem non potest aliquid reduci in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in actu: sicut calidum in actu, ut ignis, facit lignum, quod est calidum in potentia, esse actu calidum, et per hoc movet, et alterat ipsum. Non autem est possibile, ut idem sit simul in actu, et potentia secundum idem, sed solum secundum diversa: quod enim est calidum in actu, non potest simul esse calidum in potentia, sed est simul frigidum in potentia. Impossibile est ergo, quod secundum idem, et eodem modo aliquid sit movens, et motum, vel quod moveat seipsum: omne ergo, quod movetur, oportet ab alio moveri. Si ergo id, a quo movetur, moveatur, oportet et ipsum ab alio moveri, et illud ab alio: hic autem non est

³⁴⁴ Newman, *Grammar of Assent*, op. cit., p. 101.

procedere in infinitum, quia sic non esset aliquod primum movens, et per consequens nec aliquod aliud movens, quia moventia secunda non movent nisi per hoc, quod sunt mota a primo movente, sicut baculus non movet, nisi per hoc, quod est motus a manu; ergo necesse est devenire ad aliquod primum movens, quod a nullo moveatur; et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum.”³⁴⁵

“Ad Primum sic proceditur. Videtur, quod Deus non sit omnino immutabilis. Quidquid enim movet seipsum, est aliquo modo mutabile. Sed, sicut dicit August. 8. super Gen. ad litter. (cap. 20, in fin.): *Spiritus Creator movet se, nec per tempus, nec per locum*; ergo Deus est aliquo modo mutabilis.

2. Praeterea. Sap. 7. dicitur de Sapientia, quod *est mobilior omnibus mobilibus*. Sed Deus est ipsa Sapientia; ergo Deus est mobilis.

3. Praeterea. Appropinquare et elongari, motum significant: hujusmodi autem dicuntur de Deo in Scriptura Jac. 4: *Appropinquate Deo; et appropinquabit vobis*; ergo Deus est mutabilis.

Sed contra est, quod dicitur Malach. 3: *Ego Deus, et non mutor*.

Respondeo dicendum, quod ex praemissis (q. 2, art. 3) ostenditur: *Deum esse omnino immutabilem*.

Primo quidem, quia supra ostensum est (*ibid.*) esse aliquod primum ens, quod Deum dicimus; et quod hujusmodi primum ens oportet esse purum actum absque permixtione alicujus potentiae, eo quod potentia simpliciter est posterior actu. Omne autem, quod quocumque modo mutatur, est aliquo modo in potentia. Ex quo patet, quod impossibile est, Deum aliquo modo mutari.

Secundo, quia omne, quod movetur, quantum ad aliquid manet, et quantum ad aliquid transit: sicut quod movetur de albedine in nigredinem, manet secundum substantiam; et sic in omni eo quod movetur, attenditur aliqua composito. Ostensum est autem supra (q. 3, art. 7), quod in Deo nulla est compositio, sed est omnino simplex. Unde manifestum est, quod Deus moveri non potest. Tertio, quia omne, quod movetur, motu suo aliquid acquirit, et pertingit ad illud, ad quod prius non pertingebat; Deus autem, cum sit infinitus, comprehendens in se omnem plenitudinem perfectionis totius esse, non potest aliquid acquirere, nec extendere se in aliquid, ad quod prius non pertingebat. Unde, nullo modo sibi competit motus. Et inde est, quod quidam antiquorum, quasi ab ipsa veritate coacti, posuerunt primum principium esse immobile. Ad Primum ergo dicendum, quod Augustinus (*loc. cit. in arg.*) ibi loquitur secundum modum, quo Plato dicebat primum movens movere seipsum: omnem operationem nominans motum, secundum quod etiam ipsum intelligere, et velle, et amare motus quidam dicuntur. Quia ergo Deus intelligit, et amat seipsum, secundum hoc dixerunt, quod Deus movet seipsum, non autem secundum quod motus, et mutatio est existentis in potentia: ut nunc loquimur de mutatione, et motu.

³⁴⁵ Sum I, q. 2, art. 3.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod sapientia dicitur mobilis esse similitudinarie, secundum quod suam similitudinem diffundit usque ad ultima rerum: nihil enim esse potest, quod non procedat a divina sapientia per quamdam imitationem, sicut a primo principio effectivo, et formali, prout etiam artificiata procedunt a sapientia artificis. Sic igitur, inquantum similitudo divinae sapientiae gradatim procedit a supremis, quae magis participant de ejus similitudine, usque ad infima rerum, quae minus participant, dicitur esse quidam processus, et motus divinae sapientiae in res, sicut si dicamus solem procedere usque ad terram, inquantum radius luminis ejus usque ad terram pertingit. Et hoc modo exponit Dionys. cap 1, Coelestis hierarch. (*in princ.*) dicens, quod *omnis processus divinae manifestationis venit ad nos a Patre luminum moto.*

Ad Tertium dicendum, quod hujusmodi dicuntur de Deo in Scripturis metaphorice. Sicut enim dicitur sol intrare domum, vel exire, inquantum radius ejus pertingit ad domum: sic dicitur Deus appropinquare ad nos, vel recedere a nobis, inquantum percipimus influentiam bonitatis ipsius, vel ab eo deficimus.”³⁴⁶

“Substantiae vero incorporeae, quia sunt ipsae formae subsistentes, quae tamen se habent ad esse ipsarum, sicut potentia ad actum, non compatiuntur secum privationem hujus actus: quia esse consequitur formam, et nihil corrumpitur, nisi per hoc, quod amittit formam. Unde in ipsa forma non est potentia ad non esse: et ideo hujusmodi substantiae sunt immutabiles, et invariabiles secundum esse: et hoc est, quod dicit Dionys. 4. cap. de Div. Nom. (*parum a princ. lect. 1.*) quod *substantiae intellectuales creatae mundae sunt a generatione, et ab omni variatione, sicut incorporeales, et immateriales: sed tamen remanet in eis duplex mutabilitas.*

Una secundum quod sunt in potentia ad finem, et sic est in eis mutabilitas secundum electionem de bono in malum, ut Damascen. (lib. 2, cap. 3. et 4.) dicit. Alia secundum locum: inquantum virtute sua finita possunt attingere quaedam loca, quae prius non attingebant: quod de Deo dici non potest, qui sua infinitate omnia loca replet, ut supra dictum est (q. 8. art. 2). . . . Unde cum Deus nullo istorum modorum sit mutabilis, proprium ejus est, omnino immutabilem esse.”³⁴⁷

Père Pègues, following St. Thomas, gives a clear and inspiring exposition of this truth:

“Saint Thomas nous prévient que ‘de tout ce que nous avons dit jusqu’ici, il résulte que Dieu est tout à fait immuable.’ On le peut montrer à l’aide de trois raisons: premièrement, parce qu’Il est le premier Être; secondement, parce qu’Il est souverainement simple; troisièmement, parce qu’en Lui se trouve la plénitude de la perfection.—‘Nous avons montré plus haut (q. 2, art. 3) qu’il

³⁴⁶ Sum I, q. 9, art. 1.

³⁴⁷ Ibid., q. 9, art. 2. Vide loc. cit., q.s. 3, 4, 6-11; 13, 14; 18-22; 25, 26, 44.

est un premier Être, que nous appelons Dieu, et que ce premier Être doit être acte pur, sans aucun mélange de puissance, parce que la puissance en tant que telle suppose un certain acte qui lui est antérieur. Puis donc qu'en tout être qui change, quelle que soit d'ailleurs la nature du changement, se trouve nécessairement quelque puissance, il s'ensuit que Dieu, Être premier ou acte pur, 'ne peut changer en aucune manière,' qu'Il est tout à fait immuable. — 'Dieu est souverainement simple, c'est-à-dire qu'il n'y a en Lui aucune composition, de quelque nature qu'on la suppose.' Il n'est donc pas possible d'imaginer en Dieu plusieurs parties dont l'une demeurerait tandis que l'autre passerait. Or, 'en tout être qui change, il faut trouver cela: un quelque chose qui passe et un quelque chose qui demeure; c'est ainsi qu'une chose blanche qui devient noire demeure quant à sa substance; et donc en tout ce qui change nous devons trouver une certaine composition. Il s'ensuit que Dieu, qui est souverainement simple, 'ne peut absolument pas être soumis au changement.'—Enfin, 'Dieu est au sommet de toute perfection; Il est infini, et en Lui se trouve la plénitude de l'être. Il s'ensuit qu'il n'y a rien,' en dehors de Lui, 'qu'Il puisse acquérir ou qu'Il puisse atteindre alors qu'au-paravant Il ne l'atteindrait pas.' Il a tout déjà et d'une façon suréminente. Si donc tout mouvement, tout changement a pour but d'acquérir quelque chose, une perfection, qu'on n'avait pas, il s'ensuit que Dieu, ayant tout de par son fond, ne peut aucunement changer ou se mouvoir. Il est donc totalement immuable.—La splendide vérité! Et comme elle fait du bien à l'âme, comme elle est consolante! Dieu est totalement immuable. Que nous importe, dès lors, que tout change autour de nous, puisque au-dessus de nous se trouve quelqu'un pour qui nous sommes faits, et qui, Lui, ne change pas. Nous nous donnons beaucoup de mal, nous nous tourmentons beaucoup pour arriver à ces multiples fins que nous nous proposons toujours et qui toujours nous échappent; et nous oublions que nous sommes les enfants de Celui qui possède en Lui la plénitude de tout bien, et qui, partant, n'a pas à chercher en dehors de Lui. Se suffisant pleinement à Lui-même, il se repose éternellement dans l'immuable sérénité de son Être et de ses perfections infinies. S'appuyer sur Lui, ne chercher que Lui, ne serait-ce pas participer en quelque manière à son immuable et inaltérable sérénité? . . . En finissant son corps d'article, saint Thomas nous fait remarquer que la grande vérité qu'il vient d'établir est si éblouissante de clarté qu'elle a contraint 'plusieurs esprits,' même 'parmi les anciens philosophes' pourtant si ignorants des choses de Dieu, et qui, 'forcés par l'évidence, avaient affirmé que le premier principe des choses était immuable.' . . . en un certain sens il est permis de dire que 'Dieu se meut, qu'il y a du mouvement en Lui. Mais alors on prend le mot mouvement, non pas au sens où nous le prenons maintenant et où on le prend d'ordinaire, c'est-à-dire

au sens d'un acte qui perfectionne un être en puissance, mais au sens général d'acte ou d'opération. C'est ainsi que l'entendaient Platon et saint Augustin; et, dans ce sens, Aristote lui-même concède que 'Dieu se meut, c'est-à-dire qu'Il agit, qu'Il opère, non d'une action et d'une opération quelconques, mais de ces opérations qui n'emportent aucune imperfection, qui sont au contraire le couronnement et l'achèvement de la perfection. Telles sont les opérations intellectuelles, connaître, vouloir, aimer, et le reste.' ”³⁴⁸

(b) The Supreme Spiritual Life being absolutely changeless it is impossible to conceive of it as “developing dialectically through self-diremption and self-return.”³⁴⁹

The problem of the relation of the Absolute Spiritual Life to the universe admits, therefore, of only one solution: it is the relation of Creator to creature. This solution is eminently rational and is the only one which can safeguard the integrity and sanctity of God, and the free-will of man. A contemporary scientist writes: “Since we have begun by admitting God's existence, or rather since we have taken it as the corner-stone, we recognize in Him the Creator. The difficulties which now surround us come from the inability of our finite minds to grasp all that creation implies. Again the trouble is not with our reason so much as with our imagination. The idea that Omnipotence can make something out of nothing is clear enough and sound enough; but there are those who puzzle their minds by trying to imagine how it is done, and so cannot get rid of anthropomorphic conceptions.”³⁵⁰

³⁴⁸ Commentaire Français Littéral, op. cit., I. I., pp. 255-257.

³⁴⁹ B. Gibson, R. Eucken's Philosophy of Life, op. cit., p. 154. The passage which expresses Eucken's views fairly is as follows: “No just conception of the meaning which Eucken attaches to this fundamental concept can possibly be gained so long as we fail to bear in mind that the spiritual life, however deep and divine our conception of it may be, is not an oppositionless experience, but shares, *qua personal*, the essential characteristic of all [?] personal activity—that, namely, of developing dialectically through self-diremption and self-return. It is within the spiritual life itself that all oppositions are at once created and overcome. The opposition between life and death, which is the divinest stimulus of our human existence, is in this sense indigenous to the spiritual life [!] The conquest over death, though it raise the whole spiritual condition and profoundly modify our whole spiritual perspective, can hardly be held to cancel once and for all the oppositional, self-diremptive character of spiritual life. . . . Hence to conceive the spiritual life aright, we have not to abstract from its oppositional quality or conceive it as developing apart from the pain and the evil, the ignorance and the ugliness which it resists.” This is truly surprising language when we recollect that Gibson has described Eucken's philosophy as “a restatement and development in philosophical form of the religious teaching of Jesus”!! Op. cit., p. 166.

³⁵⁰ Thomas Dwight, M.D., LL.D. (late Professor of Anatomy at Harvard). Thoughts of a Catholic Anatomist, New York, 1911, p. 97.

St. Thomas writes:

"To every effect produced by God there is either something pre-existent or not. If not, the thesis stands, that God produces some effect out of nothing pre-existent. If anything pre-exists, we either have a process to infinity, which is impossible, or we must come to something primitive, which does not presuppose anything else previous to it. Now this primitive something cannot be God Himself, for God is not the material out of which anything is made (Bk. I, Chap. XVI): nor can it be any other being, distinct from God and uncaused by God . . . It is not proper to the universal cause of being, as such, to act only by movement and change: for not by movement and change is being, as such, made out of not-being, as such, but 'being this' is made out of 'not being this.' But God is the universal principle of being (Chap. XV). Therefore it is not proper to Him to act only by movement or change, or to need pre-existent material to make anything . . . God is in actuality, not by anything inhering in Him, but to the whole extent of His substance (B. I., Chap. XVIII). Therefore the proper mode of divine action is to produce the whole subsistent thing, and not a mere inherent thing, as is form in matter. Between actuality and potentiality such an order obtains, that, though in one and the same being, which is sometimes in potentiality, sometimes in actuality, potentiality is prior in time to actuality (although actuality is prior in nature), yet, absolutely speaking, actuality must be prior to potentiality, as is clear from this, that potentiality is not reduced to actuality except by some actual being. But matter [i.e., *materia prima*, or primordial matter] is being in potentiality. Therefore God, first and pure actuality, must be absolutely prior to matter, and consequently cause thereof."³⁵¹

"Every movement or change is the actualization of something that was in potentiality, as such: but in this action of creation there is nothing pre-existent in potentiality to become the subject of the action. The extremes of movement or change fall under the same order, being either of the same kind, as contraries are, or sharing one common potentiality of matter. But nothing of this can be in creation, to which no previous condition of things is supposed. In every change or movement there must be something coming to be otherwise than as it was before. But where the whole substance of a thing is brought into being, there cannot be any permanent residuum, now in this condition, now in that: because such a residuum would not be produced, but presupposed to production."³⁵²

"Hence appears the futility of arguments against creation drawn from the nature of movement or change,—as that creation must

³⁵¹ God and His Creatures, op. cit., B. II, Chap. XVI.

³⁵² Op. cit., B. II, Chap. XVII.

be in some subject, or that not-being must be transmuted into being: for creation is not a change, but is the mere dependence of created being on the principle by which it is set up, and so comes under the category of *relation*: hence the subject of creation may very well be said to be the thing created. Nevertheless creation is spoken of as a 'change' according to our mode of conceiving it, inasmuch as our understanding takes one and the same thing to be now non-existent and afterwards existing. If creation (creaturehood) is a relation, it is evidently some sort of reality; and this reality is neither uncreated, nor created by a further act of creation. For since the created effect really depends on the Creator, this relation must be a certain reality. Now every reality is brought into being by God; and therefore also this reality is brought into being by God, and yet was not created by any other creation than that of the first creature, because accidents and forms do not exist by themselves, and therefore neither are they terms of separate creation, since creation is the production of substantial being; but as they are 'in another,' so are they created in the creation of other things."³⁵³

It is difficult to form a *mental picture* of Creation, but is it easier to form an image of the ultimate constituents of the universe?

Whether we hold the atom to be indivisible with Dalton, or split it into electrons with Thompson, or adopt the Dynamical Theory of Boscovitch, or the Dynamism of Ostwald we are far from having a clear conception as to what matter really is in last analysis.

(c) Another problem arises from that of creation: it is that of *immanence and transcendence*. How is the Infinite Creator, Who is "like Himself, unlike all things besides Himself," "distinct from, independent of them all," present to His Creatures? Eucken discusses the question at considerable length,³⁵⁴ yet in his conception of the *Geistesleben* there is absolutely no possibility of predicating transcendence of it. How can that which is of the *essence of things*, and Eucken claims this for the *Geistesleben*, be at the same time wholly distinct from them? Boyce Gibson touches on the subject while maintaining the oppositional character of the spiritual life. He writes:

"To conceive immanence apart from transcendence is to conceive it metaphorically in the light of the spatial distinction between inclusion and exclusion, and not as a spiritual immanence which, *qua* spiritual, includes within itself the oppositions of sameness

³⁵³ Op. cit., B. II, Chap. XVIII.

³⁵⁴ See especially *Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart*, op. cit., E2, Das Problem der Religion, p. 390.

and otherness, of self-surrender and true freedom. The Divine immanence implies, then, the Divine transcendence; or, to express the same truth in the simpler language of emotion, love implies reverence; intimacy, respect. And what in God must transcend all human appropriation is an inwardness of Divine experience, unapproachable save through an emotion of reverence, which is none other than love itself become aware of its own intrinsic limitation."³⁵⁵

A careful reading of this passage reveals its pantheistic tendency. How can "immanence" include within itself "sameness and otherness?" We are confronted with the old difficulty of the presence of incompatible elements in the concept of the *Geistesleben*. Not only does "an inwardness of Divine experience" transcend "all human appropriation," but God Himself, in every respect, infinitely transcends such appropriation. Faith teaches us that a *supernatural* union of the soul with God is effected by Divine Grace, but such a union transcends the natural powers of the soul, and is completely outside and beyond the sphere of philosophy. As has already been pointed out God cannot be known, in the present life, as He essentially is, but only as the cause is known by the effect.³⁵⁶

Gibson, still interpreting Eucken, is more explicit in the following:

"Human freedom, truly interpreted, is seen to imply the Divine omnipresence, not as a mere postulate, a mere hope, a desire, or even a belief, but in the sense of the *higher pantheism*, as an intimacy closer to us than breathing and nearer than hands and feet."³⁵⁷

The Divine Omnipresence cannot be conceived in the light of pantheistic philosophy: it is just this which *transcendence* prohibits. Though Faith, as well as reason, teaches us that God is more intimately present to His creatures than the mind can grasp, yet God is, at the same time, infinitely distinct from them, for while being with them or in them by His essence *He is not of their essence*. The concluding words ("as an intimacy, etc.") of the cited passage recall the works of Catholic Theologians and ascetic writers—notably those of Father Faber. Indeed both Eucken and his interpreters have had frequent recourse, in our

³⁵⁵ R. Eucken's *Philosophy of Life*, op. cit., p. 157.

³⁵⁶ See *God and His Creatures*, op. cit., B. III, Chap. XLVII.

³⁵⁷ Op. cit., p. 156. Italics ours.

opinion, to Catholic writings in order to "fill in" the content of the *Geistesleben*, and to strengthen their philosophy. We feel justified in stating that if we subtracted from *Activism* all that has been taken from Scholasticism³⁵⁸ and from Catholic ascetic writings the barrenness of the residuum would be startling.

The following is the Scholastic teaching with regard to *immanence* and *transcendence*:

"God is in all things; not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an accident; but as an agent is present to anything upon which it works. An agent must be joined to anything wherein it acts immediately, and touch it by its own power; hence it is proved that the thing moved and the mover must be joined together. Since God is Existence itself by His own Essence, so created existence must be His proper effect; as to ignite is the proper effect of fire. God causes this effect in things not only when they first begin to exist, but as long as they are preserved in existence; as light is caused in the air by the sun as long as the air remains illuminated. Therefore as long as a thing exists, God must be present to it, according to its mode of existence.

"The existence (*esse*) of anything is all the closer to it and all the more profoundly belongs to it as the formal idea of all that is in it, as was shown above (Q. VII). Hence it must be that God exists intimately in all things. . . . God is above all things by the excellence of His nature; moreover, He is in all things as the cause of the being of all things. . . . No action of any agent, however powerful it may be, acts at a distance, except through a medium. But it belongs to the great power of God that He acts immediately in all things. Hence nothing is distant from Him, as if it could be without God in itself. But things are said to be distant from God by the unlikeness to Him in nature or grace; as also He is above all by the excellence of His own nature. . . . to be in a place can be understood in a twofold sense; either by way of other things—*i.e.*, when anything is said to be in other things, no matter how, as the accidents of a place are in the place; or by a way proper to place, as things placed are in the place. In both these in some way God is in every place; which means to exist everywhere. First, He is so in all things as giving them being, and power, and operation; for He is in every place as giving it existence and locative power. Also, things placed are in place, inasmuch as they fill place; and God fills every place; not, indeed, like a body; for a body is said to fill place, inasmuch as it does not suffer the co-presence of another body; whereas by God being in a place, others are not thereby excluded from it; indeed, by the very fact that He gives existence to everything in every place, He

³⁵⁸ We pointed out in Part II the influence of Scholastic teaching on Eucken.

fills every place. . . . Incorporeal things are not in place by contact of dimensive quantity, as bodies are; but by contact of power . . . God is in anything in two ways; in one way as its active cause; and thus He is in all things created by Him; in another way He is in things as the object of operation is in the operator; and this belongs to the operations of the soul, according as the thing known is in the one who knows; and the thing desired in the one desiring. In this second way God is especially in the rational creature, which knows and loves Him actually or habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this prerogative by grace, as will be shown later (Q. XII), He is said to be thus in the Saints by grace. How He is in other things created by Him, must be considered from human affairs as ordinarily known. A king, for example, is said to be in the whole kingdom by his power, although he is not everywhere present. Anything is said to be present in other things subject to its inspection; as things in a house are said to be present to anyone, who nevertheless may not be in substance in every part of the house. A thing is said to be in a place by way of substance or essence wherever its substance may be . . . God is in all things by His Power. . . . Therefore, God is in all things by His Power, inasmuch as all things are subject to His Power; He is by His Presence in all things, as all things are bare and open to His eyes;³⁵⁹ He is in all things by His Essence, inasmuch as He is the cause of existence to all things. . . . His Substance is to all things the cause of existence. . . . Knowledge and will require that the thing known should be in the one who knows; and the thing willed in the one who wills. Hence things are more truly in God by knowledge and will than God is in things. . . . No other perfection, but Grace, added to substance, renders God present in anything as the object known and loved; therefore only Grace constitutes a singular mode of God's existence in things. There is, however, another singular mode of God's existence in man by union, which will be treated of in its own place (Part III)."³⁶⁰

³⁵⁹ It is hardly necessary to remark that this expression does not imply anything anthropomorphic in St. Thomas' point of view, but is purely figurative.

³⁶⁰ Summa, Eng. translation by Fathers of Eng. Dominican Province, New York, 1911, I, I, q. VIII, arts. 1, 2, 3. As the mystery of the Incarnation is wholly beyond the sphere of philosophy, it has been merely referred to in the closing paragraph. The words of St. Paul, "In Him we live, and move, and have our being" (Acts XVII, 28), are borne out by the following from St. Thomas: "Although corporeal things are said to be in anything as in that which contains them, nevertheless spiritual things contain those things in which they are; as the soul contains the body. Hence also God is in things as containing them; nevertheless by a certain similitude to corporeal things, it is said that all things are in God; inasmuch as they are contained by Him." (Op. cit., I, I, q. VIII, a. 1, obj. 2.) How wholly removed from the pantheistic conception is this presence the entire Scholastic doctrine shows. The concluding passage of Dr. Dubray's article on the Philosophy of

From this exposition it is evident that monism of essence is not only an absurdity, it is a blasphemy. Monism of purpose—oneness in origin and destiny—such is the only unity to which all multiplicity is reducible. We cite again from Balmes:

“The human mind seeks that by reason to which it is impelled by an intellectual instinct; how to reduce plurality to unity, to re-unite, as it were, all the variety of existences in a point from which they all proceed, and in which they are all absorbed. The understanding knows that the conditioned must be included in the unconditioned, the relative in the absolute, the finite in the infinite, the various in the one. In this, all religions, all schools of philosophy agree. The proclamation of this truth belongs to no one of them exclusively; it is to be met with in all countries of the world, in primitive times, back even to the cradle of the human race. Beautiful, sublime tradition! Preserved through all generations, amid the ebb and flow of events, it offers us the idea of the Divinity presiding over the origin and destiny of the universe. Yes! The unity sought by philosophers is the Divinity itself,—the Divinity whose glory the firmament declares, and whose august face of ineffable splendor appears to us in our inmost consciousness. Yes! it is the Divinity which enlightens and guides the true philosopher, but blinds and confounds the proud sophist; it is what the true philosopher calls God, and venerates and adores in the sanctuary of his soul. . . . Considering its personality, its consciousness, its infinite intelligence, and its most perfect liberty, it is the foundation and the keystone of religion: distinct from the world, it produced the world from nothing, and preserves and governs it, and leads it by mysterious paths to the destiny assigned in its immutable decrees. There is then unity in the world; there is unity in philosophy. In this all agree; the difference is that some separate, with the greatest care, the finite from the infinite, the thing created from the creative power, unity from multiplicity, and maintain the necessary communication between the free will of the omnipotent agent and

Henri Bergson applies with equal force to every pantheistic system, and may be directed against the “higher pantheism” (vide Boyce Gibson, *op. cit.*, p. 156) of Eucken. It runs as follows: “It is, therefore, in a sense different from that of Saint Paul that Professor Bergson applies to the absolute as conceived by him the words which the Apostle applies to God (Acts XVII, 28). No; it is not of the absolute felt vaguely in intuition, but of God as known by reason, ‘for the invisible things of Him are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made’ (Rom. I, 20); it is not of the absolute conceived as becoming, but of God who gives to Himself the name of ‘He who is’ (Exod. III, 14) and who ‘changeth not’ (Mal. III, 6); it is not of the absolute who has nothing of the already made, but of God of whose ‘greatness there is no end’ (Ps. CXLIV, 3), that St. Paul speaks when he utters the sublime words: ‘In Him we live, and move, and have our being.’” (Catholic University Bulletin, April, 1914, p. 323.)

finite existences, between the wisdom of the sovereign intelligence and the fixed course of the universe: while others, affected with melancholy blindness, confound the effect with the cause, the finite with the infinite, the various with the one, and re-produce in the domain of philosophy the chaos of primeval times; but all scattering and in frightful confusion, without any hope of order or union. . . . The absurd systems invented by philosophical vanity explain nothing; the system of religion, which is that also of sound philosophy, and of all mankind, explains everything."³⁶¹

We have concluded a brief survey of Scholastic philosophy: it remains to be considered whether Eucken's attack is refuted thereby.

³⁶¹ Balmes, *op. cit.*, pp. 64 sqq.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

Eucken's Attack on Scholasticism and Its Refutation

Eucken's early attitude was favorable to Scholasticism rather than the reverse. His first four articles dealing with the subject were a distinct advance upon Prantl and men of similar caliber. This was largely due, doubtless, to the influence of Teichmüller and Trendelenburg—an influence exerted in the direction of Aristotelianism—and was not far-reaching. In proportion as Eucken has developed his own irrationalistic system he has shown an increasingly bitter and hostile spirit to Scholastic philosophy. One might almost infer he realized that here, and here only, was the rock against which his inconsistent theory would go to pieces.

As has already been pointed out, Eucken has struck the note of challenge to Scholasticism, in one form or another, in a number of his works: his anti-intellectualism is, in itself, a challenge.³⁶²

We do not propose to examine into his charges in detail; the main points will be briefly dealt with. Before mentioning them, we shall cite two statements as indicative of his general attitude. In *Life of the Spirit* he writes:

"It demands men who are either senile or else spiritually immature: it cannot satisfy men who are grown up and conscious of their powers [es verlangt eine greisenhafte oder eine geistig noch unreife Menschheit, einer mündigen und kraftbewussten kann sie nicht genügen]." ³⁶³

In *Erkennen und Leben*:

"Das ergibt dann eine Scholastik, sie ist eine Gefahr aller Zeiten, nicht bloss des Mittelalters."³⁶⁴

We find in the index, "Scholasticism a permanent danger," "Scholastik, eine bleibende Gefahr."

³⁶² It may be well to point out that in treating of Scholasticism we are dealing with the system of philosophy universally recognized under that name. We do not grant that Hegel was a scholastic, much less can we agree with Professor Stanley Hall who terms him "the greatest of modern scholastics," (Stanley Hall, *Founders of Modern Psychology*, New York, 1912, p. 455). The "Intellectualism" of Hegelianism is incompatible with scholastic philosophy and Christian truth.

³⁶³ *Einführung in eine Philosophie des Geisteslebens*, op. cit., p. 80, *Life of the Spirit*, op. cit., p. 63.

³⁶⁴ *Erkennen und Leben*, op. cit., p. 109.

Such language is more akin to abuse than to argument and is wholly beneath serious criticism. In a pamphlet published eleven years before the work last cited, Eucken's tone is much milder and a fair attempt is made to prove the charges he there formulates. In *Thomas von Aquino und Kant* he writes:

"Was uns im Thomismus geboten wird, ist eine Verbindung der aristotelischen Philosophie und der kirchlich-christlichen Lehre, eine Verbindung aber gemäss der Art des Mittelalters. Ein solcher Versuch treibt den Draussenstehenden sofort zu Zweifeln und Fragen. Eignet sich die aristotelische Philosophie zur beharrenden Grundlage der Wahrheitsforschung? Ist sie, was immer ihr Wert mag, vereinbar mit der christlichen Überzeugung? Genügt die Weise, wie beide Welten von Thomas verbunden sind, den Ansprüchen, welche wir nach den Erfahrungen einer Reihe von Jahrhunderten und nach grossen geistigen Umwälzungen erheben müssen?"³⁶⁵

Boyce Gibson puts the challenge succinctly as follows:

"Whatever claim is made in support of the abiding value of this synthesis must substantiate itself by showing—(1) that the Aristotelian philosophy is still qualified to retain the old supremacy it held in the day of Thomas Aquinas as the one permanent foundation of the search after truth, and (2) that it is logically possible to unite the requirements of the old Greek philosophy with those of Christian conviction."³⁶⁶

Eucken answers both questions in the negative.³⁶⁷

Taking the second point first, we do not intend to enter upon a discussion of Eucken's arguments—with some of which we disagree—because the possibility, or otherwise, of such a *complete union* is not the question at stake. The same remark applies to the chief reason he assigns for the supposed reconciliation effected by St. Thomas. In the *Problem of Human Life* he writes:

"Following the precedent of most of the Arabic philosophers, he [St. Thomas] saw Aristotle through the medium of Neo-Platonic ideas, and understood him in a more inward and religious sense than the facts really allow."³⁶⁸

It seems to us that this is a *petitio principii*; there is no sufficient evidence for the statement. Why forget that Plato was Aristotle's

³⁶⁵ Thomas Von Aquino und Kant, Berlin, 1901, p. 25.

³⁶⁶ Op. cit., p. 78.

³⁶⁷ See Thomas Von Aquino und Kant, ein Kampf Zweier Welten, op. cit., pp. 26-39; also Geistige Strömungen der Gegenwart, op. cit., p. 58 sqq., "Die Höhe der Scholastik," etc., to "ergeben hätte."

³⁶⁸ Op. cit., p. 255. Lebensanschauung der grossen Denker, p. 247.

master? "Like master like servant" may well hold here. How could the great mind of Aristotle remain uninfluenced by Plato to the extent that his philosophy will not bear "an inward and religious meaning?"³⁶⁹

Even if this be the case the greatness of the Scholastics is accentuated thereby since, starting from Aristotle's principles, they were able to go so far beyond them. The spiritual soul, e.g., as conceived by Aristotle, lends itself to be the "fit" for the Christian idea, and the Scholastics develop on the philosophic side, independently of Revelation, what *is* really implied in Aristotle's teaching, though he may have failed to realize the full import of his own conceptions.³⁷⁰

It is not here a question of what Aristotle himself meant—not a question of what he with his limitations could draw out of his philosophic principles—but of what the more enlightened Scholastics could, and did, draw therefrom and add thereto, so as to formulate a comprehensive system, in broad outline unchangeable for all time. Is the *Aristotelico-Scholastic* philosophy (*not merely the Aristotelian*, read in the light of certain moderns—waiving the question of their correct or wrong interpretation) qualified to retain its "old supremacy" "as the one permanent foundation of the search after truth?" We are now at the first point—with the interrogation slightly modified—and we answer in scholastic fashion "Distinguo:" in fundamental principles and broad outline, "yes:"—we do not intend to defend our statement except by referring to our exposition of Scholasticism; it is its own proof—in every detail of its teaching with regard to natural science, "no." But this does not detract from the basal soundness of the system. Both St. Thomas and Albertus Magnus recognized that the scientific knowledge and beliefs³⁷¹ of their day might well be enlarged and superseded as fresh discoveries were made. The true formulators of Scholasticism were not slavish followers of Aristotle,

³⁶⁹ B. Gibson, op. cit., p. 82.

³⁷⁰ According to Eucken Aristotelianism is more akin to Judaism than it is to Christianity. (Vide Thomas Von Aquino, op. cit., p. 39.) This would bear out the position which we took up in part I, viz., that the concept of the spiritual in Greek philosophy was directly influenced by the Hebrew Religion: moreover, Aristotelianism and Judaism belong to the Old World; they deal with the same Great Spiritual Reality, but before the bright Sun of Spirituality had actually "dwelt amongst us," so that men can no longer plead ignorance.

³⁷¹ We use "scientific" here, in its restricted sense, as designating what we termed the natural sciences.

but took and rejected according to the dictates of reason and superior knowledge, with perfect freedom and independence. It is as referring to this second aspect of Scholasticism that the words of the revered Right Rev. Bishop Spalding—of which Eucken seeks to make so much³⁷²—must be understood. Eucken's criticisms betray not only a lack of appreciation of Scholasticism, but also an entire lack of comprehension of the system itself and of its leading minds. The condescension with which he pays a rather dubious tribute to the master genius of St. Thomas is amusing.³⁷³

In a critique in the Dublin Review we read:

"Why, . . . should Neo-Thomism be styled unhistorical? Why should we be told that 'while Thomas Aquinas was not a thinker of the first rank, he was no insignificant mind and no fanatic'? Such statements leave us musing."³⁷⁴

We shall close our defense by a critique of the challenger:

"We find it very difficult to follow Professor Eucken when he is expounding his own philosophy. When we are told for instance that the individual 'must take possession of the infinite' and 'assert it,' we are left wondering how it could possibly be done. We have indeed some conception of what he means by 'activism' and some vague thought of 'the spiritual life.' But the *Professor is really not a philosopher*: he is a 'seer' who uses words in strange meanings, and who feels himself charged with some great message for humanity. He is, in fact, like our Carlyle in many ways, in feeling that he bears within himself a message of regeneration, and above all, in the vehemence and perplexing obscurity of his utterances."³⁷⁵

³⁷² Thomas Von Aquino und Kant, op. cit., p. 40.

³⁷³ Problem of Human Life, op. cit., p. 254. [Lebensanschauung der g. Denker, p. 246.] See also Thomas Von Aquino und Kant, op. cit., pp. 26 sqq.

³⁷⁴ Dublin Review, Vol. 155, July, 1914, p. 215. Probably Eucken intended the second statement to be an answer to Prantl who calls St. Thomas "einen Schwachkopf" (Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, Bd III, S. 2, u. 107). In the same critique the subjectivism of the *Problem of Human Life* is thus referred to: "There is no research-work to be found in the volume, and the personal factor looms large in all the interpretations" (p. 214).

³⁷⁵ Dublin Review, op. cit., pp. 213 sqq. Italics ours.

CONCLUSION

In the foregoing inquiry into Rudolf Eucken's philosophy we have confined ourselves, in the main, to an examination of his concept of spiritual life, and to his theory of knowledge. We have sought to show that the one is an inconceivability, and the other an impossibility. In our exposition of Scholasticism we believe we have shown that the system is consistent in its principles, intelligible in its concepts, and in harmony with the universally recognized signification of the term "spiritual" as opposed *in toto* to matter: we have shown further that, in its general principles and broad outline, it is the only permanent foundation of the search after truth.

FINAL NOTE

There are several other important aspects of *Activism* which call for criticism, but the task does not fall within the limits of this dissertation. We shall, therefore, point them out briefly, leaving the detailed refutation to others.

1. Eucken confuses the relations of Art and Morality in a serious degree, insisting that there exists an *essential* relation between them. In *Geistige Strömungen* he writes:

“Das Angewiesensein von Kunst und Moral aufeinander wird namentlich da zu voller Anerkennung gelangen, wo unsere Welt nicht als eine fertig abgeschlossene, sondern als eine erst im Werden befindliche, ja als eine solche gilt, in der nicht nur Vorhandenes auszubauen, sondern eine neue Stufe der Wirklichkeit zu erreichen ist. . . . Aber zugleich bedarf es eines kräftigen und glücklichen künstlerischen Bildens, wenn die neue Welt uns nicht in vagem Umriss verbleiben, und wenn sie das Ganze unserer Seele gewinnen soll; auch *die Kunst ist eine unentbehrliche Helferin zum Aufbau eines neuen Lebens.*”³⁷⁷

In *Life of the Spirit*, he writes:

“Further, without the creative activity of art there can be no successful construction of an independent spiritual world in the human sphere, for this construction involves the severance of the subject from the confused initial situation and a creative effort in contradistinction to it.”³⁷⁸

Various statements in the same spirit are scattered through his writings: the *Problem of Human Life* in particular, may be consulted on the point. We maintain that art may be an aid to morality both by presenting moral ideas in a concrete form, and by raising man's aspirations from the sensuous to the intellectual or the religious, but Eucken himself has shown how often art lowers rather than raises the moral standard;³⁷⁹ it cannot then be indispensable to morality. Moreover to assert an essential connection is to ignore the peculiar character of spiritual activity which manifests itself in conscience.

A study of Eucken's distinctively ethical works throws light on the mental attitude which causes the confusion; in *Können wir noch Christen sein?* he writes:

“Die Zeit liegt hinter uns wo alle Bestreitung des Christentums

³⁷⁷ Op. cit., pp. 335 sqq. Italics ours. (Main Currents, p. 400.)

³⁷⁸ Pp. 264 sqq., op. cit. (Einführung in eine Phil. des G., p. 126.)

³⁷⁹ See *Geistige Strömungen*, pp. 329-342.

an der Tatsache der christlichen Moral wie an einem unerschütterlichen Felsen scheiterte, wir sahen die Neuzeit sowohl gegen die eigentümliche Fassung als gegen die herrschende Stellung, welche die Moral im Christentum erhält, härteste Angriffe richten."³⁸⁰

Eucken evidently thinks the attacks in part merited. In *Present Day Ethics* we find:

"Owing to the closer connection between man's endeavor and his environment and to the accentuation of the struggle for existence, this kind of morality appears too mild, too soft, too subjective, and there is often a desire for a sterner and more virile kind. Religious ethics does not seem to have sufficient latitude to transform the whole of life. We can therefore understand the wide spread desire for something which can sufficiently supplement religious ethics."³⁸¹

We cite again from the Dublin Review:

"Of what religious morality can the Professor be thinking? Surely not of the Christian code, seeing that nothing less soft or more manly has ever been suggested. Was there anything soft or unmanly in the actions or ethical principles of St. Paul, St. Jerome, St. Athanasius, St. Ignatius, . . . St. Thomas à Becket?"³⁸²

Eucken's views of morality cannot be accepted *in toto* by a Christian: as usual he is vague in matters of detail but he can hardly be considered a firm upholder of the Decalogue. The exponent of Activism and kindred spirits may lead strictly moral lives in spite of the vagueness of their moral code, but the danger of spreading such teachings among the masses is self-evident. We have little hesitation in saying that these latter will trouble little about a Spiritual Life to obtain which they should enter upon a "seemingly impossible struggle;" rather will they avail themselves of the suggested "latitude" in a somewhat wider manner than the philosopher intended.

2. Eucken's subjectivism in treating of History and of historical personages is almost incredible in one who professes to believe in abiding truth. In the conception of an "historical fact" he out-pragmatizes the pragmatists.³⁸³

³⁸⁰ Können wir noch Christen sein? Recht und Erneuerungs-fähigkeit des Christentums, 4, p. 175.

³⁸¹ *Present Day Ethics*, translated by M. Legdewitz [Seydewitz?], New York, 1913, pp. 21 sqq.

³⁸² *Op. cit.*

³⁸³ See *Prolegomena zu Forschungen über die Einheit des Geisteslebens—Darlegung des eigenen Verfahrens*, especially, p. 42. Cf. R. Eucken's *Phil. of Life*, by Boyce Gibson, *op. cit.*, pp. 41 sqq.

3. His attacks on the Catholic Church are unworthy of one who has been described as "a profound German thinker:" indeed they are unworthy of any one who has the reputation of being enlightened or just. Dom Feuling seems to us a very lenient critic when he writes:

"It is true, there occur in his works, down to the last editions, passages of scornful criticism on Christian and Catholic doctrines whose sense and importance he is far from understanding. But he endeavors throughout, and in most cases succeeds, to be fair and to abstain from methods of dispute which are as little scientific, as they are apt to invite to serious controversy."³⁸⁴

With this point we may take the confidence of his assertions on matters of which he has no real knowledge, and his perfect assurance of the necessity of adopting his particular views and philosophical methods.³⁸⁵

Indeed, he cannot claim to have followed "his own teaching" as set forth in the following passage from one of his early works. "It is especially necessary that we do not fabricate dogmatically a self-sufficiency in our own range of thought, or faith in the all-sufficiency of our own principles."³⁸⁶ In this connection too we may notice his harsh treatment of St. Augustine. The encomiums he bestows on him and the admiration he professes for him cannot atone for his failure to recognize the fact of St. Augustine's conversion as an event which transformed his life, so that an analysis of his character *after* that conversion must necessarily differ from an appreciation preceding it. Moreover, following Luther, he attributes to St. Augustine doctrines the *precise opposite* of what he taught.³⁸⁷ We may add here, too, that Eucken's statement that no thinker, today, holds the same views on religion as were formerly held, is so gratuitous and untrue as to be undeserving of attention.

³⁸⁴ Dom. D. Feuling, O.S.B. R. Eucken's Philosophy, Dublin Review, op. cit., p. 77.

³⁸⁵ See, e. g., Life of the Spirit, Problem of Truth, pp. 275-333. [Einführung in eine Phil. des G., pp. 131-159.] Having criticised the Historical Standard, Protestantism, various philosophical systems, Tradition and the Catholic Church, he decides that none of them can solve the truth-problem. He forthwith unfolds his own system as the *only means* of reaching truth.

³⁸⁶ Fundamental Concepts of Modern Phil. Thought, p. 304. New York, 1880. [Grundbegriffe der Gegenwart, Leipzig, 1878, p. 264.]

³⁸⁷ See Prob. of Human Life., op. cit., 211 sqq. [Lebensanschauung der grossen Denker, pp. 207 sqq.] and for St. Augustine's teaching consult City of God.

4. Finally Eucken cannot consistently speak of the truth of Christianity—even of the “Eternal” in Christianity—and avail himself, at will, of its ethical treasures while denying the Divinity of Our Saviour. Nothing was more clearly taught by Christ than that He was the Son of God. On this very charge the High-Priest condemned Him.

“And the high-priest said to Him: I adjure thee by the living God, that thou tell us if thou be the Christ the Son of God.

“Jesus saith to him: Thou hast said *it*. Nevertheless I say to you, hereafter you shall see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of the power of God, and coming in the clouds of heaven. Then the high-priest rent his garments, saying: He hath blasphemed, what further need have we of witnesses? Behold now you have heard the blasphemy: What think you? But they answering said: He is guilty of death.”³⁸⁸

Will Eucken revere One Whose veracity he doubts? Here in concluding we again confront Eucken with an inevitable Entweder-Oder: *Either* acknowledge the Divinity of Christ, *or* renounce the ethical wealth which you have borrowed from Him, and which, alone, constitutes the worth of your system.

³⁸⁸ Matthew, Chap. XXVI, Verses 63-67.

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BIOGRAPHY

The author of this dissertation was born April 16, 1881, in Cork, Ireland. She attended the Preparatory Department, High School and College of the Ursuline nuns, St. Angela's, Cork. While there she went through the four years Intermediate Examinations for Secondary Schools, under the control of the Board of Education. Among the subjects elected by the candidate each year were French, German and Latin. She also obtained certificates in Science and Mathematics from South Kensington, England. In 1899 she passed the Matriculation examination of the Royal (now the National) University of Ireland, Dublin, taking the Honor Courses in English and French. She passed the First and the Second of Arts of the same University during the two following years, electing the Honor Courses in English, French and Logic. In October, 1901, she went to the convent of the Religious of Christian Education, Farnborough, England, where she remained for nearly three years teaching and continuing her personal work. While there she studied Latin under Professor C. A. Brown (B.A. Cambridge), and followed courses in Pedagogy by the Directress of the High School, and in Sacred Scripture and Introductory Philosophy by Dom A. Gatard, O.S.B., Benedictine Abbey, Farnborough. In 1904 she obtained the certificate of recognized teacher for Secondary Education from the London Board of Education, and having been registered as postulant of the Order, returned to Ireland early in the same year where she completed the work for B.A. and studied for the M.A. degree. She obtained her degree in Moral and Mental Science and Latin, at the Royal University of Ireland, Dublin, in 1905, having studied Latin under Professor J. Hollins, M.A., R.U.I., and Dr. Osborne Bergin (Prof. Nat. Univ.); and philosophy under Miss F. Vaughan M.A., R.U.I., and Professor P. Malone, M.A., R.U.I. She was, for a short time, assistant Professor of Latin at the Ursuline College, Cork. In January, 1906, she went again to England as Professor of English and History—for one term at the Pupil-Teachers' Centre of the "Dames de St. Maur," Wolverhampton, and for one term at the boarding school of the same Order, Weybridge, Surrey. While in England she prepared students for the Oxford Junior and Senior, and the Cambridge Higher Local

Examinations. In September, 1906, she went to the Novitiate of the Religious of Christian Education, Tournai, Belgium. Being professed in 1908 she returned for a brief period to Farnborough, then left for the American foundation of the Order in Asheville, N. C. Here she taught Latin and Mathematics in the Academy, and became professor of philosophy in the College of St. Genevieve's on its establishment. In 1912 she attended the Sister's Summer School of the Catholic University, Washington, D. C., and registered for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. September, 1913, to October, 1914, she spent in residence at the Sisters' College of the University. The courses she followed at the University are: Latin under Rev. T. McGourty; Greek under Rev. Hoey and Dr. J. B. O'Connor; History of Philosophy under Rev. Dr. W. Turner; Psychology under Rev. Dr. E. A. Pace; Philosophy under Rev. Dr. T. V. Moore and Rev. Dr. E. A. Pace.

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